The central issue
for economics raised by Moore’s ethics is the connection between wealth and
goodness. This has two aspects. The first is the relationship between goodness
and want satisfaction. The view that people are ethically better off by being
materially better off is self-evident only to a hedonist. In Keynes’s ethics,
the link is indirect, and always has to be argued. Secondly, the focus on
states of mind as criteria of goodness draws attention to the conflict between
the states of mind required for economic gain, involving “love of money” and
economic calculation, and those required for the enjoyment of ethical goods.
Much of Keynes’ ethical reasoning in economics centers on these two questions.
Keynes suggests that only states of mind are good in-themselves, but
their goodness can be increased or diminished by the fitness of states
of affairs. For example, it might be harder to enjoy a good state of mind if
suffering from a painful disease or in the presence of an overpowering bad
smell, though the obverse is not necessarily true. Better health or sanitation
does not automatically lead to better states of mind. On the other hand, public
action can more directly increase the goodness of the universe by creating fit
objects of contemplation. The social reformer can claim that by improving the
quality of the objects of experience he is increasing the ethical goodness of
the universe, even if his policies do not at all improve good states of mind in
isolation. The problem for the follower of Moore, who would also be a social
reformer, is with Moore’s class of mixed goods, in which good states of
mind depend on the existence of bad states of affairs. Moore himself gave as an
example the dependence of pity on suffering. Feelings which have positive
ethical value could be said to depend on the existence of the negatives. War
is a prime example of the mixed goods dilemma. To the extent that
social reform rids the world of bad conditions, it may be decreasing the
totality of ethical goodness.
Keynes is hesitant
in the face of this dilemma:
“I am not certain
that all tragic states of affairs are bad on the whole, when everything has
been taken into account or that the goodness of the states of mind if it is
very great may not outweigh the badness of states of affairs. [But] it is
possible, I think, to imagine two states of affairs, one of which is tragic or
unjust, and the other not, such that the states of mind in each are exactly of
equal value, and to believe that the tragic state of affairs is less desirable
than the others.”
This leads to a
quasi-Aristotelian argument for the importance of dramatic arts in an ethically
progressive civilization: “In actual life many
of the feelings, which we deem noblest and most worth having are apt to be
associated with troubles, misfortunes, and disasters. In itself we generally
judge the state of mind of the hero going into battle as good, but it is such a
pity that he should be killed .... If, on the other hand, it were possible to
sympathize with, enjoy second hand, or admire the noble feelings without
the evil happenings, which generally accompany them in real life, we would get
the best of both worlds. Now, it seems to me, the object of Tragedy is
precisely to secure for us a conjuncture in which this comes about. We come
into contact with noble feelings and escape the bad practical consequences.” (Written in 1921.)
The second problem
arising from the loose connection, in Moore’s system, between wealth and
goodness, concerns the ethical value to be attached to a life of ‘moneymaking and bridge,’ as Keynes contemptuously calls it. Business life
is at best only good as a means (!!!), but, even as a means, Keynes ranks it well below public
service. This is because it overturns the correct hierarchy of values, teaching
society to value love of money, which is bad in itself, and only good as
a possible means to the good, above love of goodness, and producing, in
consequence, bad characters. Keynes’ s characterization, and condemnation of
capitalism as based on “the love of money” echoes the already much-quoted
Biblical statement, The love of money is the
root of all evil. (I Timothy
6:10) Keynes’ s solution is not to abolish
capitalism, nor to invest it with quasi-governmental responsibilities, both of
which, he believes, would retard wealth-creation, but to get society as quickly
as possible into a situation of abundance, in which the qualities needed for
accumulation would become redundant. The next quote from his essay Economic
Possibilities for our Grandchildren (1930) is only slightly tongue in
cheek:
“When the
accumulation of wealth is no longer of high social importance, there will be
great changes in the code of morals. We shall be able to rid ourselves of many
of the pseudo-moral principles, which have hag-ridden us for two hundred years,
by which we have exalted some of the most distasteful of the human qualities
into the position of highest virtues. We shall be able to afford to dare to
assess the money-motive at its true value. The love of money as a
possession, as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the
enjoyments and realities of life will be recognized for what it is: a somewhat
disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological
propensities which one hands over with a shudder to specialists in mental
disease. But beware! The time for all this is not yet. For at least another
hundred years we must pretend to ourselves and to everyone that fair is foul
and foul is fair, for foul is useful and fair is not. (See my pertinent entry Good Business And Bad Business.) Avarice and usury and
precaution must be our gods for a little longer still. For only they can lead
us out of the tunnel of economic necessity into daylight.”
End of Part II. To conclude tomorrow.
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