Thursday, June 19, 2014

THE GREATEST OBJECT OF THOUGHT


St. Anselm (1033-1109) was a French cleric who eventually became the Archbishop of Canterbury, was exiled, but returned to his post two years before his death. The fact that he was canonized indicates that his views are considered acceptable by the Catholic Church, and although he is known as a philosopher and a Doctor of the Church, and all his biographers stress his originality as a thinker, his philosophy is generally of little interest, even at its most original, where he is basically building a bridge between Augustine and Aquinas. But one aspect of it is of such importance that, by virtue of it alone, he requires a separate entry here. This aspect is his historically famous ontological argument for the existence of God, expounded in his treatise The Proslogion (1078). Although this is a rather lengthy exercise, I see nothing better than letting Anselm present it now in his own words:

“Be it mine to look up to thy light, even from afar, even from the depths. Teach me to seek thee, and reveal thyself to me, when I seek thee,--- for I cannot seek thee, except thou teach me, nor find thee, except thou reveal thyself. Let me seek thee in longing. Let me long for thee in seeking. Let me find thee in love, and love thee in finding. Lord, I acknowledge and I thank thee that thou hast created me in this thine image in order that I may be mindful of thee, conceive of thee, and love thee; but that image has been so consumed and wasted away by vices and obscured by the smoke of wrong-doing that it cannot achieve that for which it was made except thou renew it and create it anew. I do not endeavor, O Lord, to penetrate thy sublimity for in no wise do I compare my understanding with that; but I long to understand in some degree thy truth which my heart believes and loves. For, I do not seek to understand so that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand. For this also I understand, that unless I believed, I should not understand.
And so, Lord, do thou who giveth understanding to faith, give me so far as thou knowest it to be profitable to understand that thou art as we believe, and that thou art that which we believe. And, indeed, we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God? (Psalms 14:1). But at any rate this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak-- a being than which nothing greater can be conceived-- understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist. For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another thing to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it.
Hence even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in understanding. And, assuredly, that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.
Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone, the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived is one than which nothing greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence there can be no doubt that there exists a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.
And it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is then so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist that it can’t be conceived not to exist, and this being thou art, O Lord, our God…
I thank thee, gracious Lord, because what I formerly believed by thy bounty, I now so understand by thine illumination, that if I were unwilling to believe that thou dost exist, I should not be able to understand this to be true.

…This long and tedious passage is, however, exceptionally interesting, both because it presents us with the famous ontological argument from the horse’s mouth, and as it offers an in-depth glance into the mind of a Christian theologian of the first magnitude, half-way between the Augustinian theology and medieval scholasticism. It must be said that the argument itself was rejected by the theologians of his time, as much as later by Thomas Aquinas, and later still by a long list of theologians, all of whom were only too happy to follow St. Thomas’ line. But the fate of this argument was much kinder among the philosophers, who, apparently, admire people who speak nonsense with logical consistency, like it was with Zeno Eleaticus and with quite a few others. Dèscartes was in essentially the same vein as St. Anselm, with his own ontological cogito ergo sum. Leibniz tried to improve it with the possibility clause. Kant gave it legitimacy by venturing to refute it once and for all, in which he did not succeed, as the argument reappeared very much alive in Hegel, and later in F. H. Bradley’s dictum What may be and must be, is. (Quoted from Russell.)

My personal attitude towards all attempts to prove faith by reason has been expressed on a number of such occasions, and in general. Needless to say, I have no sympathy for St. Anselm’s ontological argument, but nor do I want to ignore it altogether. In fact, the argument itself is a seminal event in the history of philosophy (to a much greater extent than in the context of theology), and, as such, it demands our serious and focused attention, which, I hope, I have amply given it in this entry.

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