[The reader will note that I am rejecting, as utterly misleading, all connotations of the term monism, which put it into opposition to the term dualism, that is, the philosophical dualism, implying separate and distinct coexistence of matter and spirit. Whether such monism is a redundant restatement of the term materialism, or an expression of the extreme form of subjective idealism (I deplore the unsound use of the term monism in reference to normal idealism, which is essentially dualistic, because in this case, spirit being timeless, it cannot be posited as either pre-existent to matter, or being the source of matter, both of which contentions impose temporal limitations on the timeless nature of spirit), the special term monism, basically indicating the single-substance origin of the world, is too unique and linguistically precious to waste it on a variety of meaningless variations. This rejection obviously has no bearing on the separate soundness and legitimacy of the term dualism, which, I repeat, is designed to indicate the separateness of mind and matter.]
The God subsection continues, with no end in sight. The reader may be surprised by my preoccupation with the God theme, and indeed, most of the entries in this philosophical section are either God-centered or God-related, and even the title of this section testifies to the importance of the God concept to my understanding of philosophy. But this should come as no surprise, considering that philosophy can not avoid this subject, and even the most atheistic philosophies smuggle in the God idea, disguised under a different name. On the other hand, all normal philosophies have God as their central subject, and none other than the great Spinoza (the purest philosopher, according to Nietzsche), has been known to us as ein Gottbetrunkener Mensch, and his philosophy is naturally all about God. For curious reference only, the key word God occupies sixty-four lines in the Index to Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy while the key word Philosophy takes up just thirty-seven lines there, and the key word Ethics, thirty-six lines!
Now, returning to the subject of the present entry, which is not counting lines in book indexes, I remember, with an unfailing amusement, how I had a theological discussion with a certain Baptist preacher, and I told him something to the effect of how the philosophical monism of the ancient Greeks was indicative of their dismissive attitude toward polytheism, and of their actual belief in One God, at which point this good man jumped to correct me, as I was obviously trying to say “monotheism,” but misspoke “monism” instead. Oh, dear! Needless to say, had he been right, I must have said something so terribly truistic and nonsensical (it would have amounted to saying that monotheism is indicative of the belief in one God), that it would have been an awfully stupid thing to say at all.
But what I actually said was much more interesting. The definition of monism is the belief, or doctrine, that a single substance, or principle, accounts for the origin of the world, or, to put it into a more stylized, poetic form, the belief in the “oneness of the all.” It is my natural conclusion, accordingly, that no self-respecting monist would be respectful of a plurality of gods, who must have been spawned out of that one substance, and are therefore posterior, and theologically inferior to it. In my treatment of Thales, the first philosopher and also a water-monist, I regard him as a clear monotheistic thinker, and his famous phrase “All things are full of gods,” to me, is by no means a polytheistic credo, which some minor philosophical commentators are so eager to suggest, but it should be understood as ‘Everything is penetrated by the sparks of Divinity,’ or as a pantheistic, yet also unmistakably monotheistic (definitely denying plurality to the Oneness of the world) statement that “One God” fills everything in existence, and thus everything in existence is filled with Divine manifestations. To interpret this phrase otherwise could only turn it into a joke, and I am absolutely sure that neither Thales, nor Aristotle, to whom we owe the knowledge of this phrase, meant it that way.
My argument that monism necessarily implies monotheism is so compelling, and my conclusion about the ancient Greek thinkers being monotheists is so natural, that I hardly require a reassurance in its correctness. Nevertheless, it is always nice to find corroborations of my theses in highly respectable sources, such as, in this case, in Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy, Chapter XIV:
"Before philosophy began," Bertrand Russell writes, "the Greeks had a theory, or feeling, about the Universe, which may be called religious, or ethical. According to this theory, every person and every thing has his or its appointed place, and appointed function. This does not depend on the fiat of Zeus, for Zeus himself is subject to the same kind of law, as governs others..." In other words, Zeus, even though generally regarded as the superior Deity among the Olympians, is inferior to a higher force, which does not dwell in a locus, nor inside time, as Zeus does, but governs the world transcendentally and eternally. "This theory is connected with the idea of fate or necessity." Which words can be substitutes for manifestations of a single Deity.
The connection between monism and monotheism is further illuminated by the following Russell passage on Spinoza’s logical monism, in the Spinoza chapter of the History of Western Philosophy:
"Spinoza’s metaphysic is the best example of what may be called “logical monism”--- the doctrine, namely, that the world as a whole is a single substance..." (here is a logical progression from a single substance being the source of the world to its continuing to be the nature of the world, or its essence), "none of whose parts are logically capable of existing alone."
