It is often the case that the same word can be used in a restrictive professional sense and in a broad common sense, and it is furthermore assumed that there must be a linguistic chasm between the professional term and its popular usage. Thus, anyone who dares to mix up the two, has to be a dunce.
To me, this is not the case in certain instances. I think that occasionally our dunce may be actually closer to the truth in his popular usage of the term than the self-important professional. Not that I would want to deny legitimacy to the professional term, but it is always instructive to look at it through the lens of the colloquial and learn a few "new" things.
Materialism and idealism are, perhaps, the most recognizable labels, routinely attached to the philosophical systems of the great thinkers of history by the examiners and interpreters of other people’s ideas. Defining both, they generally stress the monism of the former and the dualism of the latter, but such simplification is too coarse and misleading. Let us, however, take a closer look at these two definitions.
Philosophical materialism is defined as “the doctrine that matter is the only reality, and that everything in the world, including thought, will, and feeling, can be explained only in terms of matter.” (Webster’s Dictionary.) The Encyclopaedia Britannica’s short definition is similar, but not identical: “Materialism in philosophy is the view that all facts (including facts about the human mind, and will, and the course of human history) are causally dependent upon physical processes, or even reducible to them.”
On the other hand, Webster’s defines idealism in a rather extreme fashion, as “any of various theories, that hold that the objects of perception are actually ideas of the perceiving mind, and it is impossible to know, whether reality exists apart from the mind.” Meanwhile, Britannica emphasizes the philosophical dualism of idealism, attributing to it, among other things, “a belief in God, in disembodied spirits, in free will, or in certain kinds of introspective psychology.”
There are numerous variations of these definitions, of course, and, technically speaking, each of them has some merit, inasmuch as it is applied to a specific philosophical view, which, justly or not, is identified as materialistic. But their technicality is exactly their problem. A more general definition of these two terms, in their opposition to each other is basically lacking and my intent in this entry is to make an attempt at coming up with one that would suit me, in the broader sense, where the existing definitions have proved themselves pitifully inadequate.
To begin with, scientific idealism and scientific materialism have somehow become connected with faith in God or a lack thereof. I find this connection misleading at best. Here is a demonstrable case of how horribly unscientific pseudo-scientific conclusions may turn out to be. It is often better to stay away from too much professional philosophy, as, driven to excess, it becomes unreasonable. This is the reason why, in redefining materialism and idealism, I am opting for more common sense and good psychology and less abstraction and professional jargon.
But even with professional jargon, what is all this talk about the ‘monism’ of the one versus the ‘dualism’ of the other? Both of these theories exist in either form: monistic and dualistic!
Materialistic monism and idealistic monism are extreme forms, as their dualism is the more accurate way to describe reality. But dualism cannot be equated to idealism for at least these two reasons: idealistic monism is demonstrably in existence, thus defying idealism’s exclusive association with dualism, and then, secondly, there is such a thing, at least structurally and conceptually, as materialistic dualism, which may be defined as the acceptance of a coexistence of mind and matter, yet in a form which makes mind both dependent on, and, ergo, inferior to, matter.
Turning now from theory to practice, I insist that all philosophical theories related to the distinction between materialism and idealism ought to be judged by the personal ethical predispositions of their proponents.
In practical terms, very few of the many millions of religious believers will ever consent to being called “materialists,” and will further insist on being "idealists," by mere virtue of their religious affiliations, although most of them are clearly of the material kind, having nothing to connect them to idealism, but their empty declarations.
My definitions of materialism and idealism are therefore simple and to the point, and they have nothing to do with the fake distinction of monism and dualism, assuming the presence of a dualistic mix in both. This has all to do not with some outward social practices or declarations, but with the individual’s philosophical attitude to life. It is either matter (money, political power, social success) and such, over spirit, or else spirit over matter (in which case, the above-mentioned “material pursuits,” although not necessarily non-existent, become non-overwhelming, non-consuming, and demonstrably secondary to the spiritual pursuits).
Needless to say, idealism, as a philosophical attitude, which values the spirit over the material interests, is a truly rare quality of the mind, defining both the individual and all his philosophical output, whereas a selfish intellectual mercantilism is customarily the norm, with everything that it entails. And yes, one does not have to be a religious adherent at all, to merit the honorary title of idealist. Nietzsche and Russell were two salient examples of the consummate philosophical idealism, who had purposely renounced all claims to a religious affiliation.
What does this mean in the ultimate analysis? Scratch an idealistically-minded self-professing philosophical materialist, like, say, Karl Marx, and you will find an idealistic core under the surface. Indeed, it is my firm belief that a large majority of the so-called materialistic philosophical systems are closet idealistic at heart, which throws the elaborate professional judgments as to which philosophers are materialistic and which are idealistic, out of the window. (My specific entries on major philosophies, viewed under this angle, are to be posted later, as parts of the Magnificent Shadows and Significant Others sections.)
By the same token, I’ll never believe in the sincerity of the opposite case, that of a materialistically-minded individual who professes to be a philosophical idealist. I cannot imagine a materialistically-minded person capable of creating a truly idealistic philosophical system. Such a ‘split personality’ is unthinkable, and this is not just common sense, but pure science (psychology, if you like), plain and simple.
