There is a connection of sorts
between Leibniz’s published and esoteric philosophies. We shall enter it via
his famous doctrine of many possible worlds. A world is possible if it
does not contradict the laws of logic. In my understanding, any world can start
with any kind of premise, or hypothesis, even the most fantastic one, as long
as the logic of the development of this hypothesis is flawless, in which case,
it is as perfectly viable as any other one. (In other words, which I have been
using, as long as the creation is true within its properly defined boundaries.)
Now, according to Leibniz, an
infinite number of possibilities of world creation existed to God, but, being good,
He could only be satisfied with the creation of the best of all possible
worlds, determined in this case by the greatest excess of good over evil within
it. The existence of evil as such is necessitated within God’s creation by the
presence within it of the goodness of free will, which, being a greater good
than the fact of the collateral evil, wins over the alternative. In other
words, a world with both free will and evil within it (the former cannot
logically exist without the latter) is better than a world without evil, and,
consequently, without freedom of the will. (The preceding discussion shows how
much affinity my own thinking on this subject has with Leibniz’s. It is the
more regrettable, for this reason, that Leibniz was a mean, unpleasant man, in
which aspect of character we are worlds apart with him.)
And now comes the most
philosophically interesting part of Leibniz’s philosophy, even more valuable
for the fact that, looking back, it is unique to him in its complex wholeness.
Rather than retelling it in my own words, which I may eventually end up doing,
let me, once again, quote Bertrand Russell on it:
“There
is… a point, which is very curious. At most times, Leibniz represents the
Creation as a free act of God, requiring the exercise of His Will. According to
this doctrine, the determination of what actually exists is not effected by
observation, but must proceed by way of God’s Goodness. Apart from God’s Goodness,
which leads him to create the best possible world, there is no a
priori reason why one thing should exist, rather than another…
But…
there is a quite different theory as to why some things exist and others,
equally possible, do not. According to this view (laid out in Leibniz’s unpublished papers)
, everything that does not exist struggles to exist, but not all possibles can
exist, because they are not all ‘compossible.’ It may be possible for A
or B to exist on their own but not together in which case A and B are not compossible.
In other words, two or more things are only compossible when it is
possible for all of them to exist together. Leibniz seems to have imagined a
sort of war in the Limbo inhabited by essences all trying to exist; in this
war, groups of compossibles combine, and the largest group of compossibles
wins… Leibniz even uses this conception as a way of defining existence:
“The existent may be defined as that which is compatible with more things
than is anything incompatible with itself… The existent is the being which is
compatible with the most things.”
In this
account there is no mention of God, and apparently no act of creation. Nor is
there need of anything but pure logic for determining what exists. The question
whether A and B are compossible is for Leibniz a logical question: does the
existence of both A and B involve a contradiction? It follows that in
theory logic can decide what group of compossibles is the largest, and this
group consequently will exist.
This is a breathtaking
philosophical exercise on Leibniz’s part squarely putting him in a place of the
highest honor among the pre-Socratics. Compare this to Empedocles’ ontology,
for instance! Alas, poor Nietzsche missed the discovery and publication of
Leibniz’s papers by a few decades; otherwise, he would have been eager to
communicate with him, among those selected underworld shadows, either raising
their number to nine, or at somebody else’s expense. I am particularly
impressed by Leibniz’s leap off the beaten track, by his return to the noble
pre-Socratic origins of philosophy, as well as grateful to him for providing me
with ample intellectual fodder to further develop my truth-of-creation theory.
In Leibniz’s bold and unorthodox cosmogony I see a clash of what I perceive as
incompatible creations, which must coexist in separateness, as the basic
ontological law of coexistence, but, somehow, got themselves embroiled in an
internecine war, by unlawfully intruding into each other’s sovereign territory…
What a supreme intellectual feast! Thank you, Leibniz!
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