Although most citizens of free nations, even those who have read Hobbes, must ardently disagree with this pronouncement, both free and totalitarian societies are products of a social contract. While enough proof of this outrageous declaration, by circumstantial evidence, can be gathered from a multitude of entries generously sprinkled throughout this and other sections of my book, I am not too anxious to try to prove anything in this instance, because in cases like this, no matter how well one may argue his point, emotion will always trump logic, reason, or even a whole Harvard Law School of Devil’s Advocates.
Therefore, I simply and declaratively pronounce that Hobbes’s “great Leviathan, or rather that mortal god, to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defense” (Leviathan, Chapter XVII), the one, of course, born out of the free will of a free people, rather than out of the fear and necessity of the conquered, submitting to the power of the conqueror, contains in its character no indication of a particular inclination toward “representative democracy,” in our modern Western sense of the word.
My “agenda” here is not to promote some legitimate alternative to the Western-style democracy but only to clarify the reality of such alternatives under Hobbes’s own understanding of a social contract, or covenant. Read this:
“This is more than consent, it is a real unity (or “totality” in my description) of them all in one person made by covenant in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man or assembly on the condition that you likewise give up your right to him and authorize his actions... This done, the multitude so united is called a Commonwealth; or, in Latin, Civitas.” (Ibid.)
There is too much public fervor in the act of covenanting, as described by Hobbes, compared to the anemic acquiescence, indifference, and outright non-participation of the majority (not to be confused with the zeal of an enthusiastic, but preventively brainwashed, minorities of social activists) in our fêted “representative democracies.” This genuine total participation does not necessarily point to a totalitarian social order, but clearly indicates the presence of a strong element of the totalitarian ideal in all politically active societies.
Therefore, I simply and declaratively pronounce that Hobbes’s “great Leviathan, or rather that mortal god, to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defense” (Leviathan, Chapter XVII), the one, of course, born out of the free will of a free people, rather than out of the fear and necessity of the conquered, submitting to the power of the conqueror, contains in its character no indication of a particular inclination toward “representative democracy,” in our modern Western sense of the word.
My “agenda” here is not to promote some legitimate alternative to the Western-style democracy but only to clarify the reality of such alternatives under Hobbes’s own understanding of a social contract, or covenant. Read this:
“This is more than consent, it is a real unity (or “totality” in my description) of them all in one person made by covenant in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man or assembly on the condition that you likewise give up your right to him and authorize his actions... This done, the multitude so united is called a Commonwealth; or, in Latin, Civitas.” (Ibid.)
There is too much public fervor in the act of covenanting, as described by Hobbes, compared to the anemic acquiescence, indifference, and outright non-participation of the majority (not to be confused with the zeal of an enthusiastic, but preventively brainwashed, minorities of social activists) in our fêted “representative democracies.” This genuine total participation does not necessarily point to a totalitarian social order, but clearly indicates the presence of a strong element of the totalitarian ideal in all politically active societies.
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