To me, this is not the case in certain instances. I think that occasionally our dunce may be actually closer to the truth in his popular usage of the term than the self-important professional. Not that I would want to deny legitimacy to the professional term, but it is always instructive to look at it through the lens of the colloquial and learn a few "new" things.
Materialism and idealism are, perhaps, the most recognizable labels, routinely attached to the philosophical systems of the great thinkers of history by the examiners and interpreters of other people’s ideas. Defining both, they generally stress the monism of the former and the dualism of the latter, but such simplification is too coarse and misleading. Let us, however, take a closer look at these two definitions.
Philosophical materialism is defined as “the doctrine that matter is the only reality, and that everything in the world, including thought, will, and feeling, can be explained only in terms of matter.” (Webster’s Dictionary.) The Encyclopaedia Britannica’s short definition is similar, but not identical: “Materialism in philosophy is the view that all facts (including facts about the human mind, and will, and the course of human history) are causally dependent upon physical processes, or even reducible to them.”
On the other hand, Webster’s defines idealism in a rather extreme fashion, as “any of various theories, that hold that the objects of perception are actually ideas of the perceiving mind, and it is impossible to know, whether reality exists apart from the mind.” Meanwhile, Britannica emphasizes the philosophical dualism of idealism, attributing to it, among other things, “a belief in God, in disembodied spirits, in free will, or in certain kinds of introspective psychology.”
There are numerous variations of these definitions, of course, and, technically speaking, each of them has some merit, inasmuch as it is applied to a specific philosophical view, which, justly or not, is identified as materialistic. But their technicality is exactly their problem. A more general definition of these two terms, in their opposition to each other is basically lacking and my intent in this entry is to make an attempt at coming up with one that would suit me, in the broader sense, where the existing definitions have proved themselves pitifully inadequate.
To begin with, scientific idealism and scientific materialism have somehow become connected with faith in God or a lack thereof. I find this connection misleading at best. Here is a demonstrable case of how horribly unscientific pseudo-scientific conclusions may turn out to be. It is often better to stay away from too much professional philosophy, as, driven to excess, it becomes unreasonable. This is the reason why, in redefining materialism and idealism, I am opting for more common sense and good psychology and less abstraction and professional jargon.
But even with professional jargon, what is all this talk about the ‘monism’ of the one versus the ‘dualism’ of the other? Both of these theories exist in either form: monistic and dualistic!
Materialistic monism and idealistic monism are extreme forms, as their dualism is the more accurate way to describe reality. But dualism cannot be equated to idealism for at least these two reasons: idealistic monism is demonstrably in existence, thus defying idealism’s exclusive association with dualism, and then, secondly, there is such a thing, at least structurally and conceptually, as materialistic dualism, which may be defined as the acceptance of a coexistence of mind and matter, yet in a form which makes mind both dependent on, and, ergo, inferior to, matter.
Turning now from theory to practice, I insist that all philosophical theories related to the distinction between materialism and idealism ought to be judged by the personal ethical predispositions of their proponents.
In practical terms, very few of the many millions of religious believers will ever consent to being called “materialists,” and will further insist on being "idealists," by mere virtue of their religious affiliations, although most of them are clearly of the material kind, having nothing to connect them to idealism, but their empty declarations.
My definitions of materialism and idealism are therefore simple and to the point, and they have nothing to do with the fake distinction of monism and dualism, assuming the presence of a dualistic mix in both. This has all to do not with some outward social practices or declarations, but with the individual’s philosophical attitude to life. It is either matter (money, political power, social success) and such, over spirit, or else spirit over matter (in which case, the above-mentioned “material pursuits,” although not necessarily non-existent, become non-overwhelming, non-consuming, and demonstrably secondary to the spiritual pursuits).
Needless to say, idealism, as a philosophical attitude, which values the spirit over the material interests, is a truly rare quality of the mind, defining both the individual and all his philosophical output, whereas a selfish intellectual mercantilism is customarily the norm, with everything that it entails. And yes, one does not have to be a religious adherent at all, to merit the honorary title of idealist. Nietzsche and Russell were two salient examples of the consummate philosophical idealism, who had purposely renounced all claims to a religious affiliation.
What does this mean in the ultimate analysis? Scratch an idealistically-minded self-professing philosophical materialist, like, say, Karl Marx, and you will find an idealistic core under the surface. Indeed, it is my firm belief that a large majority of the so-called materialistic philosophical systems are closet idealistic at heart, which throws the elaborate professional judgments as to which philosophers are materialistic and which are idealistic, out of the window. (My specific entries on major philosophies, viewed under this angle, are to be posted later, as parts of the Magnificent Shadows and Significant Others sections.)
By the same token, I’ll never believe in the sincerity of the opposite case, that of a materialistically-minded individual who professes to be a philosophical idealist. I cannot imagine a materialistically-minded person capable of creating a truly idealistic philosophical system. Such a ‘split personality’ is unthinkable, and this is not just common sense, but pure science (psychology, if you like), plain and simple.
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