HYLAS AND PHILONOUS

 

To promote his theory of existence through perception, Berkeley uses the quite frequent, since Plato, form of the Dialogue,--- in his case, between a helpful curious questioner (Hylas) and himself (Philonous). Coming to see Philonous, right after the introductory greetings, Hylas asks the first leading question: “Can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to Common Sense, or a more manifest piece of Skepticism, than to believe that there is no such thing as matter?” (Considering that the questioner’s name Hylas relates to the Greek word “hylos,” “matter,” the ironic undertone of the question cannot escape the reader.)

Now Philonous engages Hylas in a typical Socratic discussion, asking questions to which the other answers either yes or no.

“…In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters; but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, etc. Now, that the letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt: but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.” (Hylas: No.) “It seems then, that by sensible things you mean those only which can be perceived immediately by sense?” (Hylas: Yes.) “Doth it not follow from this that, though I see one part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently conclude there must be a cause of that diversity of colors, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing?” (Hylas: Yes.) “In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds?” (Hylas: No.) “The point then is agreed between us that sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense. You will further inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight anything besides light and colors and figures; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate, anything besides tastes; by the smell, besides odors; or by the touch, more than tangible qualities… It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible? Sensible things, therefore, are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?”

Having thus prepared the ground, Philonous launches his attack: “Doth the reality of sensible things consist in being perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?” But the brave Hylas is not ready to concede: “To exist is one thing, and to be perceived is another.” Philonous, however, finishes him off with this famous aquatic argument: “Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other?” To which Hylas concedes: “Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point, and acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations existing in our minds.” Then, taking different senses one by one, Philonous proceeds to convince Hylas that whatever is immediately perceived is an idea, and it is an absurdity to seek any ideas outside the mind.

As the reader may have noticed, Berkeley’s argument sleekly jumps from reality to logic, just like Zeno the Eleatic makes a similar jump in his paradoxes, resulting in nonsense, which is obvious, but rather difficult to refute while remaining on those same logical grounds. And then, as soon as our discussion leaves the terra firma, where common sense is still with us to open our eyes to the presence of absurdity, reaching into the rarefied layers of the upper atmosphere, where thinking, like breathing, becomes more strained, our senses become somewhat blurred, and our argument loses its lifeline to the reality. Otherwise, how could we find Hegel, for instance, subscribing to some of the most outrageous of Berkeley’s absurdities? Here is Russell:

“Berkeley, as we have seen, thinks that there are logical reasons proving that only minds and mental events can exist. This view, on other grounds, is also held by Hegel and his followers. I believe this to be a complete mistake. Such a statement as there was a time before life existed on this planet, whether true or false, cannot be condemned on grounds of logic any more than there are multiplication sums which no one will have ever worked out. To be observed or to be a precept is merely to have effects of certain kinds, and there is no logical reason why all events should have effects of these kinds.”

Russell concludes his Berkeley chapter with this paragraph:

“It will be seen that… a mind and a piece of matter are each of them a group of events.” There is no reason why every event should belong to a group of one kind or the other, and there is no reason why some events shouldn’t belong to both groups; therefore some events may be neither mental nor material and other events may be both. As to this, only detailed empirical considerations can decide.

…One of my Apte Dictums says: Here is a philosophical riddle: God created nonsense, and saw that it was good… It gives two solutions: Solution 1: The Irrational is just as important as The Rational. And Solution 2: Find it at the end of my Berkeley series in the Magnificent Shadows. I hope that the reader understands its meaning now: Only the irrational, that is, nonsense, can lead us off the pedestrian track of thinking into the wild virgin country, where anything becomes possible, and where life becomes truly interesting, poetic, I can say. And, of course, George Berkeley, like a truly great philosopher, leads us into his own realm of nonsense, and that nonsense is good.