On the first day of 1959, a rather insignificant event, from the Soviet standpoint, took place far away, in the Western Hemisphere: yet another Latin-American dictator bit the dust, on the island of Cuba.
So what? The Russians were always joking that in Latin America no captain deserved a promotion to major unless he had conducted a successful coup d'état. Yet, the ouster of Fulgencio Batista would unexpectedly precipitate an utterly bizarre Cold War adventure that would deeply involve my father, and have a profound effect on the lives and thoughts of every American family, and, although far less significant to the ordinary Russians at home, would be absolutely devastating to Russia’s image abroad.
Strategically Cuba was not worth one iota of Soviet attention. Contrary to conventional Cold War wisdom, Moscow did not harbor any political aspirations in that part of the world. As the Soviet strategists used to banter, they wholeheartedly supported the Monroe Doctrine in its improved, Moscow rendition: “America for the Americans, and Eurasia for the Eurasians.” Indeed, the day when the American troops left Europe for good, would be a dream come true for Soviet foreign policy.
So, no Russian in his own mind would want to mess with the Americans in their own back yard. Moscow followed the movements of Latin-American revolutionary zealots, like “Ché” Guevara, with a wary eye. Although publicly unable to dissociate from these troublemakers completely, the Russians, privately, tried to keep them at a good distance, making sure that this attitude was known in Washington.
What made the new Cuban dictator Fidel Castro somewhat different from other Latin-American dictators was his brother Raúl, a remarkably shrewd political opportunist, who claimed to be a Communist. Unlike “Comrade Ché” (a delightful tautology!) there was not one drop of lunacy in Raúl’s blood. His goal in life was very much down-to-earth: he wanted to play in major leagues. While his brother Fidel played the rebel-desperado, waging his relentless war against Batista, Raúl was weighing his options, and putting out feelers. What can Raúl do for Moscow? Look at him, he is not insane like the rest of them. He can be useful!
Moscow appreciated Raúl’s cool head and political astuteness. Alas, there were too few Communists like him in the countries which mattered. Those claimed to have “convictions,” and always tried to shove them down Moscow’s throat. But Moscow hated Communists with convictions. It only needed “bright” soldiers, who knew what was good for them, who would come, like Raúl, and ask their Soviet Comrades, “What can I do for you?”
So, if Raúl wanted to come and live in a nice apartment in Moscow, welcome. They would surely find ways for Raúl to be helpful there. But not in Cuba, ninety miles off the coast of Florida, not as a pesky mosquito on Uncle Sam’s nose. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes, sort of.
Raúl remained undaunted by the cold shower: he knew that, with a brother like his, sooner or later, his time was bound to come.
Unlike Raúl, Fidel Castro was a revolutionary maverick, far less at home with the subtleties of politics. He was once called a fascist, and was said to have admired Hitler. In his early moment of triumph, he had no interest in Moscow whatsoever. All his politics were necessarily local. As Raúl would later explain to my father, Fidel had initially expected a quick round of negotiations with the United States, followed by the official recognition of his regime. However, as time went by and that recognition had for some reason not been forthcoming, adversely affecting Cuban business, Fidel was beginning to get very mad.
At last, exasperated, he turned to his brother Raúl: You talk to the Russians. Ask them if they are going to support me, should I retaliate against the Americans. Let’s negotiate.
Now that Raúl Castro’s little island was becoming somewhat more important to Moscow, than before, the ever impulsive Khrushchev remembered that Artem could speak Spanish, and decided to put him on this case. Thus, starting on a luxurious transatlantic pleasure cruise, a string of remarkable tête-à-têtes was conducted between Fidel’s Communist brother Raúl, and my father, who had reluctantly relinquished his habitual General’s uniform, for civilian clothes, to rise to that particular occasion.
Concerning Khrushchev’s decision to take Castro seriously, Artem was convinced that the idea of using Cuba as a bargaining chip against the United States may have visited him in some inchoate form already at this early date. Khrushchev himself, however, privately explained that his special interest in Fidel had a far more mystical origin. As soon as Uncle Nikita found out that the brothers’ full name was Castro Ruz, he allegedly felt the hand of destiny. In Russian, the name Ruz is pronounced very much like Rus, the historical name of Russia, loaded with great meaning, deep in the Russian psyche. So, here was your vintage Khrushchev!
