DEMOCRITEAN ETHICS

Looking at the nuts and bolts of the atomistic theory, and perceiving the nothing which is, whereas there is nothing else that is, it is extremely curious how the atomists developed their ethical teachings, as one is also anticipating an ethics of nuts and bolts (having repeated this twice, I am referring, of course, to the motley collection of differently-shaped atoms), whatever that means. For starters, we have two participants in the production of ethics, namely, the soul, psychê, and the thought, which seem to be little different from each other or anything else in the worlds. According to Aristotle, Democritus regarded the soul as composed of a special kind of atoms, namely, the fire atoms. This looks fairly consistent with the mechanistic function of the soul which is the cause of motion in all living bodies, and it is equally natural to associate life with heat, hence with fire. There is, however, a disagreement among the interpreters of atomism as to the seat of such fire, that is, the soul. Some point to the head, others point to the heart, and neither side has been able to get its opinion impressed on the other.

As for thought, there is nothing transcendentally mysterious about it either (or is there?), thought being an entirely physical process, and, by the way, so is perception as well. So, where does one find ethics here, and incidentally, what is ethics, atomistically speaking?

The question seems impossible to answer, and perhaps it is, as Democritus disposes of the atomistic theory altogether in his approach to ethics, reducing the latter to his personal outlook toward the art of living and resorting to some rather standard expressions of common ethical wisdom, which some scholars refer to as platitudes. But in order to allow the reader to form a personal opinion of Democritean ethics, here comes a selection of his extant fragments, although some of them have been debated as spurious. We start with his self-aggrandizement of sorts, as a good ethician:

“If anyone hearken with understanding to these sayings of mine, many a deed worthy of a good man shall be performed, and many a foolish deed be spared.”

Then follows this nice conventional platitude: “If one choose the goods of the soul, he chooses the diviner part; if the goods of the body, the merely mortal.” It is not clear, however, from the atomistic doctrine how exactly the goods of the soul differ from the goods of the other parts of the body, since they are all made of atoms, but one must presume the truth of this statement from general ethical considerations.

For the reader’s reference, here are a few more of Democritus’ ethical sayings:

“Not from fear but from a sense of duty refrain from your sins.”

“He who does wrong is unhappier than the one who suffers wrong.”

“Disease occurs in a household, or in a life, just as it does in a body.”

“Medicine cures the diseases of the body; wisdom, on the other hand, relieves the soul of its sufferings.”

“The needy animal knows how much it needs, but the needy man does not.”

“It is hard to fight with desire; but to overcome it is the mark of a rational man.”

“Moderation increases enjoyment, and makes pleasure even greater.”

“It is childish, not manly, to have immoderate desires.”

“The good things of life are produced by learning with hard work; the bad are reaped of their own accord without hard work.”

“The brave man is he who overcomes not only his enemies, but his pleasures. There are some men who are masters of cities, but slaves to women.”

“In cattle excellence is displayed in strength of body; but in men it lies in strength of character.”

“I would rather discover a single cause than become king of the Persians.”

From all of the above it is quite clear that not by atomism alone shall man live, but how the two sources of nourishment are connected is never explained. Still, Democritus can be easily excused for such disconnect, since the value of each of the parts, particularly, on the atomistic side, is self-sustained. As a tribute to the less convincing and more didactic side of his teachings, here is a nice summary of Democritean ethics, not without some tongue-in-cheek, though, by our old friend Bertrand Russell:

“In ethics [Democritus] considered cheerfulness the goal of life (no wonder his nickname is ‘the laughing philosopher’!) and regarded moderation and culture as the best means to it. He disliked everything violent and passionate; he disapproved of sex, because, he said, it involved the overwhelming of consciousness by pleasure. (Apparently, pleasure was not synonymous with happiness in his lexicon, and his comparison to Jeremy Bentham, which follows, ought to be taken with some caution.) He valued friendship, but thought ill of women, and did not desire children, because their education interferes with philosophy. In all this he was very much like Jeremy Bentham. (Who as a matter of fact, was not much of a philosopher in Russell’s view, exerting mainly political influence, slanted toward socialism.)

Although a streak of gentle humor never hurts, it would be unseemly to end the Democritus subsection on this irreverent note. He was, of course, a genius and one of the greatest pre-Socratics, and whatever we may say about him in jest or disparagingly, at once pales and fades away in the glittering light of his otherwise prodigious accomplishments.