Saturday, January 21, 2012

UNFREE WILL AND ITS EXISTENTIAL LIBERATION

The old philosophical question of ‘free will’ versus the deterministic perception of the world, and of man in it, has been debated throughout the ages with the same result each time such controversy would rise to a level that gets noticed because of the high intellectual caliber of the proponents of this or that side. The result, as I say, has always been the same. No one’s preexisting opinion on this subject has ever been swayed by the contrary argument, which only means that the argument itself has always been devoid of meaning. This is like defending the Euclid hypothesis in geometry against the contradictory Lobachevski hypothesis: it is a matter of particular preference, but not of validity or incompetence in substance. (Forgive me my constant recourse to these two names in geometry: by now they have come to signify a certain thing, which there is no longer a need to clarify, thus my repeated allusion to the same thing saves time and effort of explaining what I want to say, and thus has an obvious merit.) There is no merit therefore in sparring, say, a Hobbes or a Spinoza against an Erasmus or a Berkeley, or in restarting the whole argument again, in the hope that a different constructive result may be achieved, where the previous great minds have all failed.
I understand, though, the mesmerizing attraction that the question of free will has for the modern Western mind, preoccupied with the word freedom. I guess that there are many who rise in defense of the freedom of the will not so much for the sake of the will, as for the sake of freedom as such, and, on the other hand, all that talk about “unfree will” boils down to the desperate desire of our dear freedom-fighters to ascertain its existential liberation. More power to you, brave men: you will surely achieve better successes in the fields of modern philosophy, which is not much to talk about anyway, than fighting the realities of the real world as if you owned them.
But should we resign to the futility of the effort to convince the contrarian world that “my hypothesis beats your hypothesis” and enjoy arguing not for the sake of converting the heathens, but for its own sake, much fun can be had from the pure enjoyment of the multicolored sparks of wit and sheer insight, flying all over the place, like fireworks in a lavish display.
In the future, I may still find time to expand this quest for intellectual gratification over the subject of free will versus the deterministic view into a full-blown essay, but, so far, this is only an expression of intent to indulge myself in such an effort, and not the effort itself. For now, I am taking just a sample of what some of the most original and unpredictable minds have come up with, on this subject. And who is better suited, then, to spark up this little display than our dear friend Nietzsche, in his inépuisable Jenseits! Now, is he for free will or against it? See for yourselves:---

The ‘causa sui’ is the best self-contradiction conceived so far, it is a sort of rape and perversion of logic; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with just this nonsense. The desire for “freedom of the will,” in the superlative metaphysical sense that still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated; the desire to bear the entire responsibility for one’s own actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, the ancestors, chance, and society involves no less than to be precisely this ‘causa sui’ and with more than Munchhausen’s audacity to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the swamps of nothingness. Suppose someone were to see through the loutish simplicity of this celebrated concept of ‘free will’ and put it out of his head altogether, I then beg of him to carry his “enlightenment” a step further, and also put out of his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of “free will”: I mean “unfree will,” which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect. One should not wrongly reify cause and effect as natural scientists do… one should use cause and effect only as pure concepts, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and communication, not for explanation… The unfree will is mythology; in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills.” (Jenseits, 21).)
I've said it before, and I'll say it again, Nietzsche is truly a kindred spirit!

Meanwhile, returning to Nietzsche’s passage above, it is amazing how insightfully he catches the spirit of existentialism, making short shrift of it. Here is Sartre’s celebrated definition of existentialism to compare:

Man is nothing but what he makes of himself. This is the first principle of existentialism. He is responsible for what he is. Existentialism puts every man in possession of himself, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders.”

Was this a joke on Sartre’s part, considering how long after Nietzsche his words were to be written? Is the whole theory of existentialism a joke, and proud of it? Or maybe the need to get rid of God is so strong in Sartre and his existentialist followers that anything goes? Give me responsibility, or give me death! And, of course, by the word responsibility I understand that exact word which Thomas Paine used in his celebrated dictum: “liberty!” For Paine, it may have been simple and straightforward, but for the existentialist, no way! Personal responsibility, for him, is a liberation from God.

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