(By
all means see also my entry Nietzsche And
The Pre-Socratics in the Nietzsche
section.)
The
best introduction to the geniuses of pre-Socratic philosophy is undoubtedly
given in Nietzsche’s great work Philosophy in the Tragic age of the Greeks, to
which I have devoted a fairly lengthy entry Nietzsche And The Pre-Socratics,
in the Nietzsche section, and I strongly recommend that the reader
go back to it now, as its content is indispensable to the present section.
Reluctant to be repetitious, I shall not quote that entry in full here, but
some of these Nietzsche’s passages must be repeated here no matter what,
especially now that I have started quoting them already in the previous entry.
Needless to say, the focus of my notes in the Nietzsche section was
Nietzsche ipse, whereas here, it is the pre-Socratics, and these
different comments of mine, plus the essentiality of the subject matter to both
sections, determine the legitimacy of having such extended quotations from
Nietzsche repeated in both cases without being branded as redundant.
“They all stand before us in
magnificent solitude as the only ones who then devoted their life exclusively
to knowledge. They all possess the virtuous energy of the Ancients
whereby they excel the later philosophers in finding their own form and in
perfecting it by metamorphosis in its minutest details and general aspect. For
they were met by no helpful and facilitating fashion. Thus, together they form
what Schopenhauer, in opposition to the Republic of Scholars, calls a Republic
of Geniuses; one giant calling another across the arid intervals of ages, and
undisturbed by a wanton noisy race of dwarfs creeping about beneath them the
sublime intercourse of spirits continues.”
The
cynic might chuckle with delight at the opportunity here to interfere and bring
down the whole bunch of the pre-Socratic geniuses on the grounds that we are
discussing mythology, rather than factual reality, in this case, just as our Homer
is not even a Homer, and so on. My opinion on the subject of such
mythology is by now well known to the reader, and I shall not bother to repudiate
such cynics any further.
“Of this sublime intercourse of spirits,
I have resolved to relate those items, which our modern hardness of hearing
might perhaps hear and understand; meaning, certainly, the least of all. It
seems to me that those old sages from Thales to Socrates have discussed in that
intercourse, although in its most general aspect, everything which constitutes
for our contemplation the peculiarly Hellenic. In their intercourse, as already
in their personalities, they express distinctly the great features of the Greek
genius, of which the whole of Greek history is a shadowy impression, a hazy
copy, which, consequently, speaks less clearly. If we could rightly interpret
the total life of the Greek nation, we should ever find reflected only that
picture which in her highest geniuses shines with more resplendent colors.”
It
is understandable for Nietzsche, a classical philologist with a good knowledge
of Greek and Latin, and a faithful student of the Ancient Greek culture, to
focus specifically on the Hellenic element, whereas we can talk in broader
terms about the pre-Socratics’ relevance to the foundations of our Western
civilization as a whole. Not that Nietzsche is wrong in his focus, of course
not, but my temptation to somewhat broaden the base of this discussion was too
great not to have made this comment.
“Other nations have their Saints, the
Greeks have Sages. Rightly it is said that a nation is characterized not only
by her great citizens but rather by the manner in which she recognizes and honors
them. In other ages the philosopher is an accidental solitary wanderer in the
most hostile environment-- either slinking through or pushing through with
clenched fists. With the Greeks, though, the philosopher is not accidental;
when in the Sixth and Fifth centuries, amidst the most frightful dangers and
seductions of secularization, the Greek philosopher appears and steps forth
from the cave of Trophonios [my comments on Trophonios in the Nietzsche section
will be posted later on]
into the very midst of luxuriance, the discoverers’ happiness, the wealth and
the sensuousness of the Greek colonies ---then we perceive that they come as noble
warners for the same purpose, for which Tragedy was born in those centuries,
and which Orphic mysteries in grotesque hieroglyphics give us to understand.
The opinion of those philosophers on Life and Existence means much more than a
modern opinion, because they had before themselves Life in a luxuriant
perfection, and because with them, unlike us, the sense of the thinker was not
muddled by the disunion, engendered by the wish for freedom, beauty, fullness
of life, and the love for truth that only asks: What is the good of Life at
all? The mission that the philosopher has to discharge within a real Culture
can’t be clearly conjectured out of our circumstances and experiences, for the
simple reason that we have no such culture. It is only a Culture like
the Culture of the Greeks that can answer the question, as to that task of the
philosopher, only such a Culture can justify philosophy, because only such a
Culture knows, and can demonstrate, why and how the philosopher is not an
accidental chance wanderer, driven now hither, now thither. There is a steely necessity,
which fetters the philosopher to a true Culture: but what if this Culture does
not exist? Then, philosophers are incalculable and, therefore, terror-inspiring
comets, whereas in the favorable case they shine as the central star in the
solar system of Culture. It is for this reason precisely that the Greeks
justify the philosopher because with them they are no comets.”
There
is a possibility here that Nietzsche is idealizing the Ancient Greek society’s
benevolence towards its philosophers for the simple reason that they were not
just philosophers, but preeminent scientists, military engineers,
prognosticators, physicians, religious figures and leaders, and much more, in
other words, they were awe-inspiring colossi, whom the society depended on for
its wellbeing and even for its very existence. It was therefore not on account
of the Greeks’ particular appreciation of philosophy as such that these sages
were greatly honored, but there can be no doubt that the honorable profession
of philosophical thinking did benefit from the comprehensive,
all-embracing genius of the pre-Socratic giants.
