START: A TALE OF TWO TREATIES

24 December, 2010.
Don’t get me wrong, there is just one START Treaty between the United States and Russia, recently ratified by the U.S. Senate, and currently under an unexpectedly protracted consideration by the Russian Duma, that may now take until the end of January, or even later, before it will (or will not) be ratified. At least, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov insists that there is just one Treaty, although this claim has been questioned in the Russian legislature, ever since the Treaty’s U.S. Senate Ratification.

The Treaty may, indeed, be one, but there is a mildly scandalous situation around it, causing many to suspect that America and Russia could, in the end, be ratifying two quite different versions, caused by two different understandings of the START. The trouble began right at its April 8, 2010, signing in Prague, by Presidents Obama and Medvedev. There were two sticking points in its text, conspicuously unresolved, but gallantly papered over. One was the linkage between strategic offense and strategic defense. The Russians have been insisting on it, whereas the American side has been trying to neutralize all references to it. The idea of an American nuclear shield in Europe has long been a mantra of American Foreign and Defense Policies, too sacred to compromise on it, even for the sake of the Treaty’s proposed radical reduction of both countries’ nuclear arsenals.

The other sticking point, that of conventionalization of strategic delivery systems, was already discussed by me some time ago, in my 2006 article in the Baltimore Sun. (Fitting ICBMs with Conventional Weapons Risks Catastrophe; 11/29/2006.) But apparently this explosive issue has not been laid to rest yet, with the American side still insisting on the permissibility of conventionalization, while the Russians are vehemently determined to count all non-nuclear strategic delivery systems as if they were carrying nuclear weapons. (When an ICBM is launched by the United States, how can the Russians instantly verify that this is not the start of a nuclear war against Russia?!)

Before the U.S. Senate had taken up the START ratification proceedings, many Senators demanded that the Treaty be renegotiated, with the two American demands satisfied in its text, to which the Russians naturally objected in the most resolute terms. Facing a collapse, the American proponents of the Treaty decided on an odd compromise with its detractors: the Treaty would not be changed, but its ratification would be tied with special legislation, stipulating the contentious “American understanding” of its sticking points in an accompanying Senate Resolution. Having thus ascertained a formal acceptance of the unnegotiated American position, the Treaty was ratified, but the Russian side, following these proceedings with a watchful eye, immediately jumped on the conspicuous irregularity thinly concealed in the U.S. Senate Ratification.

The Russian legislators have, as a result, found themselves in a tight spot. On the one hand, refusing to ratify this Treaty, after the U.S. Senate has just ratified it, would be terrible publicity in Europe and in the rest of the world, where Moscow has been painstakingly cultivating a peace-loving anti-nuclear arms image. But to allow the U.S. Senate’s trick to go unchallenged would be no less unacceptable.

Konstantin Kosachev, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the State Duma talked about this at a press conference today, explaining the necessity of the delay in the Treaty’s ratification by the Russian side, as in view of these new developments initiated by the American side, the Duma will have to respond in kind, and producing such a response will take time.

“We do not have the right to leave their interpretations unanswered,” he told reporters today. “Otherwise, it may give extra advantages to our American partners… or, possibly, adversaries. We need to balance those advantages.”

…Thus from the smoke of the latest START Treaty a new propaganda war is about to start. Who is going to win it cannot be determined in the short run, but in the end, we can regrettably assume that the Treaty won’t be very effective, and to expect an energetic start of mutual nuclear arms reductions, resulting from it, might prove to be too much wishful thinking.

…And so goes our tale of two treaties. It was the best of treaties, it was the worst of treaties.