ZENO OF CITIUM, FATHER OF THE STOICS

The last two entries touched upon relatively minor philosophical movements (Cynicism and Epicureanism), but the two exceptional individuals representing them (Diogenes and Epicurus) amply justified my urge to include them both in this section. Ironically, the rationale for the existence of the present entry is quite the opposite. Zeno of Citium, Cyprus (336-264 BC), may not have earned his place here on his personal merit, but as the father of the extremely important, influential, and forever-since enduring doctrine of Stoicism, it would have been unforgivable not to devote at least one entry to his person.

Before embarking on the journey around him, however, we must also add that the chronological chain that includes other Stoics, more personally prominent than Zeno himself, and therefore included here on their own, not entirely philosophical, merit, will include Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, which means that we shall be revisiting Stoicism again and again, eventually giving it some justice.

In Bertrand Russell’s summary:

“Stoicism is less Greek than any school of philosophy known hitherto. The early Stoics were mostly Syrian (Zeno was a Phoenician), the later ones mostly Roman. Unlike the earlier, purely Greek philosophies, Stoicism is emotionally narrow, and in a certain sense fanatical; but it also has religious elements, of which the world felt the need, and which the Greeks seemed unable to supply. It was particularly appealing to rulers: “nearly all the successors of Alexander, we may say all the principal kings in existence in the generations following Zeno, professed themselves Stoics,” says Prof. Gilbert Murray.” Metaphysical nuances were of no interest to the first Stoic. Zeno rather put his emphasis on ethics, and his main preoccupation was virtue. “In the life of an individual, virtue is the sole good; such things as health or happiness, or possessions are of no account. Since virtue resides in the will, everything really good or bad in a man’s life depends only upon himself. He may become poor,-- but what of it? He can still be virtuous! Or a tyrant may put him in prison, but he can still persevere in living in harmony with Nature. He may even be sentenced to death, but he can die nobly, like Socrates. Other men have power only over externals; virtue is entirely with the individual. Therefore, every man has perfect freedom, provided he is emancipated from all mundane desires. It is only through false judgments that such desires prevail; the sage, whose judgment is true, is master of his fate in all that he values, since no outside force can deprive him of virtue.”

Love to the Stoic is not an emotion, but a principle. It is not surprising, on the sum total, that the Christian world loved the Stoics. Even the basically pagan definition of God (Zeno defined God as the fiery mind of the world, seeing Him as a bodily substance, with the whole Universe forming His substance) gets an easy pass from the Church Fathers. Tertullian famously said that, according to Zeno, God runs through matter, like honey runs through the honeycomb.

As to the origins of Zeno’s Stoicism, it is generally assumed that he took his cue from Diogenes’ Cynicism and was himself a Cynic in his younger age, until he essentially reworked that doctrine, getting rid of some unpalatable and perhaps unreasonable elements, until it would become consistent with reason and common sense.

My personal attitude towards Stoicism is that it is indeed a very reasonable, and even useful doctrine, but it can only be suitable for certain types of character, which, for better or for worse, I do not happen to belong to. It is entirely unemotional, in fact, it is inimical to all emotion, and in my book this makes it both inhuman and inhumane, as it leads to selfishness, and a complete loss of interest in human affairs. What is the virtue of such a life, I wonder? But that is me again. Judge not others, so that you shall not be judged by them, in turn. For, if they start enumerating to me the horrific downside of unselfishness, and compassion, and such, I shall have nothing to say, either in their defense, or in mine.