Those who regret that Alexander died too early should save their sympathy for those who died too late. Alexander was lucky. Had he lived longer, he might have spoiled his all too perfect legend, and the lovely barrel of pure honey he left us with would never have tasted so sweet.
On the other hand, there have been many rulers and leaders throughout the ages, whose greatest misfortune was living too long. Had they died “younger” by at least a few years, history would have been much kinder to them, but now this is all water under the bridge: the portraits are drawn, and what could, or should have been can’t have any effect on the past…
Among the winners and losers of history Napoleon occupies a special place. Defeated and forced to end his life in the custody of his enemies, his legend somehow survived and flourished, as if history just this once decided to forgive this loser his and her humiliation… Well, history is a temperamental lady! One can only imagine how Napoleon’s legend might have looked, had it not been blemished by the fall.
Waterloo? Silly Monday morning quarterbacking! Napoleon’s “Waterloo” was not Waterloo, but Moscow, and Napoleon himself realized it only too well! Code Napoleon and Tilsit, followed by the folly of the Russian campaign?! In his final exile on the island of St. Helena, Napoleon complained: “I ought to have died in Moscow!” To which I can only somberly add that he ought to have died before Moscow, or, even better, he ought to have left Russia alone altogether! (And he ought to have left a message for Hitler about it too.)
Somewhat paralleling the circumstances of Oliver Cromwell’s rise to power, Napoleon’s administrative and statesman’s genius was only allowed to be revealed as a result of his spectacular military success at Toulon. In his case (although at a much younger age) he seemed to be destined for permanent disgrace and eventual oblivion had he not been remembered two long years after Toulon, when the Republican cause was severely threatened, in October 1795, by a Royalist revolt, and there were no capable commanders left on the Republican side to organize the defense of Paris. Napoleon seized this opportunity, and from then on was unstoppable (…that is, until he stumbled over Russia).
While all glorious Napoleonic achievements are well known, and hardly need a recapitulation here, there is a demonstrable need to concentrate on the causes of his fatal folly. Why did he invade Russia at all, with a 600,000-strong army, leaving it with utterly demoralized scraps of between 22,000 and 40,000? Before this reckless campaign, Russia’s Emperor Alexander I was an admirer of his, and so were the flower of Russian nobility. Why would they threaten his domination of Europe, as long as Russia’s interests were not in direct conflict with those of France? Moreover, several defeats suffered by the Russian armies fighting on foreign soil had been convincing enough to keep the Russians away from challenging the French in classic combat, further evidenced by the Russian reluctance to engage Napoleon’s armies in such battles during his Russian adventure. Napoleon ought to have realized that in pre-nationalist Europe, where neither Germany nor Italy had yet existed, and England, although victorious at sea, would never challenge him on the continent proper where its power would dwindle for the lack of logistics, he was, by the summer of 1812, the unquestionable master and would have stayed that way through his brilliant political and administrative maneuvering for as long as he lived. And yet he dared to challenge the intensely nationalist giant Russia on her own turf with no inkling, it appears, of the impending disaster awaiting him and his Grand Armée there.
…This is not to say that he had not been warned. The great Talleyrand, his adviser of genius, was a staunch French patriot, whose judgment was always guided by the national interest of France, which allowed him to live a long life of eighty-four years appreciated by the Revolution, the Directory, the Empire and eventually the Restoration. He saw a friendship with Russia as the cornerstone of French foreign policy, to the point that he quarreled with Napoleon over it, and was dismissed.
So, what determined Napoleon’s fateful anti-Russian slide, leading to the catastrophic 1812 war? I am well aware of the relentless activities of some prominent Polish nationalists, designed to induce him to help them bring the sovereign Polish State back into existence, after its final partitioning between Russia and Prussia, in 1795. (And who would blame them for trying?) But it was no less the work of his Jewish petitioners who successfully seduced him with money and tempting promises, into the impossible mission of emancipating the less fortunate Jews residing in the Russian Empire. Once again, the Jews were understandably pursuing their own Jewish interest, but their interest not only did not coincide with the French interest, but, by imposing itself on Napoleon’s will, it actually led to the dire consequences that sealed the fate of the Napoleonic Empire. After all, a man, even of Napoleon’s stature, must know his limitations…
…It was only in retrospect that Napoleon was able to realize the extent of his folly. “I ought to have died in Moscow!” was in effect his recognition of it, while his suddenly bitter bias and resentful anger toward the Jews, whose greatest benefactor (“righteous Gentile”) he had been throughout his reign, was expressed in a single venomous comment to Gaspard Gourgaud at St. Helena: “The Jews were a cowardly and cruel people.” Observe the use of the historic past tense “were” in this sentence!...
But of course he had only himself to blame.
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