(This is the third part of a triptych. The first part Understanding Leninism and the second part Understanding Stalinism were both posted on January 26, 2011 in a cluster of entries under the umbrella title La Forza Del Destino.)
From the perspective of Stalinism as a totalitarian phenomenon, the post-Stalinist period of Russian history started shortly after Stalin’s death and in some way may be said to continue still, despite the huge upheavals of the past half-a-century.
My point might gain some clarity from the fact that I am drawing a close parallel between Stalin’s Stalinism and Peter’s “Petrism.” In fact, Stalinism is an organic continuation of Petrism, and, despite certain dramatic changes in the course of Russian history since Stalin’s death in 1953, I am claiming that the “baton” has not been passed yet, in the historical relay race of Russia’s defining giants.
Ironically, Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign, although highly detrimental to Stalin’s symbolic image, did not topple Stalinism as such, but only promoted its inevitable degeneration, following the demise of the great totalitarian. By the same token, Brezhnev’s attempts to restore some of the positives of Stalin’s image could not reverse the degeneration process, as only a strong totalitarian leader in Stalin’s mold would have been capable of reversing the downward trend. Thus, in the wake of Stalin’s demise, the Soviet Union was sliding along the path of post-Stalin totalitarian inertia, throughout Khrushchev’s, Brezhnev’s, Andropov’s, and Chernenko’s tenure. That much is pretty obvious.
What is less obvious is that Gorbachev coming to power in 1985, with all his much acclaimed glasnost and perestroika, did not inaugurate a definitive historical period of his own. There was no revival, and there was no revolution, therefore, we may say that the process of degeneration continued under him as well.
It is still unclear to most, how history, say, in fifty years from now, will evaluate Boris Yeltsin’s cataclysmic stint in power. To me, his decade of the nineties will be viewed extremely negatively, as a catastrophic and aberrational event, although, as I have already said on numerous occasions, this calamity was by no means Yeltsin’s handiwork, but a logical, albeit chaotic, outcome of the transformational dream of the keepers of the Russian nation. In other words, the 1990’s were an ugly correction of Russia’s historical course, and to a certain degree they can be seen as a separate but otherwise integral segment of the general phenomenon that I am describing here as “post-Stalinism.”
Even more shocking, the arrival of Vladimir Putin in 2000 has not inaugurated a phenomenon yet, which might be called “Putinism,” and put on a par with Petrism and Stalinism, although some attempts to introduce the new term Putinism have been made in the past decade. Nor is the current limelight-sharing of the Putin-Medvedev duo in any way indicative of a definitive stamp of Russian history. This is not to say that Mr. Putin would not be capable of making a distinctive imprint which would allow us to be talking of Putinism as a legitimate member of the Petrism-Stalinism-Putinism institutional triad. But that time has not come yet.
And finally, the reader may have noticed that while talking all the time about Petrism and Stalinism, I have not once mentioned Leninism in this entry. Leninism was, of course, a transitional/revolutionary, rather than an institutional phenomenon, but unlike the Provisional Government episode of 1917, or the Yeltsin episode of the 1990’s, it represented a legitimate transition to Russia’s most natural form of government: totalitarian state. With Yeltsin’s case far too obvious, I must note that the first decade of the twenty-first century, that is the Putin-Medvedev decade, has certainly fallen short of becoming a defining revolutionary moment in the history of post-Stalin Russia, Time of Troubles and all. In fact, despite the by now nearly twelve-year stretch of Putin power, whatever has happened in Russia during this period can hardly qualify as a revolution at all, but perhaps only as a preparation for a revolution. How the real Putin revolution will shape up, if at all, will become more or less clear in the current decade of the 2010’s. What is quite clear though, is that the blessed event in question has been much impeded under the watchful and hostile eye of mass communications and occasionally unwelcome transparency. But I suspect that eventually it is going to arrive at its destination.
From the perspective of Stalinism as a totalitarian phenomenon, the post-Stalinist period of Russian history started shortly after Stalin’s death and in some way may be said to continue still, despite the huge upheavals of the past half-a-century.
My point might gain some clarity from the fact that I am drawing a close parallel between Stalin’s Stalinism and Peter’s “Petrism.” In fact, Stalinism is an organic continuation of Petrism, and, despite certain dramatic changes in the course of Russian history since Stalin’s death in 1953, I am claiming that the “baton” has not been passed yet, in the historical relay race of Russia’s defining giants.
Ironically, Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign, although highly detrimental to Stalin’s symbolic image, did not topple Stalinism as such, but only promoted its inevitable degeneration, following the demise of the great totalitarian. By the same token, Brezhnev’s attempts to restore some of the positives of Stalin’s image could not reverse the degeneration process, as only a strong totalitarian leader in Stalin’s mold would have been capable of reversing the downward trend. Thus, in the wake of Stalin’s demise, the Soviet Union was sliding along the path of post-Stalin totalitarian inertia, throughout Khrushchev’s, Brezhnev’s, Andropov’s, and Chernenko’s tenure. That much is pretty obvious.
What is less obvious is that Gorbachev coming to power in 1985, with all his much acclaimed glasnost and perestroika, did not inaugurate a definitive historical period of his own. There was no revival, and there was no revolution, therefore, we may say that the process of degeneration continued under him as well.
It is still unclear to most, how history, say, in fifty years from now, will evaluate Boris Yeltsin’s cataclysmic stint in power. To me, his decade of the nineties will be viewed extremely negatively, as a catastrophic and aberrational event, although, as I have already said on numerous occasions, this calamity was by no means Yeltsin’s handiwork, but a logical, albeit chaotic, outcome of the transformational dream of the keepers of the Russian nation. In other words, the 1990’s were an ugly correction of Russia’s historical course, and to a certain degree they can be seen as a separate but otherwise integral segment of the general phenomenon that I am describing here as “post-Stalinism.”
Even more shocking, the arrival of Vladimir Putin in 2000 has not inaugurated a phenomenon yet, which might be called “Putinism,” and put on a par with Petrism and Stalinism, although some attempts to introduce the new term Putinism have been made in the past decade. Nor is the current limelight-sharing of the Putin-Medvedev duo in any way indicative of a definitive stamp of Russian history. This is not to say that Mr. Putin would not be capable of making a distinctive imprint which would allow us to be talking of Putinism as a legitimate member of the Petrism-Stalinism-Putinism institutional triad. But that time has not come yet.
And finally, the reader may have noticed that while talking all the time about Petrism and Stalinism, I have not once mentioned Leninism in this entry. Leninism was, of course, a transitional/revolutionary, rather than an institutional phenomenon, but unlike the Provisional Government episode of 1917, or the Yeltsin episode of the 1990’s, it represented a legitimate transition to Russia’s most natural form of government: totalitarian state. With Yeltsin’s case far too obvious, I must note that the first decade of the twenty-first century, that is the Putin-Medvedev decade, has certainly fallen short of becoming a defining revolutionary moment in the history of post-Stalin Russia, Time of Troubles and all. In fact, despite the by now nearly twelve-year stretch of Putin power, whatever has happened in Russia during this period can hardly qualify as a revolution at all, but perhaps only as a preparation for a revolution. How the real Putin revolution will shape up, if at all, will become more or less clear in the current decade of the 2010’s. What is quite clear though, is that the blessed event in question has been much impeded under the watchful and hostile eye of mass communications and occasionally unwelcome transparency. But I suspect that eventually it is going to arrive at its destination.
No comments:
Post a Comment