I
confess to having oftentimes been unfair to John Dewey (1859-1952), the
preeminent American educator and many other things, mainly on account of the
horrific educational system in America, for which horrible calamity I hold him
partly responsible. But of course he needs a fair assessment in this section,
as a distinct American phenomenon, and although this entry does not provide it
in the way I am hoping to have it in the future, still this is a good start.
Dewey’s assessment in this entry is provided by Bertrand Russell, his close
associate in a variety of projects, and although Russell admits that in many
respects his own views coincide with those of Dewey, there are some serious
philosophical disagreements between them, too, and if there is anyone, to be
found, with a dispassionate opinion of Dewey, I expect it from Russell.
John Dewey, Bertrand Russell
writes, is generally admitted to be the leading living
philosopher of America. In this estimate I entirely concur. He has a profound
influence not only among philosophers, but on students of education,
aesthetics, and political theory. He is a man of the highest character, liberal
in outlook, kind and generous in personal relations, and indefatigable in work…
With most of his opinions I am in almost complete agreement. Owing to my
respect and admiration for him, as well as to personal experience of his
kindness, I wish to agree completely, but to my regret I am compelled to
dissent from his most distinctive philosophical doctrine, namely the
substitution of inquiry for truth as the fundamental concept of
logic, and of the theory of knowledge.
He has never been what might be called a mere philosopher.
Education especially has been in the forefront of his interests, and his influence
on American education has been profound. Perhaps he hasn’t always been
satisfied with the practice of those who professed to follow his teaching, but
any new doctrine in practice is bound to be subject to some extravagances and
excess. This, however, does not matter so much as might be thought, because the
faults of what is new are more easily seen than those of what is traditional. (I wish!)
Here
now comes the most important portion of this entry concerning the essence of
Dr. Dewey’s theory of truth and inquiry. Here it is, in Bertrand Russell’s
summary:
…Formerly it would have been said that inquiry is distinguished by
its purpose, which is to ascertain some truth. But for Dewey truth is to
be defined in terms of inquiry, and not vice versa; he quotes
with approval Charles Sanders Peirce’s definition: “Truth is the opinion
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate.”
As
I noted in the previous entry on Peirce, Russell strongly objects to such a
definition of truth. This leaves us completely in the
dark as to what the investigators are doing, for we cannot, without circularity,
say that they are endeavoring to ascertain the truth. (In other words,
paraphrasing the movie Enemy of the State:
“and who is investigating the investigators?”)
…The difficulty of Dewey’s theory lies in the severing of the
relation between a belief and the fact or facts, which would commonly be said
to verify it. Let us consider the example of a general planning a
battle. His reconnaissance planes report to him certain enemy preparations, and
he acts upon them. Common sense says that the reports, upon which he acts, are
true or false regardless of whether the general subsequently wins or loses the
battle. This view is rejected by Dr. Dewey. He does not divide beliefs into true
or false, but he still has two kinds of beliefs, which we will call satisfactory,
if the general wins, and unsatisfactory if he loses. Until the
battle has taken place, he cannot tell what to think about the reports of his
scouts.
(As
an aside, it is easy to see that modern American foreign policy does not take
the side of either Dewey or Russell in this argument. The general does not
really act upon reconnaissance reports: he is simply told what to do, by
opportunistic agenda-driven ideologues. Philosophy and common sense are
sidelined spectators here, and I am afraid that even the severest critics of
Washington’s policies are contemptuously dismissive of the said spectators.)
The main difference between Dr. Dewey and me is that he judges a
belief by its effects, whereas I judge it by its causes…
Here
is your basic difference between a moralist (Russell) and a pragmatist (Dewey).
As for my take on it, I have previously laid out my theory of truth, which
allows a multiplicity of truths, as long as they are free of internal
contradictions. What Dewey and Russell are engaged in here is the question of truth as fact versus truth as opinion. The end result of an
inquiry is opinion (belief), whereas to Dewey this end result is a fact. Thus,
whatever appears satisfactory wins over what appears unsatisfactory, and the
judgment is made on that basis. But what if the general’s victory is a
short-term satisfactory result, but a long-term disaster, that is, a Pyrrhic
victory? That obviously creates several levels of judgment, and the borderline
between satisfactory and unsatisfactory may become if not erased altogether,
then at least disrupted to the point of making any sound judgment difficult or
even impossible.
Having
put it this way, it is easier to agree with Russell, who appeals to more
reliable, more independent criteria of judgment than Dewey, who appears guilty
of pure and unadulterated relativism. This does not mean that I agree with
Russell outside this particular argument, that is, with his emphasis on the”
causes,” which may be found even more difficult to ascertain than the “effects.”
As
for Russell’s indirect criticism of Peirce in this context, I find it unfair,
as it fails to consider the absolute nature of Peirce’s statement, which
negates all charges of relativism that can be raised against him on this
occasion. “…Ultimately
agreed to by all who investigate” explicitly contains two absolutes:
the finality of the “ultimate” and
the absolute inclusiveness of the “all.”
In other words, assuming that Bertrand Russell is also involved in the
investigation (otherwise, he has no business to comment on it), no collusion
between Peirce and Dewey can convince anybody as to what the truth is, unless
Russell and all other investigators of the opinion in question come to exactly
the same conclusion. Ergo, in a number of cases where the truth of an opinion
can indeed be established through the investigation, we do arrive at Peirce’s
destination point, to his credit of course, whereas in a large number of cases
where universal agreement cannot be reached after exhausting all available
tools of investigation, Peirce’s method is found inapplicable, just as he says
it in his definition, which obviously does not prove him wrong…
(This
is the end of Part I. Part II will be posted tomorrow.)
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