GLOBALISM AND GLOBALIZATION IN THEIR RELATION TO CAPITALISM

(This second entry discusses the modern phenomenon of globalization as a process and in opposition to the doctrine of globalism.)

The following paragraphs in blue are quoted from Wikipedia’s take on Globalization, in the article on Capitalism, and supplied with my comments in red.---

Although overseas trading has been associated with the development of capitalism for over five hundred years, some thinkers argue that a number of trends associated with globalization have acted to increase the mobility of people and capital since the last quarter of the twentieth century combining to circumscribe the room for maneuver of states in choosing ‘non-capitalist’ models of development. Today, these trends have bolstered the argument that capitalism should now be viewed as a truly world system. (Here is, of course, that classic neo-imperialist ideological argument for political globalization, which I was referring to, in an earlier entry.) However, others argue that globalization, even in its quantitative degree, is not much greater now than during some earlier periods of capitalist trade. (Once again, look at my argument on certain non-offensive features of natural globalization, as opposed to the political-ideological offensive of our modern-day international Globalists.) For instance, Doug Henwood (born 1952, an American journalist, publisher of the Left Business Observer newsletter, writing on matters of economics and politics) is one such economist, arguing that the heyday of globalization arose during the mid-nineteenth century. This is what he writes in What Is Globalization Anyway?:

“Not only is the novelty of globalization exaggerated, so is its extent. Capital flows were freer, and foreign holdings by British investors far larger a hundred years ago than anything we are seeing today. Images of multinational corporations shuttling raw materials and parts around the world, as if the whole globe were an assembly line, are grossly overblown, accounting for only about a tenth of U.S. trade.”
(Are we, perhaps, talking about the previous original stage of imperialist expansion, best described in clear political terms, even though less sustainable as a theoretical argument, by Comrade Lenin?)
After the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system and the strict state control of foreign exchange rates, the total value of transactions in foreign exchange was estimated at least twenty times greater than that of all foreign movements of goods and services. (The end of this passage, which follows, is of critical importance to the total argument made here and with regard to the modern meaning of globalization in general. Nota Bene!) The internationalization of finance, seen by some as beyond the reach of state control, coupled with a growing ease, with which large corporations have been able to relocate their operations to the low-wage states, has posed the question of the eclipse of state sovereignty, arising from the growing globalization of capital.
The crucial importance of this discussion of the financial aspect of globalization is the introduction of the element of a relentless political pressure by the neo-imperialist powers, primarily, by the United States, on the rest of the world through the superior ability of the rich, as opposed to the poor, of the large, as opposed to the small, to control the international financial system, and the resulting effort on the part of the poorer nations, but also, and equally significant in its own right, by the rich-yet-smaller competitors to oppose the imperialist giant’s claim to virtual monopoly over the globalization phenomenon, with some unpredictable consequences, buttressing my sharp counterdictum “It’s politics, stupid!” as opposed to the more familiar, but infinitely less insightful “It’s the economy, stupid!” cliché, coined by James Carville.

As I see it, the neo-imperialist globalization drive, mainly conducted by the United States, has produced at least two negative effects for the citadel of modern global capitalism. In its internationalist anti-nationalist offensive, Globalism meets a determined opposition from other countries which acutely perceive the threat of losing their national independence, and react accordingly, with a stiff resistance. At the very same time, the American society suffers from the effects of the above-mentioned anti-nationalist drive, but it cannot defend itself properly, because there appears to be no foreign aggression here, and thus no resistance, while the society itself slowly erodes and loses its cohesive identity, crumbling into smaller mutually antagonistic groups having very little in common.

In the meantime, the small rich countries of Europe, presumably having little in common with the traditionally poorer nations, have paradoxically formed a united front with them in opposition to the American neo-imperialist offensive. It is no coincidence that the European Union, in its definitive Maastricht form, came into existence after the collapse of the USSR, apparently in opposition to the immediate hegemonic offensive of the “sole remaining superpower.” In the establishment of the EU, I see a very similar rationale to the later formation of powerful regional organizations in Asia (SCO, etc.) and in the Americas (there are several of them there, which deliberately exclude the United States and Canada from their ranks), thus creating a significant opposition to the global power of the United States. By the same token, the creation of the euro (a very different quality from the previously devised ECU), has produced a viable opposition to the power of the US dollar, thus also counteracting the post-Soviet American hegemonic offensive.

Economic growth in the last half-century has been relatively strong. Life expectancy has almost doubled in the developing world since the postwar years, and it is starting to close the gap on the developed world, where the improvement has been smaller. Infant mortality has decreased in every developing region of the world. Income inequality for the world as a whole is diminishing. Many other variables, such as per capita food supplies, literacy, child labor, and access to clean water, have also improved.

Once again, forget these attractive statistics, proving only that the life of a domestic servant in a very rich household may have certain “benefits,” compared to the rough lebenskampf of a poor-but-proud freeman. In every struggle for independence and self-respect, the power of the economic argument takes a back seat to a host of other considerations.

And finally, here is what Noam Chomsky has to say on the phenomenon of globalization. He summarizes it with the phrase “old wine, new bottles,” suggesting that the motives of the élites are always the same: they seek to isolate general population from important decision-making processes, only under globalization the centers of power are transnational corporations and supranational banks. Chomsky argues that transnational corporate power is “developing its own governing institutions” reflective of their global reach.

According to him, a primary ploy has been the co-optation of the global economic institutions established at the end of World War II. The IMF and the World Bank have increasingly adhered to the “Washington Consensus” forcing developing countries to adhere to limits on spending and make structural adjustments that often involve cutbacks in social and welfare programs. IMF aid and loans are normally contingent on such reforms. Chomsky says that the construction of global institutions and agreements, such as the WTO, GATT, NAFTA, and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, are new ways of securing élite privileges, while undermining democracy.
Chomsky believes that these austere and neoliberal measures ensure that poorer countries merely fulfill a service role, by providing cheap labor, raw materials and investment opportunities for the first world. This also means that corporations can threaten to relocate to poorer countries, and he sees this as a weapon to keep workers in richer countries in line.
He takes issue with the terms used in discourse on globalization, beginning with the term “globalization” itself, which, he says, refers to a corporate-sponsored economic integration, rather than being a general term for things becoming international. He dislikes the term anti-globalization being used to describe what he sees as a movement for globalization of social and environmental justice. He understands what is usually known as free trade as a “mixture of liberalization and protection designed by the principal architects of policy in the service of their interests, which happen to be whatever they are in any particular period.”

All this general talk, however, is less a matter of opinion, than it is directly subject to the eventual outcome of the process discussed. The winners are never judged and vae victis. As things look today, globalization is in the last throes, so to speak, and the inglorious end of this ‘process’ is no longer in the domain of some leftist fantasy, but a full-fledged reality admitted by all those detractors who speak of it, as well as by its defenders whose way of admission is to stop talking about it altogether.