Within the large philosophical
context of the ethics of truth, by far the most dramatic query into the question
of What is “good” and what is “bad”? has
been made by Nietzsche, by virtue of his coinage of the inspired Latin dictum “Fiat
veritas, pereat vita!” Which has prompted me to reverse the terms of that
proposition, as “Fiat vita, pereat veritas!” It is with this
understanding in mind that we must be approaching the following passage from
Nietzsche’s Jenseits (4):
“The
falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment.
The question is, to what extent is it life-promoting, species-preserving,
perhaps even species-cultivating (!) And we are inclined to claim that
the falsest judgments (like the synthetic judgments ‘a priori’) are the most
indispensable for us; that without accepting the fictions of logic, without
measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and
self-identical, without constant falsification of the world by means of
numbers, man could not live. To recognize untruth as a condition of life that
certainly means resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way, and a
philosophy that risks this would by that token alone place itself beyond good
and evil.”
There is no sense for me to argue
about Nietzsche’s terminology, because I am the one who has introduced the
change that I should be arguing about. It is much better, and fairer to
Nietzsche, to express my greatest admiration for his keen sense that puts him
essentially on the same track that has brought me to my theory of truth in fiction.
But let us first present the evidence that we are talking about that same
thing. Nietzsche uses the terms falseness, falsification, untruth talking
about fiction and invention, and his splendid point is that these
unsavory elements ‘are the most indispensable to us,’ being “life-promoting,
species-preserving and even species-cultivating.” So why are
they unsavory? Just because they are false and untrue! And here is where my
theory comes into the picture. No, I say, fiction and invention are not false
and untrue, they are perfectly true, as long as they stay within the world, in
which they have been created. Therefore, there is no need to apologize for the
falseness of a judgment because the judgment here is apparently true. And
there is no need either, to recognize untruth as a condition of life, because
what we call “untruth” here is not untruth, but truth, which
is all a matter of definitions. Once the definitions are set right, we have morality
restored to our conundrum, and, lo and behold!--- there is no more
conundrum, but the solid moral ground of good life, making it
unnecessary for us to travel Jenseits von Gut und Böse for this
particular purpose. (And as an added bonus in this case, we may rejoice in
finding the famous Kantian synthetic aprioris, which were considered
either “unfindable” or, even worse, non-existent, until Nietzsche planted their
mention in the above passage for us to find and identify them as those selfsame
particles of mental matter which have come to us in vague vaporous shapes, as
represented to us by Kant, but, on second look, are nothing more elusive and
mysterious than any “normal” specimens of created fiction.
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