But whatever it was, Cuba suddenly loomed large, and Raúl Castro Ruz’s wish to play in major leagues was in the process of being fulfilled.
Artem made no effort to encourage Raúl’s ambitions. Instead, he delivered to Raúl Moscow’s prepackaged message: Let Fidel retaliate against the Americans in any which way he pleases, and he can always count on Soviet support at the United Nations, as long as he agrees not to associate himself with Communism in any shape or form.
Raúl was quick to understand the hidden message. In order for Moscow to start taking the Castro regime in Cuba seriously enough to support it, openly and directly, thus risking grave political complications with the United States, it must be given an absolutely compelling reason to do so.
…A satisfactory history of the Cuban Triangle, that is, of the trilateral relationship of the Castro regime and of the two superpowers, is yet to be written. But one thing stands out for sure. The Soviets found in Fidel an unusually tough customer. Although in the summer of 1959 Fidel ousted his Western-style liberal President Manuel Urrutia for his failure to lure the United States, his new appointment of the prominent Cuban lawyer Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado as President didn’t make Moscow particularly happy. As Raúl would explain this choice, Fidel’s old loyalty to the man, who had been helping him with money in the past, when he needed it, could not be shaken now that he didn’t.
Khrushchev deserves some credit for instantly becoming rather fond of the gutsy Barbudo Fidel, whose robust physique Uncle Nikita especially admired. In late 1959, Khrushchev arranged a visit to Cuba by Anastas Mikoyan (whom my readers may well remember from my earlier entries), to meet with Fidel personally. Not without reason, Khrushchev considered Mikoyan a grand wizard of diplomatic arts, and sending this player to Cuba was an indication of Fidel’s rapidly surging stock. My father’s own odd relationship with Raúl Castro was, consequently, marked down from the lead to the supporting cast.
Mikoyan’s first trip to Cuba in February 1960 was certainly an unusual event, in the absence of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana. It was also an affront to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Khrushchev chose to ignore him, even though Gromyko was the most knowledgeable man about Cuba in the whole Soviet leadership, having been Ambassador to Cuba in the 1940’s, while also Ambassador to the United States.
Only after Comrade Mikoyan had “straightened out Fidel’s brains” (that Fidel could not play it both ways forever), were diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana finally reestablished. It happened in May 1960, after eight years of severance, and more than sixteen months into Castro’s revolutionary regime. But, as they say, better late than never. With Moscow pushing harder and harder, and Washington continuing to treat him with undisguised hostility, Fidel finally made the right move: He nationalized. In other words, he seized American property in Cuba, as well as the property of the other foreigners, and of rich Cubans living in the United States, and declared it public property.
The expropriated community cried foul, and, in the absence of a direct military intervention by the United States, organized, in April 1961, their own Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, which infamously flopped.
After this attempt to overthrow his regime, Fidel Castro became genuinely concerned. The Bay of Pigs invasion might well be repeated with an active involvement this time of the US military. In that case, his regime would certainly be toppled. He badly needed Soviet help, and he rushed to declare himself a longtime Communist, and the Cuban Revolution, a “socialist revolution.” He went so far as to repeat his declaration several times in a row, assuming that the more the Russians heard him declare it, the better they would be satisfied. Raúl, always the cynic, was now warning that his brother’s words were cheap. Even though Fidel had agreed to unify several existing political groups into his own version of a one-party system in Cuba, he would never agree to make the next step of resurrecting the name and the symbolism of the long-abolished Communist Party of Cuba, founded back in the 1920’s. He explained that Fidel had a soft spot for his 26th of July Movement Party, and would never allow this sentimentally loaded name to be retired. (He was of course mistaken on this account: after a series of name changes, Fidel's Party became the Communist Party in 1965.)
But by now the Soviet-Cuban relations had progressed so unexpectedly far, and so quickly, that such small potatoes as the name of Fidel’s Party did not matter. After all, the Germans had a Unified Socialist Party, the Poles had a United Workers’ Party, and so on. They did not need to be called Communists, as long as they were all toeing the line.
But somehow few people in Moscow chose to believe that Fidel would ever be capable of toeing the line. It was a general consensus that the charismatic barbudo intended to use the Soviet superpower connection to his utmost advantage, but was not at all eager to be used.
