The story of the Sino-Soviet eternal friendship continues with the tale of the Korean War.
…A single China was a great threat to Soviet security in Asia. Comrade Stalin made two attempts to remedy the situation, but both failed.
Number one was to assassinate Chairman Mao on the sidelines of his friendly visit to Moscow in 1949-1950 to celebrate Stalin’s seventieth birthday. But alas, Comrade Stalin was already too old, and Chairman Mao, too smart, for the plot to succeed.
Number two presented itself during the above-mentioned birthday bash, when the young and reckless leader of North Korea, Comrade Kim Il-sung, suddenly started openly boasting to Stalin about his intent to liberate South Korea from her capitalist oppressors, for the purpose of immediate reunification. It was a dangerous piece of lunacy for anybody to swallow, and a stern rebuke from Stalin was expected by the witnesses at the scene, but Stalin quite unexpectedly encouraged Kim’s idiotic adventure, visualizing it, as it turned out, as a brilliant ploy to revive the original Soviet plan of two Chinas.
His Byzantine design was to prod the Chinese into supporting North Korea, hoping that the United States would rush to get involved on the side of South Korea, using this opportunity to fight Communist China, in order to resurrect Chiang Kai-shek. America would then invade South China and restore Chiang to power there, but before they could reach the North, Stalin would say “Stop!” and support Mao’s rule in Northern China.
In this rather convoluted scenario, Kuomintang China (and not Russia!) would once again become Mao’s main adversary, while Russia would become the indispensable big brother. As for the Koreans, Stalin was convinced that the existing North-South split was giving America legitimacy to keep military presence in the South anyway, as a “security guarantee,” whereas Korean reunification had a far better chance of resulting in the American troop withdrawal. For this reason, he favored reunification! (See my entry Secret History Of The Iron Curtain, for exactly the same kind of logic.)
The actual course of the 1950-1953 Korean War is now a matter of public record. On June 25, 1950, Kim Il-sung invades South Korea, and on June 28 captures her capital Seoul. In the meantime, the UN calls for international help in assisting South Korea, and on June 27 President Truman orders the American troops in the area to interfere in the Korean conflict. Under the flag of the United Nations and the able command of General Douglas MacArthur, US forces recapture Seoul on September 17, and then, on October 19, 1950, seize the capital of North Korea Pyongyang. Next, prodded by the Russians, the thoroughly unenthusiastic Mao sends the Chinese Army into North Korea, at the end of October, forcing MacArthur into a temporary retreat from the North. On December 5, 1950, Pyongyang is in Chinese hands, and then Seoul falls again on January 4, 1951, to be recaptured once again by the American/UN forces on March 14, 1951.
So far so good, and in full harmony with Stalin’s plan, MacArthur asks for the authorization to attack Red China, and in order to emphasize the military necessity of this move, he makes his request and the reasoning behind it public. What follows is a lethal blow to Comrade Stalin’s grand design. President Truman relieves MacArthur of his duties, and instead of rolling into China, the war itself fizzles out.
Why did President Truman stop short of the most natural move under the circumstances? Stalin explained it by the fact that the Americans were by no means as naïve as their rabid anti-Communist rhetoric might have suggested. Washington’s refusal to punish Mao with the help of Chiang, told Stalin that the United States had developed a Realpolitik stance toward the balance of power in Asia and was by no means fooled by its own phony term Sino-Soviet Bloc. He never bought the official explanation that there had to be an actual fear of the Korean War escalating into a World War III and expanding into the atomic dimension.
At any rate, President Truman explained the American strategy in the Korean War in the simplest and best terms when he shockingly called it a “police action.” Whether or not he was really on to Stalin’s plan, does not matter that much. The history lesson here is that his common sense prevailed, whereas Stalin’s plan was thereby thwarted… A note to the wise of today… although, are there any wise left in Washington these days of false ideologies and self-defeating agendas, I wonder?
…A single China was a great threat to Soviet security in Asia. Comrade Stalin made two attempts to remedy the situation, but both failed.
Number one was to assassinate Chairman Mao on the sidelines of his friendly visit to Moscow in 1949-1950 to celebrate Stalin’s seventieth birthday. But alas, Comrade Stalin was already too old, and Chairman Mao, too smart, for the plot to succeed.
Number two presented itself during the above-mentioned birthday bash, when the young and reckless leader of North Korea, Comrade Kim Il-sung, suddenly started openly boasting to Stalin about his intent to liberate South Korea from her capitalist oppressors, for the purpose of immediate reunification. It was a dangerous piece of lunacy for anybody to swallow, and a stern rebuke from Stalin was expected by the witnesses at the scene, but Stalin quite unexpectedly encouraged Kim’s idiotic adventure, visualizing it, as it turned out, as a brilliant ploy to revive the original Soviet plan of two Chinas.
His Byzantine design was to prod the Chinese into supporting North Korea, hoping that the United States would rush to get involved on the side of South Korea, using this opportunity to fight Communist China, in order to resurrect Chiang Kai-shek. America would then invade South China and restore Chiang to power there, but before they could reach the North, Stalin would say “Stop!” and support Mao’s rule in Northern China.
In this rather convoluted scenario, Kuomintang China (and not Russia!) would once again become Mao’s main adversary, while Russia would become the indispensable big brother. As for the Koreans, Stalin was convinced that the existing North-South split was giving America legitimacy to keep military presence in the South anyway, as a “security guarantee,” whereas Korean reunification had a far better chance of resulting in the American troop withdrawal. For this reason, he favored reunification! (See my entry Secret History Of The Iron Curtain, for exactly the same kind of logic.)
The actual course of the 1950-1953 Korean War is now a matter of public record. On June 25, 1950, Kim Il-sung invades South Korea, and on June 28 captures her capital Seoul. In the meantime, the UN calls for international help in assisting South Korea, and on June 27 President Truman orders the American troops in the area to interfere in the Korean conflict. Under the flag of the United Nations and the able command of General Douglas MacArthur, US forces recapture Seoul on September 17, and then, on October 19, 1950, seize the capital of North Korea Pyongyang. Next, prodded by the Russians, the thoroughly unenthusiastic Mao sends the Chinese Army into North Korea, at the end of October, forcing MacArthur into a temporary retreat from the North. On December 5, 1950, Pyongyang is in Chinese hands, and then Seoul falls again on January 4, 1951, to be recaptured once again by the American/UN forces on March 14, 1951.
So far so good, and in full harmony with Stalin’s plan, MacArthur asks for the authorization to attack Red China, and in order to emphasize the military necessity of this move, he makes his request and the reasoning behind it public. What follows is a lethal blow to Comrade Stalin’s grand design. President Truman relieves MacArthur of his duties, and instead of rolling into China, the war itself fizzles out.
Why did President Truman stop short of the most natural move under the circumstances? Stalin explained it by the fact that the Americans were by no means as naïve as their rabid anti-Communist rhetoric might have suggested. Washington’s refusal to punish Mao with the help of Chiang, told Stalin that the United States had developed a Realpolitik stance toward the balance of power in Asia and was by no means fooled by its own phony term Sino-Soviet Bloc. He never bought the official explanation that there had to be an actual fear of the Korean War escalating into a World War III and expanding into the atomic dimension.
At any rate, President Truman explained the American strategy in the Korean War in the simplest and best terms when he shockingly called it a “police action.” Whether or not he was really on to Stalin’s plan, does not matter that much. The history lesson here is that his common sense prevailed, whereas Stalin’s plan was thereby thwarted… A note to the wise of today… although, are there any wise left in Washington these days of false ideologies and self-defeating agendas, I wonder?
No comments:
Post a Comment