NICOMACHEAN HAPPINESS. PART II.

[…Before we get to this pinnacle state of contemplation, however, let us go through certain aspects of the doctrine of happiness, as it unfolds on the pages of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:]

Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is which political science aims at, and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is a general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honor; they differ, however, from one another and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth, when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal, that is above their comprehension. Now, some thought that apart from these many goods there is another, which is self-subsistent, and causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held would perhaps be somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.

Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from, and those to, the first principles. Plato was right in raising the question: Are we on the way from or to the first principles? There is a difference, as there is in a racecourse between the course from the judges to the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with what is known, things are objects of knowledge in two senses--- some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with things known to us. Hence, any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just, and generally, about subjects of political science, must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is the starting-point, and if it is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and he who has been well brought up, has or can easily get starting points…

Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed. Most men seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For, there are three prominent types of life: that just mentioned, the political, and, thirdly, the contemplative life. Now, the mass of mankind are quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts. People of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honor, for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honor, rather than on him who receives it, but the good we think to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him. Third comes the contemplative life which we shall consider later.

So far, as we have seen, the pursuit of animal pleasure is dismissed as the commonest and lowest source of happiness, and the refined man’s happiness is identified with the noble activity of pursuing the good. Before we get to the pinnacle of happiness, where all activity ceases, turning into an enlightened leisure, let us quote just one more paragraph, where the common (political) good still goes hand in hand with the personal good, as manifested in and conditioned by the quality of activity.

…Since happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue; for we shall thus see better the nature of happiness. The true student of politics, too, is thought to have studied virtue above all things; for he wishes to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws. And if this inquiry belongs to political science, clearly the pursuit of it should be in accordance with our original plan. But clearly the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good we were seeking was human good, and the happiness, human happiness. By human virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness also we call an activity of soul. But if this is so, clearly, the student of politics must know somehow the facts about soul. The student of politics, then, must study the soul, and must study it with these objects in view and do so to the extent which is sufficient for the questions we are discussing.

…It is time now to fast-forward to Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, and quote this remarkable passage in Chapter 8:

That perfect happiness is a contemplative activity appears from the following consideration. We assume the gods to be above all other beings blessed and happy; but what sort of actions must we assign to them? Acts of justice? Will not the gods seem absurd if they make contracts and return deposits, and so on? Acts of a brave man, then, confronting dangers and running risks because it is noble to do so? Or liberal acts? To whom will they give? It will be strange if they are really to have money or anything of the kind. Then, what would their temperate acts be? Is not such praise tasteless, since they have no bad appetites? If we were to run through them all, the circumstances of action will be found trivial and unworthy of gods. Still, everyone supposes that they live and therefore that they are active; we cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion. Now, if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? Therefore, the activity of God, surpassing all other activities in blessedness, must be contemplative; and among human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness.

Before I get down to my final comment, I must state my technical disagreement with Aristotle’s use of the word activity in application to contemplation. I understand that he does not use it in the sense of physical or physiological activity, requiring motion and change, but only in the sense of doing something, as opposed to doing nothing. Still, in every activity there is, however incorrect, a presumption of interaction with the outside world [reading a book, for instance, is obviously one of such interactions], and for this reason I am avoiding using the word activity, both in regard to Aristotle’s passive God and to man’s inwardly-kept contemplation.

To conclude tomorrow…