What is truth? According to my own definition, which will be elaborated in a long series of entries later on in this section, truth is the basic postulated premise at the bottom of every creation. Generally speaking, truth is a terribly complicated philosophical concept, and the question may be deceptively easy to answer, and in all likelihood this answer, whether it be charmingly childish or inanely pompous, will be philosophically inadequate. Therefore, there is a certain appealing simplicity in shielding one’s own inadequacy by the highest possible authority, responding “Truth is God!” Indeed, in all monotheistic religions (which are of course the only kind of serious religion), Truth is an attribute of God, and, therefore, considering the unknowability of God as a whole, we may describe Him by any of His attributes, provided that each of these attributes is seen as an absolute category, which does not exist anywhere in the Universe, as there is only one God, and each of His Divine attributes is absolutely unique with Him.
And, needless to say, by appealing to this transcendental, and virtually incomprehensible, mega-truth, our ability, as well as responsibility, to address the more tangible entity, which may be called “mini-truth,” has been compromised, and effectively relinquished. No wonder, then, that virtually all other responses to the question “What is truth?” except that “Truth is God!” are mostly naïve and largely disingenuous.
But, on the other hand, there can be no truth, in the sense of mini-truth, without a belief. The truth must be absolute, because it cannot be allowed to become relativistic, when it completely loses its meaning, and we cannot conceive of the Absolute without reaching out to the Eternity, with belief serving as our vehicle. If belief is a lie, this does not lead us into a dead end, seeing that the truth has a lie as a necessary condition to its perception. Such absurdity will only mean that our moral definitions are deficient, and that we must seek better definitions. “Revaluation of Values” again!!! However, we must not start from naught. Our starting point for all and any morality has to be, yes, “God is Truth!!!” Not axiomatically, hypothetically, logically, etc., but by sheer definition. Truth must be defined in absolute terms, so that it does not become a relative value, “amended” at will in the course of successive generations by something like a two-thirds majority, or other such nonsense. The only absolute is God by definition. Therefore, truth belongs with God, and the reverse formulation of the previous is also necessarily true: “Truth is God.”
But let us continue with this important discussion, looking at truth both in its absolute infinity, and in its practical applications.
When we say God is truth, we point to the infinite quality of truth by identifying it with the infinite nature of God. In this universal sense, Truth is almost synonymous with Goodness, while Falsehood belongs with the Devil, which makes it evil (and, as I will be later arguing, finite!).
The Goodness of Truth is indispensable to ethics. Without such identification in infinity, truth loses all its meaning, both universal and practical, in limited applications. It is, therefore, essential for our morality to keep their connection not just in mind, but also in sharp focus. For this reason, I find the following passage in Hobbes’s Leviathan (I-4) deficient both in scope and in clarity:
“For true and false are attributes of speech, not of things, and where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood,” says Hobbes, “Error there may be, as when we expect what shall not be, or suspect what has not been; but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth.” And now, he goes on to define “truth” in the following way: “Truth consists in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeks precise truth had need to remember what every name he uses stands for and to place it accordingly or else he shall find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime twigs: the more he struggles, the more belimed.”
By deficiency in scope here I do not suggest that we should never attempt limited definitions, for practical purposes. On the contrary, most of our speech deals not with “universalities,” but exactly with such limited practicalities, and, of course, we should always strive after adequate contextual definitions. However, in the instance of such a highly charged concept as truth, disengagement from universality is bound to cause some serious problems in the import of our idea. Characteristically, Hobbes, immediately following this passage, goes on to say that geometry rests on pre-settled definitions (therefore implying its truthfulness), but, as I’ve said in numerous places elsewhere, the only truthfulness geometry possesses is the specific truthfulness of its fiction. I doubt if Hobbes would have agreed with me on this point, and, besides, he has already gone on record, contrasting the allegedly true ‘mathematical’ knowledge to its ‘dogmatic’ counterpart.
As a consequence of what I have called his deficiency in scope, there is also a definite deficiency in clarity. A clear distinction between falsehood and error, the former as a deliberate lie, and the latter as an ‘honest’ mistake, has ceased to exist. On the contrary, according to Hobbes, a bad definition results in a falsehood, and, eventually, his whole argument stops making any sense.