(Within the teleological logic of Creation, the principle that God’s Design has not produced anything either superfluous or inherently deficient, easily leads to the conclusion that everything in our world is interconnected and interdependent, and thus, not intended to exist alone! It therefore provides a good, sound foundation to Spinoza’s “logical monism,” without for a moment making the terms monotheism and pantheism, the latter in a very general sense, mutually exclusive.)
This concludes the present entry, but the subject continues in the next one (Anti-Monism And Monotheism), to be posted tomorrow.
The God subsection continues, with no end in sight. The reader may be surprised by my preoccupation with the God theme, and indeed, most of the entries in this philosophical section are either God-centered or God-related, and even the title of this section testifies to the importance of the God concept to my understanding of philosophy. But this should come as no surprise, considering that philosophy can not avoid this subject, and even the most atheistic philosophies smuggle in the God idea, disguised under a different name. On the other hand, all normal philosophies have God as their central subject, and none other than the great Spinoza (the purest philosopher, according to Nietzsche), has been known to us as ein Gottbetrunkener Mensch, and his philosophy is naturally all about God. For curious reference only, the key word God occupies sixty-four lines in the Index to Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy while the key word Philosophy takes up just thirty-seven lines there, and the key word Ethics, thirty-six lines!
Now, returning to the subject of the present entry, which is not counting lines in book indexes, I remember, with an unfailing amusement, how I had a theological discussion with a certain Baptist preacher, and I told him something to the effect of how the philosophical monism of the ancient Greeks was indicative of their dismissive attitude toward polytheism, and of their actual belief in One God, at which point this good man jumped to correct me, as I was obviously trying to say “monotheism,” but misspoke “monism” instead. Oh, dear! Needless to say, had he been right, I must have said something so terribly truistic and nonsensical (it would have amounted to saying that monotheism is indicative of the belief in one God), that it would have been an awfully stupid thing to say at all.
But what I actually said was much more interesting. The definition of monism is the belief, or doctrine, that a single substance, or principle, accounts for the origin of the world, or, to put it into a more stylized, poetic form, the belief in the “oneness of the all.” It is my natural conclusion, accordingly, that no self-respecting monist would be respectful of a plurality of gods, who must have been spawned out of that one substance, and are therefore posterior, and theologically inferior to it. In my treatment of Thales, the first philosopher and also a water-monist, I regard him as a clear monotheistic thinker, and his famous phrase “All things are full of gods,” to me, is by no means a polytheistic credo, which some minor philosophical commentators are so eager to suggest, but it should be understood as ‘Everything is penetrated by the sparks of Divinity,’ or as a pantheistic, yet also unmistakably monotheistic (definitely denying plurality to the Oneness of the world) statement that “One God” fills everything in existence, and thus everything in existence is filled with Divine manifestations. To interpret this phrase otherwise could only turn it into a joke, and I am absolutely sure that neither Thales, nor Aristotle, to whom we owe the knowledge of this phrase, meant it that way.
My argument that monism necessarily implies monotheism is so compelling, and my conclusion about the ancient Greek thinkers being monotheists is so natural, that I hardly require a reassurance in its correctness. Nevertheless, it is always nice to find corroborations of my theses in highly respectable sources, such as, in this case, in Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy, Chapter XIV:
"Before philosophy began," Bertrand Russell writes, "the Greeks had a theory, or feeling, about the Universe, which may be called religious, or ethical. According to this theory, every person and every thing has his or its appointed place, and appointed function. This does not depend on the fiat of Zeus, for Zeus himself is subject to the same kind of law, as governs others..." In other words, Zeus, even though generally regarded as the superior Deity among the Olympians, is inferior to a higher force, which does not dwell in a locus, nor inside time, as Zeus does, but governs the world transcendentally and eternally. "This theory is connected with the idea of fate or necessity." Which words can be substitutes for manifestations of a single Deity.
The connection between monism and monotheism is further illuminated by the following Russell passage on Spinoza’s logical monism, in the Spinoza chapter of the History of Western Philosophy:
"Spinoza’s metaphysic is the best example of what may be called “logical monism”--- the doctrine, namely, that the world as a whole is a single substance..." (here is a logical progression from a single substance being the source of the world to its continuing to be the nature of the world, or its essence), "none of whose parts are logically capable of existing alone."
(Within the teleological logic of Creation, the principle that God’s Design has not produced anything either superfluous or inherently deficient, easily leads to the conclusion that everything in our world is interconnected and interdependent, and thus, not intended to exist alone! It therefore provides a good, sound foundation to Spinoza’s “logical monism,” without for a moment making the terms monotheism and pantheism, the latter in a very general sense, mutually exclusive.)
This concludes the present entry, but the subject continues in the next one (Anti-Monism And Monotheism), to be posted tomorrow.
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