Reducing and virtually equating
the totalitarian principle to a number of regimes of the past, produces the
wrong impression that it is an outdated phenomenon. Nothing is farther from the
truth. Totalitarianism is a powerful nationalistic trend in all societies, and a
very natural trend at that, and the failure to realize its importance, and to educate
the public about its essence, is a great disservice to the public as well as to
social scholarship as such.
The following supplementary
summary is a reference item for those readers who are
interested in the historical nuts and bolts of this subject. There is little
value in arguing against or agreeing with the individual scholars mentioned in
this entry, in the form of special line-by-line comments on my part, as my
views on all these matters are already adequately expressed throughout this
section. However, my closing comment at the end of this entry may be of
interest to the students of totalitarianism, and I strongly advise my readers
who may consider skipping the teal-fonted material not to miss it altogether.
“The
term totalitarismo, employed in the writings of the philosopher Giovanni
Gentile, was popularized by the Italian fascists under Mussolini. The original
meaning of totalitarianism, as described
in La dottrina del fascismo (1932), was a society, in which the ideology
of the state had influence, if not power, over most of its citizens. Thanks
to the modern technologies, like radio and the printing press, which the state
could, and probably would use to spread its ideology, most modern nations would
naturally become totalitarian in the above-stated sense.
“While
originally referring to an “all-embracing, total state,” the label has been
applied to a wide variety of regimes and orders of rule in a critical sense.
Karl Popper in his Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), and in The
Poverty of Historicism (1961), developed an influential critique of
totalitarianism: He contrasted the ‘open society’ of liberal democracy with totalitarianism, and
argued that the latter is grounded in the belief that history moves toward an
immutable future, in accordance with knowable laws. During the Cold War, the
term gained renewed currency, especially following the publication of Hannah
Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1957). She argued that Nazi and
Stalinist regimes were totally new forms of government, not merely some updated
versions of the old tyrannies. The source of the mass appeal (sic!!!)
of totalitarian regimes, according to Arendt, was
their ideology, providing a comforting, single answer to the mysteries
of the past, present, and future. For Nazism, all history is the history of
racial struggle, while for Marxism all history is history of class struggle.
Once that premise was accepted by the public, all actions of the regime could
be justified by an appeal to the Law of History or Nature.
“During
the Cold War, the political scientists Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski
were responsible for expanding the usage of the term in university social science
and professional research, reformulating it as a paradigm for the Soviet Union
under Stalin, as well as for the “fascist” regimes. In their view, the defining
elements of totalitarianism included an elaborate guiding ideology; a single mass
party, led by a dictator; a system of terror; a monopoly of the means of
communication and physical force; and centralized direction and control of the
economy through state planning. Such regimes had their initial origins in the
chaos in the wake of the World War I, at which point the higher sophistication
of modern weapons and communications enabled totalitarian movements to
consolidate power in Italy, Germany, and Russia.
“Eric
Hoffer in The True Believer argues that mass movements like Communism,
Fascism, and Nazism had a common trait in picturing Western democracies and
their values as decadent, with the people too soft, too pleasure-loving
and too selfish to sacrifice for a higher cause, which, for them, implies
an inner moral and biological decay. He claims that all these movements had
offered the prospect of a glorious, yet imaginary, future to a frustrated
people, letting them find a refuge from the lack of personal accomplishments in
their individual existence. Individual is then assimilated into a compact collective
body, and “fact-proof screens from reality” are established.
“In the
social sciences, the approach of Friedrich and Brzezinski came under criticism
from scholars who argued that the Soviet system, both as a political and a
social entity, was in fact better understood in terms of interest groups,
competing elites, or even in class terms (using the concept of nomenklatura
as a vehicle for a new ruling class). These critics pointed to evidence of
popular support for the regime and widespread dispersion of power, at least in
the implementation of policy, among sectoral and regional authorities. For some
followers of this pluralist approach, this was evidence of the ability
of the regime to adapt to include new demands. However, the proponents of the
totalitarian model claimed that the failure of the system to survive showed not
only its inability to adapt, but the mere formality of supposed popular
participation. Its proponents do not agree on when the Soviet Union ceased to
be describable as totalitarian.
“The
notion of post-totalitarianism was put forward by Juan Linz. (See
my entry Post-Totalitarianism As A Fake
Concept, posted on July 21st, 2012.) For
some commentators, such as Linz and Alfred Stepan, the USSR entered a new phase
after the abandonment of mass terror, after Stalin’s death. Discussions of “post-totalitarianism”
featured prominently in debates about the reformability and durability of the
Soviet system in comparative politics.
“As the
Soviet system disintegrated, opponents of the concept claimed that the
transformation of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, and its subsequent sudden
collapse, demonstrated that the totalitarian model had little explanatory value
for researchers. Several decades earlier, in 1957, for example, Bertram Wolfe
had claimed that the Soviet Union faced no challenge or change possible from
the society at large. He called it a “solid and durable political system
dominating a society that has been totally fragmented or atomized,” one
which will remain “barring an explosion from within, or battering down from
without.” Many of the classic theories of totalitarianism ruled out the
possibility of such change, yet subsequent theorists acknowledged the
possibility and in fact encouraged and welcomed it. Any suggestions of the
indefinite stability of states labeled “totalitarian” among proponents of the
term were largely discredited when the Soviet Union fell by the wayside.
“While
totalitarianism as a political term fell into disuse during the 1970’s among
many Soviet specialists, other commentators found the typology not only useful
for the purposes of classification but for guiding the official policy. In her
1979 essay Dictatorships and Double Standards, Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick
argued that a number of important foreign policy implications could be drawn by
distinguishing “totalitarian” regimes from autocracies in general. According to
Kirkpatrick, typical autocracies are primarily interested in their own
survival, and as such allow varying degrees of autonomy regarding elements of
civil society, religious institutions, court, and the press. On the other hand,
under totalitarianism, no individual or institution can be autonomous from the
state’s all-encompassing ideology. Therefore US policy must distinguish between
the two, and even grant temporary support to non-totalitarian autocratic
governments, in order to combat totalitarian movements, and promote U.S.
interests. Kirkpatrick’s influence, particularly, as foreign policy adviser and
the United Nations ambassador, was essential to the formation of the Reagan
administration’s foreign policy, and her ideas came to be known as the Kirkpatrick
Doctrine.”
Summarizing all of the above, we
can see yet again how a dubious application of the totalitarian principle is
treated as a principle and then dismissed, on the grounds that it does not meet
a fixed set of standards which in themselves have been based on a cluster of
compounded fallacies and misperceptions.
As for the Kirkpatrick
Doctrine, it reminds me of the current neoconservative idiocy just as ludicrous,
if not quite as dangerous, as the new one. It seems like each time the academic
standards hit a new low, there is a still deeper ditch to descend into. (See
also the previous entry in this section [Iran,
Iraq, And Jeane Kirkpatrick, posted on July 20, 2012 – sic!] and the “Kirkpatrick paragraph” in the entry
which precedes it. [Totalitarianism In
Western Tidbits – Part II, posted on July 19, 2012.])
In so far as the details of my
criticism of these doctrines is concerned, they are being discussed in numerous
previous entries, and elsewhere. But the theoretical bottom line is twofold:
one cannot substitute the principle by an application, and one cannot, and must
not, dismiss the soundness of a principle on the grounds of the unsoundness of
an application or – even worse – of something which is mistaken for a
representation of the real thing.
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