Sunday, March 24, 2013

OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE



(Having mostly been written five or so years back, with a part of the first paragraph added to it about a year ago, this entry has not lost its poignancy, in my estimation, but I will let the good reader be the judge of that as I am posting it as is without any new updates or revisions.)

This entry is about the past, present, and future state of Europe, so far, a roller coaster, first fancied united, in Giuseppe Mazzini’s vision, later, after World War II, split into two camps by Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain, next ostensibly united in the European Union, the closest model so far to the practical solution of the United Europe problem, but almost instantaneously split again into old Europe and new Europe, using the sarcastic description of the new fault line, given to it by the American Bush Administration in the new twenty-first century. (It’s been several years since this entry was written, and there is no stop to the cracks in the so conveniently, yet so deceptively shining armor of a “United Europe.” The most recent split along the predictable fault line of the more stable-less stable Europe has zeroed in on the sharp financial problems of the Eurozone, that is, pitting the nations needing to be financially rescued against their terribly reluctant and awfully demanding rescuers… But this story is to be told another day…)
In order to have a better appreciation of the future of Europe, one ought to have a clearer picture of its past, but that picture is still very incomplete and suffering from at least one key distortion which flaw this and my other books and articles have always attempted to address.
While Mazzini and a number of notable others have collectively combined to form the dreamy prehistory of a United Europe, its practical history starts with the… postage stamps inscribed Europa, the creation of Europe’s Common Market and the EEC, European Economic Community, all of this during the Cold War period, and, naturally, limited to the Western-style democracies of Europe. This prototype of the European Union (the old familiar slogan of the United States of Europe could not possibly remain in place, as it was unnecessarily, and unfairly, underscoring Western Europe’s dependence on the United States of America) also became its core when the EU itself came into existence, and it was this essential core that received the mocking nickname Old Europe at the hands of the Bush Administration.
From the collapse of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe, it ostensibly followed that the only obstacle that ever mattered to the unification of Europe having been removed, the EU dream would now be coming true, like the logical conclusion to a mathematically pre-calculated formal sequence of a pre-calculable physical process. In my articles on the future of Europe, published by the Marin Independent Journal twenty years or so ago, I uncharitably called Eastern Europe “a can of worms,” and warned about the coming resentful controversies, political conflicts and outright wars that would threaten to tear Europe apart. My prediction quickly came to pass in Yugoslavia and a number of places elsewhere, but in the meantime, the new pattern of Old Europe versus New Europe was quickly forming, and there was no way to wish it away. In simplest terms it was the question of America’s new role in Europe. Whereas the free nations of old Europe by now were sick and tired of Washington bossing them around, the governments of new Europe to a much larger extent than the people of these nations were welcoming the massive incursion of the American big brother as a promise of coming prosperity, a get-rich-quick dream becoming a reality.
Such is today’s newest fault line cutting across Europe. It is no longer all that much about Russia, as about America. (Except for the fact that it is Russia, which is at the heart of the American expansionist policy in Europe, the fact that few of the new Europeans have realized so far, and when they do, their sobering up is going to be rather unpleasant…) And while the new Europeans are still recklessly flirting with their rapist in the naïve hope of marrying him, the old pros of the west are eyeing these new gals on the block with a wary and anxious eye and growing intense resentment, most certainly regretting their rashness in admitting these newcomers into their common home, which is now threatening to set that home on fire.
So, what is the future of all Europe going to be? I doubt that the European Union as such will collapse any time soon: it is too useful and convenient for too many purposes. Besides, it has already survived a number of domestic disturbances, such as the refusal of some members to sign the European Constitution. So what? we may ask. The Union is not an empire held together by force. As long as they have at least some interests in common, and we can safely assume that this will always be the case, they can retain a flexible structure of their loosely-knit commonwealth, and more or less live happily ever after.
I do not think that a warm rapprochement between Old Europe and the United States is in the cards. New Europe, however, is an unfolding story, which needs to be looked at from the opposite angle. We may assert that its ties to America are at the zenith of their strength, but there are certain factors which complicate their honeymoon, if we may call it that.
It is a standard business practice in America that a new customer in the consumer market is always treated like an honored VIP, showered with various sweetheart incentives, like three months of free HBO, or some free-of-charge gadgets, or even an extension of interest-free credit for your purchase, so that you can enjoy your new acquisition for almost a year, before you start paying for it. This is an attractive business practice, and most consumers are hooked on it. Let us say that New Europe is among such consumers and the spell of euphoria has not worn out yet.
But sooner or later the consumer will have to pay, and let us hope that the reasonable consumer understands that nothing in this business world is for free. I do suspect, however, that the New European consumer has less responsible behavior on his mind. After all, don’t we know that collection on a bad loan is frequently unenforceable even here at home, so how are we supposed to collect from our customer half a world away? But there are also other reasons as well.
Stuck between Russia and Old Europe, the New Europeans have too many needs that the distant America cannot possibly satisfy. They will have to live and cope with their neighbors, and such a practical prospect cannot bode well for Washington’s imperial ambitions. It is, therefore, my sincere prediction that a decade or two from today the current New European waywardness will certainly settle down, and the prodigal sons and daughters of Europe will come back to the home, which, ironically, they never have left.

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