Nietzsche’s iconoclastic reputation is, no doubt, richly deserved. His irreverent manner of close scrutiny of everything he wishes to examine, religion included, is bound to offend the religious sensibilities of anyone without exception, whoever accepts the first part of Nietzsche’s own dictum: “Of what is great (in this case meaning sacred) one must either be silent or speak with greatness (meaning with reverent trepidation).”
But here, in being just the first part of a two-part whole lies the key to the puzzle. Nietzsche does not deny greatness to the sacred. However, in his inimitable lexicon, to speak “with greatness that means cynically and with innocence.”
One can argue that genuine innocence, that is, being without guile, without a hidden agenda, and without all those self-imposed restraints on free speech, described by the modern-day term political correctness, can be equated to cynicism in its most refined manifestation. Or, putting it more accurately, cynicism, in one of its essential connotations, is an inherent quality of innocence. But then, again, one can argue that cynicism, in a slightly different connotation, is the opposite of innocence, which is the utmost level of sophistication. For instance, the epitome of worldly sophistication Oscar Wilde is known as a great cynic, and no one can ever suspect him of the possession of as little as one iota of innocence. But this little argument returns us to the question raised in several previous entries, concerning the dependence of meaning on the context, as well as on the specific angle of vision, employed in the definition.
Ironically, getting back to the roots of Greek philosophical cynicism, we find out that neither definition of cynicism quite fits the original, and if either of them is to be preferred, Oscar Wilde’s cynicism would win over Nietzsche’s cynicism hands down. But, as all linguists have known for ages, the etymology of a term gives no authority to the parameters of its usage, and, in this case, cannot be cast as the decisive weight on the scale of either argument, which leaves the issue delightfully unresolved, for the benefit of all wordplays and double entendres.
Returning however to the subject of our entry, it is not Oscar Wilde’s sophisticated cynicism that Nietzsche is talking about, but the guileless offensiveness of a childlike innocent, and so in the Nietzschean context his understanding of cynicism as on a par with innocence, wins hands down.
And this is how he speaks, and this is how his speech is mistaken for blasphemy, whereas I see no offense in what he says.
But here, in being just the first part of a two-part whole lies the key to the puzzle. Nietzsche does not deny greatness to the sacred. However, in his inimitable lexicon, to speak “with greatness that means cynically and with innocence.”
One can argue that genuine innocence, that is, being without guile, without a hidden agenda, and without all those self-imposed restraints on free speech, described by the modern-day term political correctness, can be equated to cynicism in its most refined manifestation. Or, putting it more accurately, cynicism, in one of its essential connotations, is an inherent quality of innocence. But then, again, one can argue that cynicism, in a slightly different connotation, is the opposite of innocence, which is the utmost level of sophistication. For instance, the epitome of worldly sophistication Oscar Wilde is known as a great cynic, and no one can ever suspect him of the possession of as little as one iota of innocence. But this little argument returns us to the question raised in several previous entries, concerning the dependence of meaning on the context, as well as on the specific angle of vision, employed in the definition.
Ironically, getting back to the roots of Greek philosophical cynicism, we find out that neither definition of cynicism quite fits the original, and if either of them is to be preferred, Oscar Wilde’s cynicism would win over Nietzsche’s cynicism hands down. But, as all linguists have known for ages, the etymology of a term gives no authority to the parameters of its usage, and, in this case, cannot be cast as the decisive weight on the scale of either argument, which leaves the issue delightfully unresolved, for the benefit of all wordplays and double entendres.
Returning however to the subject of our entry, it is not Oscar Wilde’s sophisticated cynicism that Nietzsche is talking about, but the guileless offensiveness of a childlike innocent, and so in the Nietzschean context his understanding of cynicism as on a par with innocence, wins hands down.
And this is how he speaks, and this is how his speech is mistaken for blasphemy, whereas I see no offense in what he says.
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