A GREATER PERFECTION TO KNOW THAN TO DOUBT

Perhaps the greatest philosophical achievement of Dèscartes, and his most valuable philosophical legacy to humanity is his doubt. It is explicitly presented as his first methodological precept in the previous entry, and its full force can be felt in the following two excerpts from his Discours de la Méthode, Book I:

“From my childhood, I have been familiar with letters; and, as I was given to believe that with their help a clear and certain knowledge of all which is useful in life might be acquired, I ardently desired instruction. But as soon as I had finished the full course of study, at the close of which it is customary to be admitted into the order of the learned, I completely changed my opinion. For, I found myself involved in so many doubts and errors, that I was convinced I had advanced no farther in all my attempts at learning, than the discovery at every turn of my own ignorance. Yet, I was studying in one of the most celebrated Schools in Europe, where I thought there must be learned men, if such were anywhere to be found. I had been taught all that others learned there; and not content with the sciences actually taught us, I had, in addition, read all the books that had fallen into my hands… I was thus led to take the liberty… of concluding that there was no science in existence that was of such a nature as I had previously been given to believe.”

“…Of Philosophy I will say nothing, except that when I saw that it had been cultivated, for many ages, by the most distinguished men, and that, yet, there is not a single matter within its sphere, which is not still in dispute, and nothing, therefore, that is above doubt, I did not presume to anticipate that my success would be greater in it than that of others; and furthermore, when I considered the number of conflicting opinions touching a single matter that may be upheld by learned men, while there can be only one true, I reckoned as well-nigh false all that was only probable.”

Meantime, he honestly confesses that perpetual doubt is hardly the greatest perfection for the philosopher:

“I clearly saw that it was a greater perfection to know than to doubt. As I observed that this truth,-- Cogito ergo sum,-- was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt could be alleged, I concluded that I might accept it as the first principle of the Philosophy of which I was in search. And as I saw that in the words Cogito ergo sum there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this, that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist, I concluded that I might take as a general rule the principle that all the things which we clearly and distinctly conceive are true, only observing, however, that there is some difficulty in rightly determining the objects that we distinctly conceive. But if we did not know that all which we possess of real and true proceeds from a Perfect and Infinite Being (God), however clear and distinct our ideas might be, we should have no ground on that account for the assurance that they possessed the perfection of being true. But after the knowledge of God and of the soul has rendered us certain of this rule, we can easily understand that the truth of the thoughts we experience when awake must not be called in question on account of the illusions of our dreams. For, if it happened that an individual, even when asleep, had some very distinct idea, as if a geometer should discover some new demonstration, the circumstances of his being asleep would not militate against its truth. But whether awake or asleep, we must never allow ourselves to be persuaded of the truth of anything, unless on the evidence of our Reason. And it must be noted that I say: of our Reason; and not of our imagination, or of our senses.”

Ironically, he is just as helpless here as in his painfully unfulfilled quest after the Creation Formula, except that there, he realized his failure, whereas here, in the false certainty of Cogito, ergo sum, he lulls himself into a sense of discovery, which, on close scrutiny, turns out to be nothing but an illusion.

The only suitable key to a conditional acceptance of his thinking here, however, is not to see him trying to prove anything at all, but in making the argument that his hypothesis must have a certain merit, and it can be sustained not as a proof of anything, but as a hypothesis only. This distinction is subtle, but critical! As to what Dèscartes must have had in mind as an absolute certainty and what must indeed hold as true against even the worst type of cynicism is what his words explicitly tell, and why his sentence ought to be accepted fully and unconditionally: Clearly, it is a greater perfection to know than to doubt! There can be no doubt about that!