And yet, the whole (I-4) in Leviathan is a wonderful treatise on the importance of good definitions, which brightly shines as soon as we rub the metaphysical casuistic regarding the truth off its golden surface. As a matter of fact, my theory of the “truth of fiction” is uncannily harmonious with Hobbes’s insistence on the correlation between truth and denotative accuracy. The following passage, for instance, is nearly perfect:
“By this it appears how necessary it is for anyone who aspires to true knowledge to examine the definitions of former authors and either to correct them where they are negligently set down or to make them himself. For, the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lies the foundation of their errors.”
(And then, as long as we are on this subject, here is a priceless gem of relevance for our mentally-troubled time: “For words are wise men’s counters; they do but reckon by them: but they are the money of fools who value them by the authority of Aristotle, Cicero or Thomas or of any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man.” The special irony of this marvelous sentence is, of course, that today our ‘doctors’ are by no means any of the above, mentioned by their names, and their so-called “expert authority” has an even better reason to be called into question.)
Before I leave this entry (but by no means the subject it raises), here is a postscript which brings us back to a slightly different subject, related, however, through the exactly the same question asked, and only slightly differently (but what a difference!) answered.
When a Christian answers the question “What is Truth?” by replying “Jesus Christ!,” he makes no attempt at becoming a philosopher (which would have been possible with the ‘God’ reply), but in fact he undermines any possibility of a valuable philosophical discussion by merely expressing his religious belief, you take it, or leave it. Pity! This question, however, is too important to be reduced to religion alone. Each great culture has its own religion, and also the cults, the sects, and all other sorts, including the non-religious,--- all have their own understanding of God, and, therefore, their own definitions of truth. Too many ‘gods,’ usually at odds with each other, and too many truths, to hope to find a common denominator that could serve us all as some sort of an international ethical standard, generating the necessary common concepts of International Justice, or such. Here is the real problem identified and posited. It does not matter who agrees or disagrees with what, as long as this problem is understood, and the objective necessity to have it resolved is realized. Then finding a solution becomes the issue. Therefore, we must definitely raise these vital ethical concepts, which I have mentioned, above the all-too-vague level of mere belief to the higher level of Reason, which is the level of philosophy, by giving the proper reply to the question of What is Truth?: “God, by definition!”
As we can clearly see, this reply is absolutely consistent with all religious beliefs (even with atheism, if the value of this “interfaith” approach is properly represented to the non-believer, who, as an exception, rather than the rule within his own cultural tradition, does not pose a problem, except in a frivolously posturing debate), but being theologically-general rather than religion-specific, is not offensive toward any particular religion, among those of them, of course, that are of definite international cultural significance.
And, needless to say, by appealing to this transcendental, and virtually incomprehensible, mega-truth, our ability, as well as responsibility, to address the more tangible entity, which may be called “mini-truth,” has been compromised, and effectively relinquished. No wonder, then, that virtually all other responses to the question “What is truth?” except that “Truth is God!” are mostly naïve and largely disingenuous.
But, on the other hand, there can be no truth, in the sense of mini-truth, without a belief. The truth must be absolute, because it cannot be allowed to become relativistic, when it completely loses its meaning, and we cannot conceive of the Absolute without reaching out to the Eternity, with belief serving as our vehicle. If belief is a lie, this does not lead us into a dead end, seeing that the truth has a lie as a necessary condition to its perception. Such absurdity will only mean that our moral definitions are deficient, and that we must seek better definitions. “Revaluation of Values” again!!! However, we must not start from naught. Our starting point for all and any morality has to be, yes, “God is Truth!!!” Not axiomatically, hypothetically, logically, etc., but by sheer definition. Truth must be defined in absolute terms, so that it does not become a relative value, “amended” at will in the course of successive generations by something like a two-thirds majority, or other such nonsense. The only absolute is God by definition. Therefore, truth belongs with God, and the reverse formulation of the previous is also necessarily true: “Truth is God.”
But let us continue with this important discussion, looking at truth both in its absolute infinity, and in its practical applications.
When we say God is truth, we point to the infinite quality of truth by identifying it with the infinite nature of God. In this universal sense, Truth is almost synonymous with Goodness, while Falsehood belongs with the Devil, which makes it evil (and, as I will be later arguing, finite!).
