The great wisdom of the ancient times that the earth was resting on three whales has long since become an expression of absurdity, which the modern world cannot help laughing at. I much doubt, however, that there is anything one could ever think of in modern wisdom that would have been so carelessly rejected as absurd by the ancient thinkers. As far as I know, the pre-Socratics, for instance, had a great respect for the absurd, and would not have failed to discuss it patiently and in good faith.
Ironically, all theology, but particularly Christian theology, has been based on what any clear-headed outside observer might characterize as absurd, such as, say, the dogma of God becoming man and executed on the cross, to redeem men’s sins; or the dogma of the Trinity, which is three persons, but one God, etc. One may argue that theology must not be confused with philosophy, which we are now discussing, but then, just think how much bona fide philosophy has sprung from Christian theology in an effort to justify and rationalize things which must normally be considered absurd.
My initial thoughts about the philosophy of the absurd, that started me on the road of writing this particular entry, were not triggered, as expected, by something written by Camus (who will be taking the center stage in my entry Absurdism As A Philosophy, to be posted later), but by the following curious excerpt from Nietzsche’s Jenseits. They are not presented here as a criticism of his point, which is unassailable, at least in so far as far as physiology is concerned. The key word of this passage, to me, is “absurd,” and my comment revolves around its implications for philosophy.
“To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist that the sense organs are not phenomena, in the sense of idealistic philosophy; as such they could not be causes!
What? And others even say that the external world is the work of our organs? But then, our body, as a part of this external world, and our organs themselves, would be the work of our organs! This is absurd, as the external world is not the work of our organs…” (Jenseits: 15)
Nietzsche is right, citing “physiology” against some of the more absurd proponents of idealistic philosophy, who outright deny the existence of all objective reality, apparently, just for the heck of it. As for me, I don’t see validity in any absolute positions which are held to the exclusion of others. This is why I am objecting to all philosophers who are trying to play God with their general theories. But I still believe in the freedom of hypothesis, no matter how absurd it sounds, as long as it contributes to the development of human mind by encouraging original thought, and can also serve in some useful applications. Idealistic philosophy, in my opinion, has the legitimacy of any similar ‘hypothesis.’ From the point of view of psychology, for instance, this amounts to an extreme form of eccentricity, rather than egocentricity (a rather peculiar phenomenon), and, as long as the philosopher satisfies himself with “What if?,” I will say, “Why not?” This position is, to me, consistent enough with the Socratic conversation method of inquiry (which is properly called dialectic, in the original sense of the word), where even asinine questions are gladly tolerated, as long as they allow a wise answer.
The only objection to absurd ideas is when their proponent isn’t satisfied with the rules of transparency and the easy-does-it attitude of an intellectual game, and, especially, when he possesses sufficient power over the playing field to promote them beyond the limits of the “reasonable.” Another objection is, of course, if he is just stubborn and annoying, and does not have any sense of humor, in which case, he should be sent away, but his idea may still be allowed to stay, if it possesses the quality of an intellectual challenge.
This contemplation on my part is not included here for nothing else to do. The whole issue of the freedom of thought and freedom of speech is contained in our disposition to tolerate the absurdity of ideas, as long as we are free to express contrary opinions and to engage in free deliberation on the subject. Unfortunately, in so far as political ideas are concerned, the level of intolerance exhibited by the powerful toward all ideas that they dislike, or feel threatened by, turns the whole issue from a simple matter of intellectual exercise into a situation of political persecution, and becomes no fun at all.
And, of course, human nature being the same in the best democracies and worst dictatorships, the way these differ is only in the severity of punishments imposed on the persecuted.
I hope that Nietzsche was fully aware of what I have just suggested, and that he engaged in his dismissal of the idealistic philosophy purely as a matter of polemics, ‘for the heck of it,’ as I said earlier. His random style in general, somehow convinces me that philosophy for him is always a challenge, and never a science. His point, I repeat, is well taken, but, again, it is only as a matter of polemics, where it has indisputable merit.
Ironically, all theology, but particularly Christian theology, has been based on what any clear-headed outside observer might characterize as absurd, such as, say, the dogma of God becoming man and executed on the cross, to redeem men’s sins; or the dogma of the Trinity, which is three persons, but one God, etc. One may argue that theology must not be confused with philosophy, which we are now discussing, but then, just think how much bona fide philosophy has sprung from Christian theology in an effort to justify and rationalize things which must normally be considered absurd.
My initial thoughts about the philosophy of the absurd, that started me on the road of writing this particular entry, were not triggered, as expected, by something written by Camus (who will be taking the center stage in my entry Absurdism As A Philosophy, to be posted later), but by the following curious excerpt from Nietzsche’s Jenseits. They are not presented here as a criticism of his point, which is unassailable, at least in so far as far as physiology is concerned. The key word of this passage, to me, is “absurd,” and my comment revolves around its implications for philosophy.
“To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist that the sense organs are not phenomena, in the sense of idealistic philosophy; as such they could not be causes!
What? And others even say that the external world is the work of our organs? But then, our body, as a part of this external world, and our organs themselves, would be the work of our organs! This is absurd, as the external world is not the work of our organs…” (Jenseits: 15)
Nietzsche is right, citing “physiology” against some of the more absurd proponents of idealistic philosophy, who outright deny the existence of all objective reality, apparently, just for the heck of it. As for me, I don’t see validity in any absolute positions which are held to the exclusion of others. This is why I am objecting to all philosophers who are trying to play God with their general theories. But I still believe in the freedom of hypothesis, no matter how absurd it sounds, as long as it contributes to the development of human mind by encouraging original thought, and can also serve in some useful applications. Idealistic philosophy, in my opinion, has the legitimacy of any similar ‘hypothesis.’ From the point of view of psychology, for instance, this amounts to an extreme form of eccentricity, rather than egocentricity (a rather peculiar phenomenon), and, as long as the philosopher satisfies himself with “What if?,” I will say, “Why not?” This position is, to me, consistent enough with the Socratic conversation method of inquiry (which is properly called dialectic, in the original sense of the word), where even asinine questions are gladly tolerated, as long as they allow a wise answer.
The only objection to absurd ideas is when their proponent isn’t satisfied with the rules of transparency and the easy-does-it attitude of an intellectual game, and, especially, when he possesses sufficient power over the playing field to promote them beyond the limits of the “reasonable.” Another objection is, of course, if he is just stubborn and annoying, and does not have any sense of humor, in which case, he should be sent away, but his idea may still be allowed to stay, if it possesses the quality of an intellectual challenge.
This contemplation on my part is not included here for nothing else to do. The whole issue of the freedom of thought and freedom of speech is contained in our disposition to tolerate the absurdity of ideas, as long as we are free to express contrary opinions and to engage in free deliberation on the subject. Unfortunately, in so far as political ideas are concerned, the level of intolerance exhibited by the powerful toward all ideas that they dislike, or feel threatened by, turns the whole issue from a simple matter of intellectual exercise into a situation of political persecution, and becomes no fun at all.
And, of course, human nature being the same in the best democracies and worst dictatorships, the way these differ is only in the severity of punishments imposed on the persecuted.
I hope that Nietzsche was fully aware of what I have just suggested, and that he engaged in his dismissal of the idealistic philosophy purely as a matter of polemics, ‘for the heck of it,’ as I said earlier. His random style in general, somehow convinces me that philosophy for him is always a challenge, and never a science. His point, I repeat, is well taken, but, again, it is only as a matter of polemics, where it has indisputable merit.
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