THOUGHTS ON THOUGHTS

A Roman Emperor thinking like a Greek slave… I like Marcus Aurelius (121-180 AD), and working on his Thoughts was not a waste of time. But he is hardly an original thinker by any stretch of imagination. He is bright enough, however, to serve as a host, carrying the great thoughts and ideas of the Greek philosophers whom he admired and passing them on to future generations by the power of the “diplomatic immunity” of his Imperial pouch. (On the other hand, his heroes being Greek Stoics, such as Epictetus, first and foremost, their effective philosophical range is rather limited and there are many extra-philosophical things in Marcus Aurelius, much more interesting than his thoughts of specifically philosophical nature. Some of these extra-philosophical gems I was frequently referring to, in previous entries.)

And then of course, the identity of the host, whether he is the original source or a carrier, does not matter so much when we are dealing not with the history of philosophy per se, but with the analysis of specific ideas. The first concern does not matter, because all extant sources of antiquity-- direct and indirect-- have usually been corrupted anyway, en route to the attention of the modern reader. A classic example of how adequately my second concern has been resolved, is the case of Socrates, of whom we know only on the rebound, but, taking the person of Plato, what a magnificent rebound! So, let us concentrate on the ideas, and not on the persons of the ancients. (Not that these persons do not merit personal attention, far from it! But what I have in mind is separating these two different categories and treating each for its own sake, only occasionally allowing the mix, where appropriate.)

Incidentally, the same does not hold with any similar conviction for later thinkers. Particularly, this is not the case with Nietzsche. His personality is so much fused with his thinking that they are hard to separate, and I can only regret, with some bitterness, that in my young years I did not take up the German language to learn it with an adequate proficiency to be able to read Nietzsche in the original. I am missing a lot now, as a result!

Getting back to Marcus Aurelius, here is another demonstration of one sincere thinker’s futile attempt to prove the improvable. Ironically, it does not really matter if he is trying to convince the others, or himself only, that God does exist. I believe that this personal need to “prove” the subject of faith indicates that this faith has not been strong enough to sustain itself by belief only. In my case, God exists to me personally by the sufficiency of faith. (This is why I may often sound irreverent in my philosophical arguments about the need to establish God as a virtually fictional character, by mathematical axiom, which I usually refer to as God by Definition.) Anyway, Marcus Aurelius’s self-deceptive conviction of the existence of divine power and government by the argument from design was founded on his conception of the order of the universe. Like Socrates, he says that, though we cannot see the forms of divine powers, we know that they do exist, because we see their works. “But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so full of what we call evil?” he asks, and replies: “Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and particularly, the wickedness of one man does no harm to another.-- It is only harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it as soon as he should choose.” The first part of this is consistent with the doctrine that the whole can never sustain any harm (in other words, evil)… As opposed to what, I may ask? Apparently the answer is, ‘as opposed to a part of the whole.’ This sounds very much like a classic casuistic argument to me. It does not really prove anything, but clearly wants to produce the impression of doing so. I believe that my explanation of evil as a time-contained bad effect of a good thing is by far simpler and better! The second part is explained by the Stoic principle that there is no evil in anything, which is not in our power. What wrong we suffer from another is his evil, and not ours. This is not my kind of philosophy, but, rather, a nice case of make-feel-good psychology, which is, naturally, quite legitimate, but only as long as it stays where it belongs: on the shrink’s couch. But, as George Long points out, “Antoninus has no answer to the objections to the existence of God because of moral disorder and suffering, which are in the world.” --No wonder! What else can I say? This Socratic argument for the existence of divine power is inconclusive and fails to make its point, but only causes a wry condescending smile on the lips of its critic. As I said before, God’s existence is improvable, by God’s own design. The Stoic argument that there is no evil in anything, which is not in our power, seems rather egocentric, and disrespectful of God, because it is an argument of resignation to evil without even trying to explain its origins. This is of course my response, should we keep insisting on taking it seriously as a philosophical argument and not limiting ourselves to its place and role as “fodder” for the psychiatrist’s couch.

(The bottom line here is to see evil as a necessary bad alternative of the effect of human action proceeding from our freedom of choice, which freedom is in-itself a good thing, whereas its absence would only cause the elimination of the concept of good from our consideration. I must stress, however, that although evil is a necessary alternative, it doesn’t mean that evil is necessary. The critical purpose of ethics is winning the argument of alternatives within he choice of human action for the good option. On the other hand, natural disasters, as the Hurricane Katrina has shown, reveal not the evil ‘in-itself,’ but a glaring incompetence of man. Improve the man, this natural disaster may still be terrible, yet it will not be allowed to result in evil. I know that I will be passionately contradicted to the effect that there are many instances of “force majeure,” where man, even at the top of human competence, is powerless against the impending catastrophe, but here I will insist that we are dealing with a tragedy, but not with some case of evil, as evil is man-made or man-allowed, and, although many people do not see the difference between the two, it is ethically imperative to draw such a distinction.)

…Having read back this entry to myself, I realize that it is does not appear to be about Marcus Aurelius but is rather a personal reflection, veering off the subject rather significantly. But looking at its title, I see that it pretty well describes the final product; and being a meditation on Marcus Aurelius, let him get at least some credit for it.