PASCAL'S WAGER

Several mathematical theorems and physical laws have received the name of Pascal, such as Pascal’s law, Pascal’s arithmetical triangle; Pascal’s mystic hexagram, etc. But it is his peculiar philosophical theorem, known as Pascal’s wager, which is the subject of this entry. It is developed by him in #233 of his Pensées, which is too lengthy, perhaps, to quote it here in its entirety. But a very short summary of it will make an introduction. God is infinitely incomprehensible, and therefore utterly unknowable. But it is more rational to believe that He exists than the opposite, because the former is either supremely beneficial or totally harmless to us, but the latter is either totally irrelevant or supremely harmful to us, threatening us with eternal damnation.

“God is or He is not. But to which side shall we incline? Reason decides nothing here. There is an infinite chaos separating us. A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance, where heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason, you can do neither the one thing, nor the other; according to reason, you can defend neither of the propositions. Do not, then, reprove for error those who have made a choice; for you know nothing about it. No, but I blame them for having made not this choice, but a choice; for again, both he who chooses heads and he who chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong. The true course is not to wager at all.

Yes, and yet you must wager. This is not optional. You are embarked. Which will you choose? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which interests you the least. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing the one rather than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled… But your happiness?.. Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate the two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.

That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may perhaps wager too much. Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives instead of one, you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play, since you are under the necessity of playing, and it would be imprudent when you are forced to play, not to chance your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain… But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite.

The end of the discourse. Now, what harm will befall you in taking this side? You will be faithful, humble, grateful, generous, a sincere friend, truthful. Certainly, you will not have those poisonous pleasures, glory, and luxury; but will you not have others? I shall tell you that you will thereby gain in this life, and that, at each step you take on this road, you will see so great a certainty of gain, and so much nothingness in what you risk, that you will at last recognize that you have wagered for something certain and infinite, for which you have given nothing.

I have always been against any effort to prove the existence of God. (If knowledge were available, I argue, who would need the faith?) Moreover, should this wager be seen as an attempt to outsmart people of lesser intelligence into believing in God just because this costs you nothing, such an attempt would appear tacky and frivolous, a clever self-promotion of a brainwashing artist to a sympathetic audience. This is not, however, how it ought to be viewed, but primarily as a sophisticated philosophico-logical exercise directed toward philosophically-minded peers: as a deceptively simple challenge to them, rather than as a lure to the crowd, keeping in mind that the Pensées are, indeed, hardly intended for general audiences.

Bearing this in mind, and generally, the great Pascal’s honoris causa, this certain tackiness of his “wager” ought to be unequivocally excused. Yet, on the other hand, the “wager” must not be emulated and repeated by the lesser minds, directing it toward mediocrities just like them. Quod licet Jovi, non licet Bovi!