This short post-preamble to the subsection on Jewish philosophy concerns itself with just one question: how is Philosophia Judaica different from all other philosophies, and a Judaic philosopher from all others?
In the subsection on the Judaic Religion, I have already established the fact that Biblia Hebraica is radically different from, say, the Protestant Bible, with regard to the fundamental question of its human versus Divine authorship. Now, what must be the crucial difference between Jewish and general philosophy, to compel us to distinguish the one from the other? And yet, such distinction is historically being made, thus imbuing this whole important line of inquiry with the irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial quality, which, I suspect, it richly possesses.
According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, the term Jewish Philosophy has meant different things at different times. In the Middle Ages it meant any kind of philosophical endeavor pursued by the Jews. In our time, it is limited to the philosophical discussion of specifically Judaic themes, whereas any ethnically- or religiously-Jewish thinker who is unconcerned with Judaism, or with his distinctive Jewish heritage, cannot be classified as a Jewish philosopher. (At the same time, I bet that no Gentile [non-Jewish] thinker, no matter how much he, or she, is preoccupied with the Judaic themes can ever be accepted as a “Jewish” philosopher. What a rotten discrimination!)
Governed by this “modern” principle, namely, that only an ethnically Jewish and Judaically-specific thinker can qualify as a Jewish philosopher, whereas an ethnically Jewish philosopher who studies free will an-Sich, and declares that “if a rock hurled into the air had a consciousness, it would believe it was traveling of its own will,” cannot be qualified as such, but only as a general philosopher. But what if our general philosopher of Jewish heritage also examines the Talmud or a Midrash, and therefore qualifies as a Jewish philosopher? The man I have in mind is obviously Benedict/Baruch Spinoza…
One can respond by suggesting that Spinoza ought to be classified in both these categories, depending on which subject, and where, is being discussed. But then, what if a Jewish Talmudic scholar delving into the wisdom of the Gemara should organically shift his focus to a question of sufficient reason or of etiology of forms, that is, combine his study of matters Judaic with matters of general philosophical nature? Believe me, I will never discriminate against the great Isaac Luria by denying him the well deserved status of a “general” philosopher!
That was previously a rhetorical question, of course; leading me to suggest that one should always address all such confusing issues not conventionally, but as one pleases, which is exactly what I am doing, and also, that the question of what constitutes a distinctive Philosophia Judaica is, indeed, “irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial.” In my view, Jewish philosophy is philosophy, and I am convinced that leaving, say, Maimonides, or Luria, or Cordovero, etc. outside the reach of general philosophical studies, deprives the Gentile student of an essential source of philosophical knowledge and understanding.
In the subsection on the Judaic Religion, I have already established the fact that Biblia Hebraica is radically different from, say, the Protestant Bible, with regard to the fundamental question of its human versus Divine authorship. Now, what must be the crucial difference between Jewish and general philosophy, to compel us to distinguish the one from the other? And yet, such distinction is historically being made, thus imbuing this whole important line of inquiry with the irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial quality, which, I suspect, it richly possesses.
According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, the term Jewish Philosophy has meant different things at different times. In the Middle Ages it meant any kind of philosophical endeavor pursued by the Jews. In our time, it is limited to the philosophical discussion of specifically Judaic themes, whereas any ethnically- or religiously-Jewish thinker who is unconcerned with Judaism, or with his distinctive Jewish heritage, cannot be classified as a Jewish philosopher. (At the same time, I bet that no Gentile [non-Jewish] thinker, no matter how much he, or she, is preoccupied with the Judaic themes can ever be accepted as a “Jewish” philosopher. What a rotten discrimination!)
Governed by this “modern” principle, namely, that only an ethnically Jewish and Judaically-specific thinker can qualify as a Jewish philosopher, whereas an ethnically Jewish philosopher who studies free will an-Sich, and declares that “if a rock hurled into the air had a consciousness, it would believe it was traveling of its own will,” cannot be qualified as such, but only as a general philosopher. But what if our general philosopher of Jewish heritage also examines the Talmud or a Midrash, and therefore qualifies as a Jewish philosopher? The man I have in mind is obviously Benedict/Baruch Spinoza…
One can respond by suggesting that Spinoza ought to be classified in both these categories, depending on which subject, and where, is being discussed. But then, what if a Jewish Talmudic scholar delving into the wisdom of the Gemara should organically shift his focus to a question of sufficient reason or of etiology of forms, that is, combine his study of matters Judaic with matters of general philosophical nature? Believe me, I will never discriminate against the great Isaac Luria by denying him the well deserved status of a “general” philosopher!
That was previously a rhetorical question, of course; leading me to suggest that one should always address all such confusing issues not conventionally, but as one pleases, which is exactly what I am doing, and also, that the question of what constitutes a distinctive Philosophia Judaica is, indeed, “irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial.” In my view, Jewish philosophy is philosophy, and I am convinced that leaving, say, Maimonides, or Luria, or Cordovero, etc. outside the reach of general philosophical studies, deprives the Gentile student of an essential source of philosophical knowledge and understanding.
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