KNOWLEDGE IS POWER

This is my special entry on Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626), the author of the world-famous phrase Scientia Potentia Est. All authorities appear to agree that although Bacon never proposed an actual philosophy, and in this sense he cannot be called “a philosopher,” his suggestion of a method of developing philosophy makes him a bona fide methodologist of philosophy, and here the line separating the two types becomes infinitely more faint than some people would like to believe. Is there, for instance, such a sharp dividing line between Plato and Aristotle, because one is more literary and creative, whereas the other is more systematic? While we can argue about the pluses and minuses of different approaches to philosophy, we do not deny access to philosophy to rationalists in favor of irrationalists, or vice versa. For the same reason, we ought not to deny access to a methodologist, such as was the subject of this entry Francis Bacon.

Bertrand Russell sums up Bacon’s scientific legacy pretty adequately, and his summary qualifies Bacon as a philosopher without any doubt: “Francis Bacon, although his philosophy is in many ways unsatisfactory, has permanent importance as the founder of modern inductive method and as a pioneer in the attempt at a logical systematization of scientific procedure.” For this ‘attempt’ as a minimum Russell gives Bacon a full chapter of his own, in his History of Western Philosophy.

Nietzsche exhibits a similar attitude toward him. On the one hand, he seems to attack Bacon in Jenseits 252 --- …They are no philosophical race these Englishmen: Bacon signifies an attack on the philosophical spirit (!); Hobbes, Hume, and Locke, a debasement and lowering of the value of the concept of philosophy, for more than a century. It was against Hume that Kant arose, and rose; and it was Locke, of whom Schelling said, understandably, “Je méprise Locke!” As the reader must have noticed, Nietzsche puts Bacon in the same lineup with Hobbes, Hume, and Locke, all of whom are undeniably first-rate philosophers, although not in Nietzsche’s personal estimation. But the lineup itself creates the precedent of placing Bacon among all the other most distinguished British luminaries, quod erat demonstrandum. But Nietzsche does not stop there. In his posthumous collection titled Wille zur Macht, he first implicitly justifies the identification of method with philosophy: History of scientific method, considered by Auguste Comte as virtually philosophy itself. (#467) Then, quite explicitly: The most valuable insights are arrived at last; but the most valuable insights are methods. (#469)

And of course his #468 ibidem, puts Francis Bacon in an elite international philosophical circle: The great methodologists: Aristotle, Bacon, Dèscartes, Auguste Comte.

His greatest service to science and philosophy was the emphasis on induction, as opposed to deduction. We know that deduction was the method of choice used by the Greeks, and it will be fair to say that induction, in its modern shape (and with its modern flaws!), originated with Bacon. Not that it had not existed before him, but as he himself describes its allegedly pitiable state: Another form of induction must be devised than has hitherto been employed, and it must be used for proving and discovering not ‘first principles’ (as they are called) only, but also the lesser axioms, and the middle, and indeed all. For the induction proceeding by simple enumeration is childish.

The serious flaws of Bacon’s method are, once again, summarized by Bertrand Russell: Bacon’s inductive method is faulty through insufficient emphasis on hypothesis. He hoped that mere orderly arrangement of data would make the right hypothesis obvious, but this is seldom the case. As a rule, the framing of these hypotheses is the most difficult part of scientific work, and the part where great ability is indispensable. So far, no method has been found making it possible to invent hypotheses by rule. Usually some hypothesis is a necessary preliminary to the collection of facts, since the selection of facts demands a way of determining relevance. Without something of this kind, the mere multiplicity of facts is baffling. The part played by the deductive method in science is greater than Bacon thought. Often, when a hypothesis has to be tested, there is a long deductive journey from the hypothesis to some consequence, which can be tested by observation. Usually, the deduction is mathematical, and, in this respect, Francis Bacon underestimated the importance of mathematics in scientific investigation.

All this may sound like a very harsh putdown, but at least he tried and raised this question. Once again, we may very unkindly ask how many great philosophers who had posed great questions were ever able to find adequate answers to them? Had the answer, and not the question, been the main criterion of philosophical greatness, the end of wisdom would have come upon the world right then and there.

There are two more important things I would like to add to this conversation about Francis Bacon.

One concerns his ethics. He separates social morality (a matter of ethics) from personal morality ( a matter of religion), which is a very interesting distinction. He holds philosophy to be kept separate from theology. The latter, according to him, comes from revelation. Reason, on the other hand, is the sole underpinning of philosophy. (Ergo, the doctrine of the double truth is allowed to sneak in here!) It is possible however to be brought to God through reason (that is, philosophy): “A little philosophy inclineth man’s mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men’s minds about to religion.”

And, finally, as an important curiosity, Francis Bacon, an acknowledged great man of science, was himself astonishingly behind his times in the questions of contemporary science. He flatly rejected the Copernican theory, was indifferent to Kepler, seems to have been totally ignorant of Vesalius, Gilbert, and Harvey. He was scorned for this by Harvey, who was, understandably, of a low opinion of him: “He writes philosophy like a Lord Chancellor.” (An incredibly witty and profound remark!)

My personal opinion of Francis Bacon is, well, not very high, because although I appreciate the importance of method in philosophy, my preference is for the intuitive flight of a disorganized imagination. Dèscartes is a different case, of course, because there is so much more to Dèscartes than his method. Furthermore, there are a great many Baconian aphorisms in my Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, but having read through them in search of an inspirational click, I ended up rather disappointed. His Scientia Potentia est is of course a big classical item, moreover, it had been lavishly used in my time as a perennial Soviet slogan that I have always liked as a matter of fact, but this did not bring my heart any closer to Bacon himself. At this late point in my life, however, I am very open to a closer reexamination of Bacon’s legacy, and if I still have time left in the future, I am more than willing to give him a second look.