Among educated laymen, and possibly among professionals too, Bertrand Russell’s best-known phrase must be “the present King of France is bald,” which provides a powerful illustration to his theory of descriptions. Russell insists that this proposition is neither true nor false, as there is no king in France (in his time, as well as in ours).
It is not my intention to argue with him about this matter, trying to convince anybody that, indeed, there is a bona fide King in France today, or, for that matter, to agree that there is nothing of the kind. My intention is to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that all subjects of such propositions are relative, and it is very hard to insist on the truth or falsity of any statement, or even to cop out of pronouncing a judgment by saying that something is neutral in this respect, meaning neither-nor.
Let us imagine a very reasonable situation that there are some people in the world who consciously contend that France is still considered a monarchy by the French monarchists and point to the “rightful pretender” to the throne. Thus, although France is not juridically a monarchy, the subject identified as “the present king of France” is real, and it can be predicated, turning the phrase above into a normal subject-predicate sentence, contrary to what Russell says about it.
To get any obstinate nitpickers out of the way, I will just add that, aside from France, there have been many other nations on earth where the Russell question of whether they have a King, or a Shah, or a Grand Prince is at least arguable. England did have a King (Charles II) throughout Cromwell’s Protected Commonwealth, even if one could get in big trouble for saying it. The Russians, even today, have two Romanov claimants to the Russian throne, even if the likelihood of either one’s ascension to the throne is lurking somewhere in the whereabouts of zero.
My larger point, however, is to suggest that, just like in the case of “the present King of France,” where the nonsensicalness of the subject can be reasonably disputed, there is no lawful subject among the members of the regular subject-predicate community, whose legitimacy cannot be disputed by a competent “lawyer.”
There are no unassailable truths under the sun that could not be exposed as lies. There are no statements that could not be contradicted. There are no perennial idols that could not be knocked off their marble pedestals. There are only propositions that can be accepted axiomatically, by postulate.
This whole line of thinking has very interesting repercussions, which I encourage the reader to dwell on.
It is not my intention to argue with him about this matter, trying to convince anybody that, indeed, there is a bona fide King in France today, or, for that matter, to agree that there is nothing of the kind. My intention is to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that all subjects of such propositions are relative, and it is very hard to insist on the truth or falsity of any statement, or even to cop out of pronouncing a judgment by saying that something is neutral in this respect, meaning neither-nor.
Let us imagine a very reasonable situation that there are some people in the world who consciously contend that France is still considered a monarchy by the French monarchists and point to the “rightful pretender” to the throne. Thus, although France is not juridically a monarchy, the subject identified as “the present king of France” is real, and it can be predicated, turning the phrase above into a normal subject-predicate sentence, contrary to what Russell says about it.
To get any obstinate nitpickers out of the way, I will just add that, aside from France, there have been many other nations on earth where the Russell question of whether they have a King, or a Shah, or a Grand Prince is at least arguable. England did have a King (Charles II) throughout Cromwell’s Protected Commonwealth, even if one could get in big trouble for saying it. The Russians, even today, have two Romanov claimants to the Russian throne, even if the likelihood of either one’s ascension to the throne is lurking somewhere in the whereabouts of zero.
My larger point, however, is to suggest that, just like in the case of “the present King of France,” where the nonsensicalness of the subject can be reasonably disputed, there is no lawful subject among the members of the regular subject-predicate community, whose legitimacy cannot be disputed by a competent “lawyer.”
There are no unassailable truths under the sun that could not be exposed as lies. There are no statements that could not be contradicted. There are no perennial idols that could not be knocked off their marble pedestals. There are only propositions that can be accepted axiomatically, by postulate.
This whole line of thinking has very interesting repercussions, which I encourage the reader to dwell on.
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