(The reader who is unfamiliar with my blog, particularly with my January 17, 2011 posting Totalitarianism Without Prejudice, may easily misinterpret my usage of the term totalitarian, imbuing it with the prejudiced substance of its most common uses. My treatment of totalitarianism is unprejudiced, that is, unaffected either by its erstwhile apologists such as Giovanni Gentile, or by its modern armies of detractors. I see this term, stripped of its heavy historical baggage, as a legitimate and extremely useful tool (regrettably unutilized by political science on account of its prejudice against it), describing not so much a specific social practice as a specific type of social mentality characterizing vigorous nationalistic societies, and constituting, in its extreme, the socialist antipode to laissez-faire capitalism, which is, of course, also an extreme. In this sense, it is my firm belief that the Russian society is historically “totalitarian” in its predisposition, and I am obviously not using this word as the usual form of opprobrium.)
The West has been preoccupied for some time now with the nature of the Putin-Medvedev relationship in the current Kremlin structure of “power-sharing.” The idea generated in the West of a power struggle going on in Moscow, as to who is number one, reflects the basic misunderstanding by Western analysts of the core difference between authoritarian and totalitarian power structures. While the former are characterized by the clash of competing egos, the latter are determined by the peculiarities of the overall system, and its nuts and bolts-- namely, the individuals engaged in the power structure--- are not so much competing against each other as striving to comply with the requirements of the system. A political coup within all totalitarian systems is only possible when the individual in ascendance promises to be in better compliance with the requirements of the system than the individual he is about to replace.
Within this context, there is no power struggle in the Kremlin, and there is no competition between Putin and Medvedev. The only sticky issue here is the constitutional outline of the political titles, namely President vs. Prime Minister. Had the system been left to itself, it would have disposed with such silly trivialities through the convenient leader-principle. But the system strives to present a respectable face to the world, where the technicalities of political distinctions offer the best comprehended clue as to the system’s democratic versus undemocratic nature and thus the totalitarian system feels compelled to oblige. Therefore, if according to the constitution the office of the head of state is limited to two specified terms, so be it, as long as the players in the system itself realize that the meaning of such “constitutional power changes” is merely perfunctory, and has no effect on the actual situation within the system.
Now, what if Medvedev, taking advantage of his constitutional preeminence, wanted to convert perfunctory advantages into actual ones? In conducting a coup of this nature, he would not be fighting just Mr. Putin and his loyalists. He would be posing a challenge to the whole totalitarian system. If the system likes what it sees in Mr. Medvedev better than what it sees in Mr. Putin, Mr. Medvedev will succeed. If not, he is bound to fail. But neither he nor his competitor would have a personal edge in this fight, as its result will be determined at a level above either of them.
As a matter of trivia, there used to be a trivial game of rearranging the chairs, played in the Kremlin since as early as the Lenin transitional era, when such phrases as, say, “President Sverdlov” or “Prime Minister Rykov” (I am operating with the familiar equivalent titles, rather than with the strange-sounding literal ones, which still amount to the same thing) had no real substance. In later times, Khrushchev preferred the post of Premier to that of President, while Brezhnev preferred the post of President to that of Premier, whereas the pinnacle of the power pyramid had always remained with the Leader, identified from Lenin to the end of the USSR with being Head of the Party.
The significance of the Leader never really subsided in post-Soviet times. Yeltsin (even if it makes me sick to say it) was the Leader, which position he, of course, abused and debased. Putin, as soon as he popped up to the surface, became the Leader and by all indications he still is. Looking at Medvedev today, I see a loyalist junior partner, a prospective Prime Minister, when Putin returns to the post of President. Somehow I cannot envisage Medvedev as the next Leader of Russia, because, in my opinion, he has played the role of follower for too long. Leaders like Putin burst onto the political scene out of relative obscurity, they are not groomed for the office, as the history of all past and present Leaders without exception has revealed to all those ready and willing to learn from it.
