Monday, April 29, 2013

TEACHING “WITHOUT ERROR” PART I


This is a commentary on an interesting passage from Hobbes’s Elements 1-13-3, which is here in the S&C format. (“S&C” means Sources and Comments, which is a separate book of mine, conveniently structured after Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks.) The entry is divided into two parts, where Part I mostly deals with the Hobbes’ passage, whereas the shorter Part II constitutes my closing comment.

A legitimate question can be asked why this passage should be discussed at all in the Philosophy section. In fact, it highlights the problem which philosophy, and particularly religious philosophy, has experienced with science, when we see one of the pillars of philosophical thinking, comparing these two and declaring one of them virtually infallible, while the other one is, in his opinion, riddled with all sorts of holes, and suffering from a variety of seemingly incurable ailments. (The reader must have long guessed which is which?!) This passage also touches upon the philosophical problem of knowledge (is science really knowledge, while poor philosophy can never do better than express an erroneous opinion?), on Pilate’s big question What is truth? and on a variety of other questions, all essential to philosophy. And now, here is the long-promised and perhaps awaited passage.---

The infallible sign of teaching exactly and without error… (Here is some remarkable obduracy, if I may say so. Is it even theoretically possible to have such “teaching exactly and without error at all? I understand that Hobbes must be terribly sore at the “false teachers of vain philosophy,” who have been doing exactly the opposite, but this should not be a reason for going into the other extreme, either!) …is that no man has ever taught the contrary. (This is already nonsense, because the teachers are chronically ‘behind the curve,’ and the very last argument for anything to be true should be the authority of the teachers, even if they are all united in their most predictable fallacy.) …For, commonly, truth is on the side of the few, rather than of the multitude; (Dèscartes states this more elegantly, with his “plurality of suffrages,” but Hobbes’s simplicity of expressing this truth has its own charm. It does not follow from this, however, that Hobbes’s “infallible sign” will be itself infallible!) but when in opinions and questions considered and discussed by many, it happens that not any one of the men that so discuss them differ from another, then it may be justly inferred, they know what they teach and that otherwise they do not. (A glaring non-sequitur here, just as I noted before. Compare this to the argument in my entry The Clock Conspiracy. There is no wisdom in expecting the truth to come out of any kind of consensus, even if it includes ‘the few’ enlightened ones. What if the ‘good time clock’ has not yet come into existence? That’s why Hobbes’s opening thesis above, that ‘teaching exactly and without error’ is possible, doesn’t quite measure up to the test.) And this appears most manifestly to them that have considered the different subjects, wherein men have exercised their pens, and the different ways, in which they have proceeded; together with the diversity of the success thereof. For those who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the comparison of magnitudes, numbers, times, and motions, and their proportions one to another, have thereby been the authors of all those excellences, (most of which excellences have, by now, been summarily debunked, and so much for their truth!) wherein we differ from such savage people as are now the inhabitants of different places in America (It is so hilarious to read this passage today: I don’t think that the attitude of Europe toward America has changed all that much since Hobbes’s day…), and as have been the inhabitants heretofore of those countries, where at this day arts and sciences do most flourish... Yet, to this day was it never heard of, that there was any controversy concerning any conclusion in this subject; where science (Alas, Hobbes, like so many others after him, places too much faith in science, which is apparently no less susceptible to errors, than any other ‘soft science, which he consistently disparages…) has nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched with conclusions of most difficult and profound speculation. The reason whereof is apparent to every man that looks into their writings; for they proceed from the most low and humble principles, (As I’ve observed before, all sciences, hard and soft, proceed from founding hypotheses; to imagine anything otherwise would be to persist in error, and Hobbes, apparently, does just that, although, in his defense, it can be said that he is by no means alone in this delusion...) evident even to the meanest capacity; going on slowly, and with most scrupulous ratiocination… On the other side, those men who have written concerning the faculties, passions and manners of men, (like himself, who has written a lot on exactly this subject, apparently, believing that what he is saying must be true) that is to say, of moral philosophy, or of policy, government and laws, whereof there be infinite volumes have been so far from removing doubt and controversy in all these questions they have handled, that they have very much multiplied the same; (with this, I perhaps cannot disagree) nor does any man at this day so much as pretend to know more than has been already delivered two thousand years ago by Aristotle. And yet, every man thinks that in this subject he knows as much as any other; supposing there needs to be no study but that it accrues to them by natural wit; though they lay, or employ their mind otherwise in the purchase of wealth or place. (This argument is of course unacceptable in a Perry Mason court of law, but Hobbes does not mind getting argumentative and personal in his attack on philosophers, which little pleasure cannot be denied him: after all, this is his book, and his domain, this is his right to say what he pleases!) The reason whereof is no other than that in their writings and discourses they take for principles those opinions which are already vulgarly received, whether true or false; being for the most part false. (The same question pops up yet again: What is true and what is false?) There is, therefore, a great deal of difference between teaching and persuading; the signs of the latter being controversy; and the sign of the former, no controversy.

(This is the end of Part I. Part II will be posted tomorrow.

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