BAD CONSCIENCE AND INSTINCT FOR FREEDOM. PART III OF 3.

Let us now proceed with excerpts from Nietzsche’s Genealogie-2^nd Essay: 16 and 17, extensively annotated by me both within the text, and following the quote, loaded with deep meaning, and illuminated by non-stop lightning strikes of his inexhaustible genius.---

“I regard bad conscience as the serious illness (the question of whether this “serious illness” is terminal, or only temporary, will be instantly answered by Nietzsche’s own clarification next) contracted by man under stress, when he found himself finally enclosed within the walls of society and of peace. All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward, this is what I call the internalization of man. (As you can see, I have chosen not to put my next comment right after the sentence-ending word ‘peace,’ which would have been natural, but that temptation has been resisted for the reason that the reader may well conjecture. Yes, we are dealing here with that same touchy subject of the cathartic effect of war on society, prominent in Hegel, and even more explicitly stated in Dostoyevsky, but here, in Nietzsche, receiving its psychiatric rationale. Internalization of man is, therefore, the clinical description of the disease of social degeneration, caused by man’s prolonged confinement within the tight prison walls of peace!) Thus it was that man first developed what was later called his soul. (I cannot accept such a definition of soul, of course, for obvious reasons, but Nietzsche is hardly offering this as a definition of anything. This is an idea caught within the moment of creation, one of those bright illuminating lightning strikes that I was talking about before, and it must be treasured as such. Precisely speaking, we are dealing here with only one aspect of soul and a rather fetid one at that, I dare say… but not with “soul” as such!) Those fearful bulwarks, with which the political organization protected itself against old instincts of freedom--- punishments belong among these bulwarks ---brought about that all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man turned backward against man himself. That is the origin of the “bad conscience.”

The instinct for freedom (how about freedom in this context, our smart-alecky freedom-lovers, sending this nation’s troops to foreign lands in the name of… ‘freedom,’-- is this river too deep for you?!) forcibly made latent, pushed back and repressed, and finally able to vent itself only on itself: that alone is what the bad conscience is in its beginnings. Genealogie-2-16 & 17.

Here is vintage Nietzsche, terrifically useful for my purpose, and in several ways.

First, how about the theory of freedom? This wonderful passage is an absolute must in all my deliberations on the nature of freedom and liberty, two words too badly misused and made incomprehensible by overuse and indiscriminate thoughtless abuse these days.

To get serious however, the concept of freedom poses exactly the same sort of difficulty that the concept of democracy does: where do we draw the line between good freedom and bad freedom, the freedom which we love and promote, and the freedom we find objectionable and suppress through law enforcement, and such. Not a simple question, not an easy answer. But look at all the Bacchanalia of freedom-loving sloganeering and propaganda around us! It leaves no place for serious thinking; just toe the line and cheer!

But here is some really serious thinking: Nietzsche writing about “the instinct for freedom” in Passage 17. What is very clear is that our professors have been slightly confused, or rather deliberately confusing, about these two things: democracy and freedom. The latter is, of course, a natural force, an instinct, as Nietzsche puts it, and Hobbes in his definition of freedom as absence of external impediments suggests the existence of the same natural law, or law of nature, from which all instincts are derived.

But democracy, as I have already said, is very different. All philosophers agree in this that every man at all times wants to impose his will on others. Which means that he does not want to be left out of the political process. But his will to power does not mean a will to power-sharing. The social contract, or covenant of any kind, to use Hobbesian language, is drawn up for this very reason: to prevent individuals from striving for the same object, leaving them in a perpetual state of war. Peace is bought at the price of every man’s--- except the absolute ruler’s--- deprivation of liberty. Thus, war is a natural aspiration of freedom, and peace is an “external impediment” to it.

Thus, every social contract is drawn to restrain man’s natural ‘freedom,’ but it does not follow that having been deprived of it, he would prefer democracy over a strong one-man rule. Read history books, professors! Maybe you can still learn something…

An afterthought of sorts… Incidentally, Nietzsche is the precursor-genius of modern European philosophy, which, as I see it, is bent, with spectacular unsuccess, on philosophical analysis. But is the disease curable? Thinking “positive,” this remains an open question.

The End.