As I am about to talk a little bit in this entry about redefining the terms materialism and idealism, I should, perhaps, tentatively refer my reader to the general philosophical entry about this: Materialism And Idealism Redefined in the Philosophy section, which I will be posting later.
Meanwhile, it is my purpose in the present entry to demonstrate that Marx and Marxism, under my revised definition, do not meet the criteria of “materialism” but, quite uncannily, fall under the criteria of "idealism." Materialism is most commonly described as “the view that all facts (including facts about the human mind and will and the course of human history) are causally dependent upon physical processes, or reducible to them.” (Britannica.) “The course of history,” Britannica moves further, “is determined by the interaction of masses of people and masses of material things, in such a way as to be predictable without reference to the ‘higher’ processes of thought and will.” The second sentence is very interesting in that, instead of giving us a useful independent description of the materialistic approach to history, so that we could ourselves apply it to Marx, to see if it fits or not, my clear impression is that this thing goes the other way round, and Marxism is taken in this case as the starting point, to enlighten us as to the meaning of materialism in history.
“Materialism is thus opposed to philosophical dualism, or Idealism,” Britannica continues. “Materialistic views insist upon settling questions by reference to public observation and not to private intuition.” Since Marx’s view of history is not based on such public observation, but rather on his private intuition, we must make an exception here right away, and Britannica does it by stating that Marx, indeed, offered a new kind of materialism, which apparently had not existed before him, that is, “dialectical materialism.” (Don’t get me wrong, though. I am not singling Britannica out for some special ridicule. On the contrary, Britannica being among the most reputable encyclopedic authorities in the world, I am quoting it as the gold standard of science, on this issue.)
The world seems to know for a fact that Marx was a materialist, because he himself called himself one. But he was well aware, of course, that his materialism was altogether suspect, that’s why he called it by the new name dialectical materialism, and had to explain that it was completely different from the old materialism of his materialistic predecessors. Those, he argued, were mistakenly regarding sensation as passive, which attributed activity mostly to the object. But all matter being an objective reality given to us in perceptions, all perception is an active interaction between the subject and the object. Observe how subtly, but surely, he is substituting the philosophical monism of materialism with his own brand of philosophical dualism, which generally falls under the jurisdiction of idealism, except that Marx refuses to call it so.
It is the active interaction of the objective reality and the subject in the state of knowing it, which constitutes Marx’s materialism. It may be argued by Marx himself that, in his case, the knower apprehends reality via pure reason, and not via spontaneous apprehension, that is, intuition, but such thinking is clearly defective, as it would deny any legitimacy whatsoever to intuition as a mode of apprehension, and it turns into a false premise right away. At least, one must admit that intuition is a partner of reason in the cognitive process, but as soon as we allow intuition into Marx’s dialectical materialism, its idealistic “dark side of the moon” is immediately exposed.
Whether Marx sees himself as a Hegelian Spirit, in the course of such dialectic interaction between subject and object, or holds a proxy on behalf of the toiling masses (the first is actually more consistent with Marx thus describing the task of philosophy: “Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, but the real task is to alter it.” It is not the proletariat, mind you, who is allotted the task of altering the world, but the new philosopher, and we do not have to guess too wildly as to who this philosopher is, in Marx’s mind), there is no way of denying the existence of, well, something, striving to reach the Ideal, the Absolute. His Communism is, of course, such an Absolute, on reaching which, the course of all human history comes to a glorious stop, as if Faust had just exclaimed, “Linger awhile, [moment]! so fair thou art!”
Despite all his protestations to the contrary, Karl Marx is a historical idealist, for the simple reason that he idealizes history. Without any hesitation, he moralizes the historical progress, making the course of history look suspiciously close to the workings of intelligent design. I have already noted on several occasions that his communism appears to be extremely close to Christian Communism, with regard to every tiny detail of their respective organizations, including, most notably, their common view of money and private property, and their abolition of both, within their respective communities, when their common shining hour, the kairos, finally comes through…
Meanwhile, it is my purpose in the present entry to demonstrate that Marx and Marxism, under my revised definition, do not meet the criteria of “materialism” but, quite uncannily, fall under the criteria of "idealism." Materialism is most commonly described as “the view that all facts (including facts about the human mind and will and the course of human history) are causally dependent upon physical processes, or reducible to them.” (Britannica.) “The course of history,” Britannica moves further, “is determined by the interaction of masses of people and masses of material things, in such a way as to be predictable without reference to the ‘higher’ processes of thought and will.” The second sentence is very interesting in that, instead of giving us a useful independent description of the materialistic approach to history, so that we could ourselves apply it to Marx, to see if it fits or not, my clear impression is that this thing goes the other way round, and Marxism is taken in this case as the starting point, to enlighten us as to the meaning of materialism in history.
“Materialism is thus opposed to philosophical dualism, or Idealism,” Britannica continues. “Materialistic views insist upon settling questions by reference to public observation and not to private intuition.” Since Marx’s view of history is not based on such public observation, but rather on his private intuition, we must make an exception here right away, and Britannica does it by stating that Marx, indeed, offered a new kind of materialism, which apparently had not existed before him, that is, “dialectical materialism.” (Don’t get me wrong, though. I am not singling Britannica out for some special ridicule. On the contrary, Britannica being among the most reputable encyclopedic authorities in the world, I am quoting it as the gold standard of science, on this issue.)
The world seems to know for a fact that Marx was a materialist, because he himself called himself one. But he was well aware, of course, that his materialism was altogether suspect, that’s why he called it by the new name dialectical materialism, and had to explain that it was completely different from the old materialism of his materialistic predecessors. Those, he argued, were mistakenly regarding sensation as passive, which attributed activity mostly to the object. But all matter being an objective reality given to us in perceptions, all perception is an active interaction between the subject and the object. Observe how subtly, but surely, he is substituting the philosophical monism of materialism with his own brand of philosophical dualism, which generally falls under the jurisdiction of idealism, except that Marx refuses to call it so.
It is the active interaction of the objective reality and the subject in the state of knowing it, which constitutes Marx’s materialism. It may be argued by Marx himself that, in his case, the knower apprehends reality via pure reason, and not via spontaneous apprehension, that is, intuition, but such thinking is clearly defective, as it would deny any legitimacy whatsoever to intuition as a mode of apprehension, and it turns into a false premise right away. At least, one must admit that intuition is a partner of reason in the cognitive process, but as soon as we allow intuition into Marx’s dialectical materialism, its idealistic “dark side of the moon” is immediately exposed.
Whether Marx sees himself as a Hegelian Spirit, in the course of such dialectic interaction between subject and object, or holds a proxy on behalf of the toiling masses (the first is actually more consistent with Marx thus describing the task of philosophy: “Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, but the real task is to alter it.” It is not the proletariat, mind you, who is allotted the task of altering the world, but the new philosopher, and we do not have to guess too wildly as to who this philosopher is, in Marx’s mind), there is no way of denying the existence of, well, something, striving to reach the Ideal, the Absolute. His Communism is, of course, such an Absolute, on reaching which, the course of all human history comes to a glorious stop, as if Faust had just exclaimed, “Linger awhile, [moment]! so fair thou art!”
Despite all his protestations to the contrary, Karl Marx is a historical idealist, for the simple reason that he idealizes history. Without any hesitation, he moralizes the historical progress, making the course of history look suspiciously close to the workings of intelligent design. I have already noted on several occasions that his communism appears to be extremely close to Christian Communism, with regard to every tiny detail of their respective organizations, including, most notably, their common view of money and private property, and their abolition of both, within their respective communities, when their common shining hour, the kairos, finally comes through…
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