ALL THINGS ARE THE SAME…

Although there is practically nothing to write about the life and person of this Diogenes (as all our previous references were made to Diogenes Laertius), the philosophical challenge of his thesis, quoted in the title of this entry, merits a discussion of its own, making this entry conditionally yet unquestionably postable.

Democritus appears to be the very last big name on the conventional list of the pre-Socratic club members. Occasionally, his two atomistic followers, Epicurus and Lucretius, may be found there too, by association, but the chronological incongruity of their potential inclusion is so shocking that we are not going to do it by any stretch of imagination. However, our own list for this section has not been exhausted, and even though the remainder of the section can be challenged by purists, there are reasons for extending it, to include all the names, which will now follow. None of them, mind you, can be disqualified on the most important criterion here, which ought to be the chronological grounds.

Our first focus in this post-Democritean tail subsection is the virtually unknown philosopher and scientist of the 5^th century BC, Diogenes Of Apollonia. Born in Apollonia, Crete, he studied and taught in Athens. The fact that he was a notable philosopher is evidenced by the great comedic playwright Aristophanes making fun of him in his play Clouds. (Aristophanes always chose only very important persons as his targets.) Aristotle’s use of Diogenes’ clinical study of veins has received a proper attribution, and, as we know from him, this man was also an outstanding anatomist and physiologist extraordinaire.

My personal interest in Diogenes of Apollonia has to do with certain aspects of his philosophy, which I find fascinating, and striking a harmonious cord with what I myself have been asserting since time immemorial. It is true that in ascribing the role of the first substance to air, he is demonstrably derivative, as this old idea had first been promoted by the Eleatic Anaximenes. Furthermore, his idea that all things are the same, being mere differentiations of the same, is a novelty already, but the real treat comes as he ascribes intelligence to the primary substance. What this is to me, will be discussed later, but, first, here are the extant fragments of his work for my reader’s reference, and also to allow me to quote him firsthand, rather than to resort to recapitulations:

(1) In the beginning of any discussion it seems to me that one should make one’s starting point something indisputable, and one’s expression simple and dignified. (2) My view is, to sum it all up, that all things are differentiations of the same thing, and are the same thing. And this is obvious; for, if the things which are now in this world, namely, earth, and water, and air, and fire, and the other things, which we see existing in this world----- if any one of these things, I say, were different from any other, different, that is, by having a substance peculiar to itself; and if it were not the same thing, that is often changed and differentiated, then things could not in any way mix with one another, nor could they do one another either good or harm. Nor could a plant grow out of the earth, nor any animal, nor anything else, come into being, unless things were composed in such a way as to be the same. But all these things rise from the same thing, differentiated and taking different forms at different times, and returning again to the very same thing. (3) For, it would not be possible for it, without intelligence, to be so divided, as to keep the measures of all things, of winter and summer, of day and night, of rains and winds and fair weather. And anyone who cares to reflect will find that everything else is disposed in the best possible manner. (4) And, further, there are still the following great proofs. Humans, and all other animals, live upon air by breathing it, and this is their soul, and their intelligence, as will be clearly shown in this work; while when this is taken away from them, they die, and their intelligence fails. (5) And so, my view is, that that which has intelligence is what people call air, and that all things have their course steered by it, and that it has power over all things. For, this thing I hold to be a god, and to reach everywhere, and to dispose of everything, and to be in everything; and there is not anything, which does not partake in it. Yet, no single thing partakes in it just in the same way as another; but there are many modes, both of air and of intelligence. For, it undergoes many transformations, warmer and colder, drier and moister, more stable, and in swifter motion, and it has many other differentiations in it, and an infinite number of colors and tastes. And the soul of all living things is the same, and this is air, warmer than that outside us and in which we are but much colder than that near the sun. And this warmth is not alike in any two kinds of living creatures nor for the matter of that in any two persons; but it does not differ much, only so far as is compatible with their being alike. At the same time, it is not possible for any of the things which are differentiated to be exactly like one another, until they all once more become the same. (6) Since, then, differentiation is multiform, living creatures are multiform and many, and they are like one another neither in appearance nor in intelligence, because of the multitude of differentiations. At the same time, they all live, and see, and hear by the same thing, and they all have their intelligence from the same source. (7) And it is an eternal and undying body, but of those other things some come into being and some pass away. (8) But this too appears obvious to me , that it is both great, and mighty, and eternal, and undying, and of great knowledge.

Here is, of course, a very interesting and original answer to the big question of Anaximander, regarding the generation of the many, and their separation from the one. And here is Diogenes’ answer: It is impossible for the one to be divided into the many without intelligence. This has been precisely my point since a very long time ago, that there is a definite psychological and philosophical connection between what is known as physical monism, and what I call metaphysical monism, which is rudimentary monotheism, and there is no doubt that Diogenes Of Apollonia exhibits it explicitly, being perhaps the first among the pre-Socratics to do so. It is also important to point out that, although the first impression of his assertion about all things being the same may smack of pantheism to one, in conjunction with Diogenes’ intelligence; in reality, the sameness of all is philosophically much closer to the atomistic theory of the universe, which of course has no serious bearing on metaphysics, or on any theistic considerations.

To sum it up, I find Diogenes of Apollonia a truly remarkable and exciting thinker within the pre-Socratic philosophical community, and, were it up to me, his name would be honorably mentioned in every history of Western philosophy. Perhaps, the day will come when this wish of mine will come true, because he has really earned such a place in the pantheon of human thought.