KANT AND NIETZSCHE

The philosophical importance of Kant is shown in the amount of attention paid to him by Nietzsche in his writings. Mind you, he is by no means fond of Kant, and would not count him among those souls he would like to be associated with, or to communicate with, in the underworld communion. But he respects him and recognizes him as a major force in world philosophy, particularly momentous for German philosophy.

Most of Nietzsche’s references to Kant are fairly negative. In his essay on Schopenhauer, which is perhaps his chronologically earliest major assessment of Kant’s role in German philosophy, he says (I am purposely reducing this long quote to what concerns Kant in it):

I profit from a philosopher only if he can be an example. That he is capable of drawing nations after him through his example is beyond doubt. But this example must be supplied by his life, and not merely in his books, in the way, in which the philosophers of Greece taught, through their bearing, what they wore, and ate, their morals, rather than by what they said, let alone by what they wrote. How completely this visible philosophical life is lacking in Germany, where the body is only beginning to liberate itself after the spirit seems to have been liberated; and yet it is only an illusion that a spirit can be free and independent, if this attained sovereignty, which is creative sovereignty over oneself, is not demonstrated anew from morn till night in every glance and gesture. Kant clung to his university, submitted himself to regulations, retained the appearance of religious belief, endured living among colleagues and students, so, naturally, his example has produced university professors and professional philosophy… (Schopenhauer as Educator: III.)

This rather uncomplimentary reference plays up the caricature of the professional philosopher, which has an element of unfairness in it, but Kant has deserved his, becoming the epitome of the university professor, with all its negative connotations, by the way of life he had chosen, as well as by the dry academic manner of his presentation, frequently with such particular affectation and even ostentation as to appear thoroughly ludicrous to his future critics. Take this proud and self-congratulatory exhortation, for instance:

I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved, or for which solution the key at least has not been supplied. (Preface to the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason 1781.) In the 1787 preface to the second edition, he compares himself to Copernicus, and crowns his effort as a Copernican revolution in philosophy. This is not only a show of conceit, but a basic lack on his part of understanding how philosophy is different from science: scientific progress leaves scattered debris of older science in its wake, but philosophical ideas remain evergreen from Thales to the modern times, and into the future till the end of time.

Nietzsche’s attack on Kant’s manner of living grows even sharper as he starts attacking his philosophical legacy: The first danger in whose shadow Schopenhauer grew up was isolation, the second was despair of the truth. This danger attends every thinker who sets out from Kantian philosophy, provided he is a whole and vigorous man in suffering and desire, and not a mere clattering thought and calculating machine. Now, we all know well the shameful implications of this presupposition; it seems that Kant has had a living and life-transforming influence on only a few men. One reads that, since this quiet scholar produced his work, a revolution has taken place in every domain of the spirit; but I cannot believe it. For I cannot see it in those men who need themselves to be revolutionized, before a revolution could take place, in any whole domain whatever. If Kant ever should begin to exercise any wide influence, we shall be aware of it in the form of a gnawing and disintegrating skepticism and relativism; and only in the most active and noble spirits who have never been able to exist in a state of doubt would there appear instead that undermining and despair of all truth, such as Kleist for example, experience, as the effect of the Kantian philosophy. “Not long ago,” he writes in his moving way, “I became acquainted with the Kantian philosophy, and now have to tell you of a thought I derived from it, which I feel free to do, because I have no reason to fear that it will shatter you so profoundly and painfully as it has me. We are unable to decide whether what we call truth really is truth, or only appears to be. If the latter, then the truth we assemble is nothing after our death, and all effort to acquire a possession which will follow us to the grave, is in vain. If this thought does not penetrate your heart, do not smile at one who feels wounded by it, in the deepest and most sacred part of his being… My one great aim has failed me, and I have no other.” [Letter to Wilhelmina von Zenge, 1801] (Schopenhauer as Educator: III.)

Nietzsche attacks not only the arcane part of the Kantian philosophy, but also his ethics, finding them too naïve.

The older morality, namely, Kant’s (a reference to the categorical imperative: “Always act in such a way that the maxims of your will could function as the basis of a universal law of action”) demands from the individual those actions that one desires from all men --- a nice, naïve idea, as if everyone without further ado would know which manner of action would benefit the whole of mankind, that is, which actions were desirable at all. It is a theory like that of free trade, which assumes that a general harmony would have to result of itself, according to innate laws of melioration. Perhaps, a future survey of the needs of mankind will reveal it to be thoroughly undesirable that all men act identically; rather, in the interest of ecumenical goals, for whole stretches of human time special tasks,-- perhaps, in some circumstances, even evil tasks,-- would have to be set. In any event, if mankind is to keep from destroying itself by such a conscious overall government, we must discover a knowledge of the conditions of culture surpassing all previous knowledge as a scientific standard for ecumenical goals. This is the giant task of the great minds of the next century. (Menschliches 25)

I could go on and on in quoting Nietzsche’s references to Kant (by my count, there are more than 120 such references, maybe more, in all his works) but my main point can already be made. The amount of effort he makes in his references shows Kant’s profound impact not only on German philosophy, but on Nietzsche’s mind in particular, which, by itself, testifies to Kant’s enduring greatness.