Friday, January 31, 2014

HERACLITUS THE ASCETIC MYSTIC AND MISANTHROPE


In his most interesting essay on Heraclitus, Bertrand Russell inadvertently clarifies why this particular pre-Socratic is so dear to Nietzsche’s heart. On the one hand, Heraclitus was a peculiar mystic, which in itself establishes him as an excellent philosopher, in Nietzsche’s eyes. On the other hand, his ethic, according to Russell, is a kind of proud asceticism, very similar to Nietzsche’s. Having set this up as a nice preamble for our next entry’s discussion of Nietzsche’s opinion of Heraclitus, we shall remain with Bertrand Russell for the rest of this entry.

Russell thinks that Heraclitus was not a nice man, and he comes to this opinion on the basis of the Greek’s extant fragments only. He is much too much addicted to contempt, for Russell’s liking, and is the reverse of a democrat. Being a native of Ephesus, he speaks not very nicely of his compatriots, even if they deserve it: Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown person of them, and leave the city to beardless lads; for they have cast out Hermodorus, the best person among them, saying, “We will have none who is best among us; if there be any such, let him be so elsewhere and among others.” Had this been an isolated instance of his contempt, this could have passed as a flash of angry sarcasm, but, as Russell points out, he speaks ill of all his eminent predecessors, be that Homer or Hesiod or Pythagoras or Xenophanes, etc. The only exception is Bias (this is not a joke!), mistakenly identified by Russell as Teutamas from the following Fragment 112: In Priene lived Bias, son of Teutamas who is of more account than the rest. (He said, Most people are bad.) With a delightfully understated humor, Russell explains Heraclitus’ praise of Bias by the latter’s opinion of humanity. At any rate, Bias would have appreciated Heraclitus view that only force will compel people to act for their own good: Every beast is driven to the pasture with blows. No wonder, then, Russell says, that Heraclitus believes in war: War is the father of all and the king of all, we must know that war is common to all, and that strife is justice, and that all things come into being and pass away in strife.

Russell points out as well that Heraclitus’ attitude toward the religion of his time is hostile, “but not with the hostility of a scientific rationalist. He has his own religion, and in part interprets current theology to fit his doctrine, in part rejects it with considerable scorn.” This corresponds to my own earlier expressed view that Heraclitus does not attack religion as such, but only the polytheistic mythology and the anthropomorphic theology of his age, as opposed to his personal espousal of monotheism, where fire is more or less symbolic of the One Deity.

Heraclitus believes in perpetual change, Russell asserts, but “sometimes he speaks as if the unity were more fundamental than the diversity… But, nevertheless, there would be no unity if there were no opposites to be combined: It is the opposite, which is good for us. In this peculiar doctrine, Russell sensibly finds the germ of Hegel’s dialectics. Not surprisingly, of course, Heraclitus is often called the father of dialectics.

Russell’s essay ends with a return to the question of permanence and change, which he calls painful:

The doctrine of the perpetual flux, as taught by Heraclitus, is painful, and science can do nothing to refute it. One of the main ambitions of philosophers has been to revive hopes (of permanence) that science seems to have killed. Philosophers, accordingly, have sought, with great persistence, for something not subject to the empire of Time. This search begins with Parmenides.

Parmenides is of course another story, to follow this one later. But on the question of permanence, Russell, happily, does not deny it to Heraclitus completely, rightfully referring to the already quoted Fragment 20: Heraclitus himself, for all his belief in change, allowed something everlasting. The conception of eternity, as opposed to endless duration, which comes from Parmenides, is not to be found in Heraclitus, but in his philosophy the central fire never dies: the world was ever, is now, and ever shall be, an ever-living Fire.

Having come to the end of our discussion of Russell’s Heraclitean essay, we have seen that Russell treats his philosophy with seriousness that it deserves, but his opinion of Heraclitus the man is not good at all. It is therefore extremely intriguing now to find out what exactly attracts Nietzsche to this scornful man, why he exhibits so much warmth toward this cold misanthrope, whose nickname the weeping philosopher puts it all too mildly. So, welcome to the next entry, and to Nietzsche’s royally secluded, all-sufficing Heraclitus.

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