PLATO’S PROBLEM

In the last entry, I brought attention to the linguistic aspect of Plato’s theory of knowledge and perception, promising to devote a separate entry to what Noam Chomsky calls ‘Plato’s problem.’ In his 1988 Lectures on Language and Problems of Knowledge, he begins by posing four central questions arising in the study of language-- 1. What do we know when we are able to speak and understand a language?-- 2. How is this language acquired?-- 3. How do we use this knowledge?-- 4. What are the physical mechanisms, involved in the representation, acquisition, and use of this knowledge?

Of these four questions, discussed in some detail in my entry Language And Problems Of Knowledge, in the Philosophy section, only the question #2 is specifically addressing the so-called Plato’s problem. Leaving it together with the rest of the four such questions with the said entry, I shall here outline the problem proper, and only in  so far as it relates to Plato and his theory of knowledge and perception.

In summary (taken from Chomsky’s authorized website), Plato’s Problem is the term given by Chomsky to the gap between knowledge and experience. It presents the question of how we account for our knowledge, when environmental conditions seem to be an insufficient source of information. It is used in linguistics to refer to the “argument from poverty of the stimulus” (APS). In a more general sense, Plato’s Problem refers to the problem of explaining a lack of input. Solving Plato’s Problem involves explaining the gap between what one “knows” and the apparent lack of substantive input from one’s experience (the environment). Plato’s Problem is most clearly illustrated in the Meno Dialogue where Socrates shows that an uneducated boy still understands geometric principles.

The dialogue begins with Meno asking Socrates whether virtue can be taught. Socrates responds by stating that he doesn’t know the definition of virtue. Meno replies by stating the characteristics of a virtuous man, to which Socrates responds that these characteristics may be the by-products of virtuousness, but they by no means define virtue. Meno is obliged to agree; to wit, he tries to modify his explanation of virtue. Socrates counters each attempt by pointing to inconsistencies and circular arguments.

Meno seems to commit two fallacies when trying to define virtue. He either defines it using some form of the word itself, or he defines it using other words, which are themselves in need of definitions. Eventually, Meno is led to confess his shortcomings, as he tries to define the enigmatic term. Socrates claims that the definition of virtue must consist of common terms and concepts that are clearly understood by those in the discussion.

The key point in the dialogue arrives when Socrates tells Meno that there is no such thing as teaching, but only a recollection of knowledge from past lives, or anamnesis. Socrates can demonstrate this by showing that one of Meno’s servants, a slave boy, knows geometric principles, although he is uneducated. Socrates states that he will teach the boy nothing, only ask him questions to assist the process of recollection. He is asking the boy a series of questions about the size and length of lines and squares, using visual diagrams to aid the boy in understanding the questions. The culmination of this part of the dialogue is that, though the boy has never been taught any geometry, he knows the Pythagorean Theorem. How does the servant know it without having ever been taught? The suggestion is essentially, that people have innate knowledge. This is derived from Socrates’ belief that one’s soul has existed in past lives, and knowledge is transferred from those lives to the current one. These were revealed in a former state of existence and are recovered by the reminiscence (anamnesis) or association from sensible things. The claim is therefore that one does not need to know what knowledge is before gaining knowledge, but, rather, one has a wealth of knowledge before ever gaining any experience.

…Kant obviously knew what he was talking about when he insisted on the existence of a priori knowledge. He had read Plato!