Tuesday, April 30, 2013

TEACHING “WITHOUT ERROR” PART II


…Although Hobbes is hardly persuasive on this subject, what he has to say about exact sciences, as opposed to social sciences, is noteworthy. I am of course treating this matter differently. As I said before, different scientific theories can exist in contrariness to each other, like the geometries of Euclid and Lobachevsky (strictly speaking, the latter is not a different geometry, but a general geometry, treating Euclid’s merely as a particular), but they, nevertheless, coexist in perfect harmony, as somewhat different hypotheses used in different applications. Once again, nota bene, the point with mathematics is not that it is supremely “truthful,” as Pythagoras would assert in strong theological terms, or as Dèscartes would want to believe, seeking his elusive mathematical formula of Creation, but exactly because mathematics is based not on some immutable and universal truth, but only on such and such hypotheses, and therefore cannot be denied legitimacy, but must be believed in its entirety. The sole criterion for a mathematical theory to be acceptable is the practicality of its applications.
This peculiar feature of mathematics ought not to be too much generalized either, or else we might end up saying that the mathematical hypotheses about the shape of the earth: flat or spheroid, can be harmonized to the point of suggesting that the earth exists in different shapes. Curiously enough, we do need the earth to be flat, though, in order to exercise the practical applications of Euclidian geometry, but while making such measurements, and while still accepting its usefulness in all school curricula, we never for a moment wish to suggest that our flat-earth calculations can be taken out of, and generalized beyond the particular context of their applications, somehow concluding that, in fact, the earth is flat!
As far as philosophy is concerned, however, there ought to be two demands made on it: that the philosopher always limit his method to his own peculiar way of thinking, without trying to impose it on anybody, and discouraging his disciples from doing so as well, exactly as Dèscartes puts this in his Method. And the other demand is not to play God, as I have said before, that is, to limit their findings to practical applications and to leave the development of absolute theories and concepts alone, as they belong to the realm of the Absolute, which is with God.
Now, back to Hobbes, once again, as always in philosophical readings of great philosophers, it is not very important what exactly Hobbes has to say on this particular subject, but crucially important that he raises it in this particular way. In the logic of the passage I quoted above, I could easily reverse his propositions, and still it should make sense. Indeed, considering the fates of Bruno and Galileo, to name just these two, there has been such abundant controversy in exactly the exact sciences, that Hobbes stops making sense in this regard. Furthermore, should we acknowledge the right of every philosopher to think the way he wishes to think, as long as the line described above has not been crossed, once again Hobbes fails to be convincing.
My last point on this subject is to suggest that, in truth, there is no real difference between philosophy and science, in so far as each is based on a set of hypothetical principles; and what are claimed to be observable facts in science are as subjective as the personal opinion of any particular philosopher. Only in recognizing this as a fact can science and philosophy (and religion!) be reconciled, and ultimately harmonized, as three legitimate and perfectly compatible spheres of human activity and self-realization.

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