Having said that, I do not exclude the possibility, which I mentioned in an earlier entry, of Mr. Medvedev to become the future President of Russia (after Putin’s next twelve years), in which case his current status can be best described as “President-in Training.” I like Mr. Medvedev very much, and I am certain that he will make a good and competent President of Russia the second time around, but I do doubt his great-leader credentials for the reasons explained in the previous paragraph. Needless to say, this scenario will only be possible if, after the end of Vladimir Putin’s last term, no strong leader of his kind emerges to take over the helm of the Russian ship of state.
The West has been preoccupied for some time now with the nature of the Putin-Medvedev relationship in the current Kremlin structure of “power-sharing.” The idea generated in the West of a power struggle going on in Moscow, as to who is number one, reflects the basic misunderstanding by Western analysts of the core difference between authoritarian and totalitarian power structures. While the former are characterized by the clash of competing egos, the latter are determined by the peculiarities of the overall system, and its nuts and bolts-- namely, the individuals engaged in the power structure--- are not so much competing against each other as striving to comply with the requirements of the system. A political coup within all totalitarian systems is only possible when the individual in ascendance promises to be in better compliance with the requirements of the system than the individual he is about to replace.
Within this context, there is no power struggle in the Kremlin, and there is no competition between Putin and Medvedev. The only sticky issue here is the constitutional outline of the political titles, namely President vs. Prime Minister. Had the system been left to itself, it would have disposed with such silly trivialities through the convenient leader-principle. But the system strives to present a respectable face to the world, where the technicalities of political distinctions offer the best comprehended clue as to the system’s democratic versus undemocratic nature and thus the totalitarian system feels compelled to oblige. Therefore, if according to the constitution the office of the head of state is limited to two specified terms, so be it, as long as the players in the system itself realize that the meaning of such “constitutional power changes” is merely perfunctory, and has no effect on the actual situation within the system.
Now, what if Medvedev, taking advantage of his constitutional preeminence, wanted to convert perfunctory advantages into actual ones? In conducting a coup of this nature, he would not be fighting just Mr. Putin and his loyalists. He would be posing a challenge to the whole totalitarian system. If the system likes what it sees in Mr. Medvedev better than what it sees in Mr. Putin, Mr. Medvedev will succeed. If not, he is bound to fail. But neither he nor his competitor would have a personal edge in this fight, as its result will be determined at a level above either of them.
As a matter of trivia, there used to be a trivial game of rearranging the chairs, played in the Kremlin since as early as the Lenin transitional era, when such phrases as, say, “President Sverdlov” or “Prime Minister Rykov” (I am operating with the familiar equivalent titles, rather than with the strange-sounding literal ones, which still amount to the same thing) had no real substance. In later times, Khrushchev preferred the post of Premier to that of President, while Brezhnev preferred the post of President to that of Premier, whereas the pinnacle of the power pyramid had always remained with the Leader, identified from Lenin to the end of the USSR with being Head of the Party.
The significance of the Leader never really subsided in post-Soviet times. Yeltsin (even if it makes me sick to say it) was the Leader, which position he, of course, abused and debased. Putin, as soon as he popped up to the surface, became the Leader and by all indications he still is. Looking at Medvedev today, I see a loyalist junior partner, a prospective Prime Minister, when Putin returns to the post of President. Somehow I cannot envisage Medvedev as the next Leader of Russia, because, in my opinion, he has played the role of follower for too long. Leaders like Putin burst onto the political scene out of relative obscurity, they are not groomed for the office, as the history of all past and present Leaders without exception has revealed to all those ready and willing to learn from it.
Having said that, I do not exclude the possibility, which I mentioned in an earlier entry, of Mr. Medvedev to become the future President of Russia (after Putin’s next twelve years), in which case his current status can be best described as “President-in Training.” I like Mr. Medvedev very much, and I am certain that he will make a good and competent President of Russia the second time around, but I do doubt his great-leader credentials for the reasons explained in the previous paragraph. Needless to say, this scenario will only be possible if, after the end of Vladimir Putin’s last term, no strong leader of his kind emerges to take over the helm of the Russian ship of state.
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