...To be continued in the next entry The Cuban Missile Crisis.
So what? The Russians were always joking that in Latin America no captain deserved a promotion to major unless he had conducted a successful coup d'état. Yet, the ouster of Fulgencio Batista would unexpectedly precipitate an utterly bizarre Cold War adventure that would deeply involve my father, and have a profound effect on the lives and thoughts of every American family, and, although far less significant to the ordinary Russians at home, would be absolutely devastating to Russia’s image abroad.
Strategically Cuba was not worth one iota of Soviet attention. Contrary to conventional Cold War wisdom, Moscow did not harbor any political aspirations in that part of the world. As the Soviet strategists used to banter, they wholeheartedly supported the Monroe Doctrine in its improved, Moscow rendition: “America for the Americans, and Eurasia for the Eurasians.” Indeed, the day when the American troops left Europe for good, would be a dream come true for Soviet foreign policy.
So, no Russian in his own mind would want to mess with the Americans in their own back yard. Moscow followed the movements of Latin-American revolutionary zealots, like “Ché” Guevara, with a wary eye. Although publicly unable to dissociate from these troublemakers completely, the Russians, privately, tried to keep them at a good distance, making sure that this attitude was known in Washington.
What made the new Cuban dictator Fidel Castro somewhat different from other Latin-American dictators was his brother Raúl, a remarkably shrewd political opportunist, who claimed to be a Communist. Unlike “Comrade Ché” (a delightful tautology!) there was not one drop of lunacy in Raúl’s blood. His goal in life was very much down-to-earth: he wanted to play in major leagues. While his brother Fidel played the rebel-desperado, waging his relentless war against Batista, Raúl was weighing his options, and putting out feelers. What can Raúl do for Moscow? Look at him, he is not insane like the rest of them. He can be useful!
Moscow appreciated Raúl’s cool head and political astuteness. Alas, there were too few Communists like him in the countries which mattered. Those claimed to have “convictions,” and always tried to shove them down Moscow’s throat. But Moscow hated Communists with convictions. It only needed “bright” soldiers, who knew what was good for them, who would come, like Raúl, and ask their Soviet Comrades, “What can I do for you?”
So, if Raúl wanted to come and live in a nice apartment in Moscow, welcome. They would surely find ways for Raúl to be helpful there. But not in Cuba, ninety miles off the coast of Florida, not as a pesky mosquito on Uncle Sam’s nose. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes, sort of.
Raúl remained undaunted by the cold shower: he knew that, with a brother like his, sooner or later, his time was bound to come.
Unlike Raúl, Fidel Castro was a revolutionary maverick, far less at home with the subtleties of politics. He was once called a fascist, and was said to have admired Hitler. In his early moment of triumph, he had no interest in Moscow whatsoever. All his politics were necessarily local. As Raúl would later explain to my father, Fidel had initially expected a quick round of negotiations with the United States, followed by the official recognition of his regime. However, as time went by and that recognition had for some reason not been forthcoming, adversely affecting Cuban business, Fidel was beginning to get very mad.
At last, exasperated, he turned to his brother Raúl: You talk to the Russians. Ask them if they are going to support me, should I retaliate against the Americans. Let’s negotiate.
Now that Raúl Castro’s little island was becoming somewhat more important to Moscow, than before, the ever impulsive Khrushchev remembered that Artem could speak Spanish, and decided to put him on this case. Thus, starting on a luxurious transatlantic pleasure cruise, a string of remarkable tête-à-têtes was conducted between Fidel’s Communist brother Raúl, and my father, who had reluctantly relinquished his habitual General’s uniform, for civilian clothes, to rise to that particular occasion.
Concerning Khrushchev’s decision to take Castro seriously, Artem was convinced that the idea of using Cuba as a bargaining chip against the United States may have visited him in some inchoate form already at this early date. Khrushchev himself, however, privately explained that his special interest in Fidel had a far more mystical origin. As soon as Uncle Nikita found out that the brothers’ full name was Castro Ruz, he allegedly felt the hand of destiny. In Russian, the name Ruz is pronounced very much like Rus, the historical name of Russia, loaded with great meaning, deep in the Russian psyche. So, here was your vintage Khrushchev!