The Goodness of Truth is indispensable to ethics. Without such identification in infinity, truth loses all its meaning, both universal and practical, in limited applications. It is, therefore, essential for our morality to keep their connection not just in mind, but also in sharp focus. For this reason, I find the following passage in Hobbes’s Leviathan (I-4) deficient both in scope and in clarity:
“For true and false are attributes of speech, not of things, and where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood,” says Hobbes, “Error there may be, as when we expect what shall not be, or suspect what has not been; but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth.” And now, he goes on to define “truth” in the following way: “Truth consists in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeks precise truth had need to remember what every name he uses stands for and to place it accordingly or else he shall find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime twigs: the more he struggles, the more belimed.”
By deficiency in scope here I do not suggest that we should never attempt limited definitions, for practical purposes. On the contrary, most of our speech deals not with “universalities,” but exactly with such limited practicalities, and, of course, we should always strive after adequate contextual definitions. However, in the instance of such a highly charged concept as truth, disengagement from universality is bound to cause some serious problems in the import of our idea. Characteristically, Hobbes, immediately following this passage, goes on to say that geometry rests on pre-settled definitions (therefore implying its truthfulness), but, as I’ve said in numerous places elsewhere, the only truthfulness geometry possesses is the specific truthfulness of its fiction. I doubt if Hobbes would have agreed with me on this point, and, besides, he has already gone on record, contrasting the allegedly true ‘mathematical’ knowledge to its ‘dogmatic’ counterpart.
As a consequence of what I have called his deficiency in scope, there is also a definite deficiency in clarity. A clear distinction between falsehood and error, the former as a deliberate lie, and the latter as an ‘honest’ mistake, has ceased to exist. On the contrary, according to Hobbes, a bad definition results in a falsehood, and, eventually, his whole argument stops making any sense.
And yet, the whole (I-4) in Leviathan is a wonderful treatise on the importance of good definitions, which brightly shines as soon as we rub the metaphysical casuistic regarding the truth off its golden surface. As a matter of fact, my theory of the “truth of fiction” is uncannily harmonious with Hobbes’s insistence on the correlation between truth and denotative accuracy. The following passage, for instance, is nearly perfect:
“By this it appears how necessary it is for anyone who aspires to true knowledge to examine the definitions of former authors and either to correct them where they are negligently set down or to make them himself. For, the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lies the foundation of their errors.”
(And then, as long as we are on this subject, here is a priceless gem of relevance for our mentally-troubled time: “For words are wise men’s counters; they do but reckon by them: but they are the money of fools who value them by the authority of Aristotle, Cicero or Thomas or of any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man.” The special irony of this marvelous sentence is, of course, that today our ‘doctors’ are by no means any of the above, mentioned by their names, and their so-called “expert authority” has an even better reason to be called into question.)
Before I leave this entry (but by no means the subject it raises), here is a postscript which brings us back to a slightly different subject, related, however, through the exactly the same question asked, and only slightly differently (but what a difference!) answered.
When a Christian answers the question “What is Truth?” by replying “Jesus Christ!,” he makes no attempt at becoming a philosopher (which would have been possible with the ‘God’ reply), but in fact he undermines any possibility of a valuable philosophical discussion by merely expressing his religious belief, you take it, or leave it. Pity! This question, however, is too important to be reduced to religion alone. Each great culture has its own religion, and also the cults, the sects, and all other sorts, including the non-religious,--- all have their own understanding of God, and, therefore, their own definitions of truth. Too many ‘gods,’ usually at odds with each other, and too many truths, to hope to find a common denominator that could serve us all as some sort of an international ethical standard, generating the necessary common concepts of International Justice, or such. Here is the real problem identified and posited. It does not matter who agrees or disagrees with what, as long as this problem is understood, and the objective necessity to have it resolved is realized. Then finding a solution becomes the issue. Therefore, we must definitely raise these vital ethical concepts, which I have mentioned, above the all-too-vague level of mere belief to the higher level of Reason, which is the level of philosophy, by giving the proper reply to the question of What is Truth?: “God, by definition!”
As we can clearly see, this reply is absolutely consistent with all religious beliefs (even with atheism, if the value of this “interfaith” approach is properly represented to the non-believer, who, as an exception, rather than the rule within his own cultural tradition, does not pose a problem, except in a frivolously posturing debate), but being theologically-general rather than religion-specific, is not offensive toward any particular religion, among those of them, of course, that are of definite international cultural significance.
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