“After such contemplations, it will
be accepted without offense if I speak of the pre-Platonic philosophers as of a
homogeneous company, and devote this paper to them exclusively. Something quite
new begins with Plato; or it might be said with equal justice that in
comparison with that Republic of Geniuses from Thales to Socrates, the
philosophers since Plato lack something essential.”
The
next paragraph explains what, in Nietzsche’s opinion, all pre-Socratics have
that Plato and other greats who follow him are missing. The Republic of
Geniuses from Thales to Socrates has the elemental integrity, each specimen
totally unlike the others, and in this unique heterogeneity, purity of the
type, they find their homogeneity, so that they can all be seen as a single
company. A very interesting observation!
On
the other hand, Plato, Aristotle, and the rest of them, are composite types,
according to Nietzsche, in the sense that their philosophy has distinctive
elements of eclecticism. This can be very helpfully compared to chemistry,
where we find pure elements in nature, whose number is limited, and also
compounds, in far-far larger numbers. We cannot say that all compounds are
inferior to pure substances, but the latter are grouped together in the periodic
table of the elements, unlike the compounds, and thus, particularly honored in
their selective quality, as being alike, in the sense of being unlike all
others.
“Whoever wants to express himself
unfavorably about the older masters, may call them one-sided, and their
Epigones, with Plato as head, many-sided. Yet it would be more just and unbiased
to conceive of the latter as philosophic hybrid characters and of the former as
the pure types. Plato himself is the first magnificent hybrid character, and as
such finds expression as well in his philosophy as in his persona. In his
ideology are united Socratic, Pythagorean, and Heraclitean elements, and for
this reason it is not a typically pure phenomenon. As a person, too, Plato
mingles the features of the royally secluded, all-sufficing Heraclitus, of the
melancholy compassionate and legislatory Pythagoras, of the psycho-expert
dialectician Socrates. All later philosophers are hybrid characters; wherever
something one-sided does come into prominence with them, as in the case of the
Cynics, it is not type, but caricature. Much more important, however, is the
fact that they are founders of sects, and the sects founded by them are all
institutions in direct opposition to the Hellenic culture and to the unity of
its style prevailing up to that time. In their own way, they seek a redemption,
but only for the individuals, or at the best, groups of friends and disciples,
closely connected with them. The activity of the older philosophers tends,
although they were unconscious of it, towards a cure and purification on a
large scale; the mighty course of Greek culture is not to be stopped; terrible
dangers are to be removed out of the way of its current; the philosopher
protects and defends his native country. Now, since Plato, he is in exile, and
conspires against his fatherland.”
The
last portion of this paragraph is raising an extremely peculiar question: Are
the pre-Socratics an organic part of their Hellenic society, whereas all later
philosophers (with the most notable exception of the Italian Giovanni Gentile,
at least in his initial idealistic period of glorifying il totalitarismo e
fascismo) stand in isolation from, and in opposition to, their surroundings
epitomizing the alienation of the individual from his society? An answer to
this question should be a very difficult one, for at least two reasons. One,
concerning post-Socratic philosophy, it is making too broad a generalization,
although the temptation to agree with this familiar premise is too great, that in
the universal conflict of man versus society philosophers are counted in
the front ranks of “man.” The second reason is twofold of itself. On the
one hand, we are too far removed from the pre-Socratic era to make an accurate
judgment, contraposing pre-Socratic philosophy to the post-Socratics, and on
the other seeing the pre-Socratics as Nietzsche sees them being integral and
indispensable assets of their communities, we may wonder whether these renaissance
men had been adequately honored by their communities and reciprocated that
honor primarily on account of their enormous practical services, their
philosophical contributions being secondary to their relationships, and perhaps
benevolently tolerated by the community, rather than admired by it. Having said
that, it is only proper for me to quote myself from the last paragraph of Nietzsche
And The Pre-Socratics, in the Nietzsche section:
I
will not be so presumptuous as to jump into agreeing with Nietzsche on the
impeccable intellectual taste and the spiritual nobility of the Ancient Greeks,
in treating their greatest thinkers as a superior caste. After all, it is very
unfortunate, and indeed rather suspicious, that the works of the Pre-Socratic
philosophers had not survived the ‘annorum series et fuga temporum’ in
a much larger volume, if not in their entirety. But I am completely with
Nietzsche in turning this Greek experience into a monumental history of
the greatness of the Ancient Greek spirit, as a lesson to subsequent
generation, as the gold standard of any nation’s value, a powerful
“Plutarchian” example for all of us to look up to.
“It is a real misfortune that so very
little of those older philosophic masters has come down to us, and that all
complete works of theirs are withheld from us…”
This
is indeed a misfortune, considering how much our knowledge of our cultural
heritage could have been enriched, and how much we are therefore missing. But
alas, such has been the will of fate, or as I had called it before, in Italian,
and for a very good reason,--- la forza del destino.
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