But whatever it was, Cuba suddenly loomed large, and Raúl Castro Ruz’s wish to play in major leagues was in the process of being fulfilled.
Artem made no effort to encourage Raúl’s ambitions. Instead, he delivered to Raúl Moscow’s prepackaged message: Let Fidel retaliate against the Americans in any which way he pleases, and he can always count on Soviet support at the United Nations, as long as he agrees not to associate himself with Communism in any shape or form.
Raúl was quick to understand the hidden message. In order for Moscow to start taking the Castro regime in Cuba seriously enough to support it, openly and directly, thus risking grave political complications with the United States, it must be given an absolutely compelling reason to do so.
…A satisfactory history of the Cuban Triangle, that is, of the trilateral relationship of the Castro regime and of the two superpowers, is yet to be written. But one thing stands out for sure. The Soviets found in Fidel an unusually tough customer. Although in the summer of 1959 Fidel ousted his Western-style liberal President Manuel Urrutia for his failure to lure the United States, his new appointment of the prominent Cuban lawyer Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado as President didn’t make Moscow particularly happy. As Raúl would explain this choice, Fidel’s old loyalty to the man, who had been helping him with money in the past, when he needed it, could not be shaken now that he didn’t.
Khrushchev deserves some credit for instantly becoming rather fond of the gutsy Barbudo Fidel, whose robust physique Uncle Nikita especially admired. In late 1959, Khrushchev arranged a visit to Cuba by Anastas Mikoyan (whom my readers may well remember from my earlier entries), to meet with Fidel personally. Not without reason, Khrushchev considered Mikoyan a grand wizard of diplomatic arts, and sending this player to Cuba was an indication of Fidel’s rapidly surging stock. My father’s own odd relationship with Raúl Castro was, consequently, marked down from the lead to the supporting cast.
Mikoyan’s first trip to Cuba in February 1960 was certainly an unusual event, in the absence of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana. It was also an affront to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Khrushchev chose to ignore him, even though Gromyko was the most knowledgeable man about Cuba in the whole Soviet leadership, having been Ambassador to Cuba in the 1940’s, while also Ambassador to the United States.
Only after Comrade Mikoyan had “straightened out Fidel’s brains” (that Fidel could not play it both ways forever), were diplomatic relations between Moscow and Havana finally reestablished. It happened in May 1960, after eight years of severance, and more than sixteen months into Castro’s revolutionary regime. But, as they say, better late than never. With Moscow pushing harder and harder, and Washington continuing to treat him with undisguised hostility, Fidel finally made the right move: He nationalized. In other words, he seized American property in Cuba, as well as the property of the other foreigners, and of rich Cubans living in the United States, and declared it public property.
The expropriated community cried foul, and, in the absence of a direct military intervention by the United States, organized, in April 1961, their own Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, which infamously flopped.
After this attempt to overthrow his regime, Fidel Castro became genuinely concerned. The Bay of Pigs invasion might well be repeated with an active involvement this time of the US military. In that case, his regime would certainly be toppled. He badly needed Soviet help, and he rushed to declare himself a longtime Communist, and the Cuban Revolution, a “socialist revolution.” He went so far as to repeat his declaration several times in a row, assuming that the more the Russians heard him declare it, the better they would be satisfied. Raúl, always the cynic, was now warning that his brother’s words were cheap. Even though Fidel had agreed to unify several existing political groups into his own version of a one-party system in Cuba, he would never agree to make the next step of resurrecting the name and the symbolism of the long-abolished Communist Party of Cuba, founded back in the 1920’s. He explained that Fidel had a soft spot for his 26th of July Movement Party, and would never allow this sentimentally loaded name to be retired. (He was of course mistaken on this account: after a series of name changes, Fidel's Party became the Communist Party in 1965.)
But by now the Soviet-Cuban relations had progressed so unexpectedly far, and so quickly, that such small potatoes as the name of Fidel’s Party did not matter. After all, the Germans had a Unified Socialist Party, the Poles had a United Workers’ Party, and so on. They did not need to be called Communists, as long as they were all toeing the line.
But somehow few people in Moscow chose to believe that Fidel would ever be capable of toeing the line. It was a general consensus that the charismatic barbudo intended to use the Soviet superpower connection to his utmost advantage, but was not at all eager to be used.
...To be continued in the next entry The Cuban Missile Crisis.
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